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The AEGIS Cruiser Air-Defense Simulation is a program that models the 
operations of a Combat Information Center (CIC) team performing the ADC duties in a 
battle group using Multi-Agent System (MAS) technology implemented in the Java 
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reconstruction of interesting events (i.e. watchstander mistakes, chain-of-error analysis) 
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A. THE AEGIS CRUISER BATTLE GROUP AIR-DEFENSE SIMULATION 
The Air-Defense Commander (ADC) Simulation is a top-view, dynamic, Java 
language-based, graphics-driven software implementation of an AEGIS Cruiser Combat 
Information Center (CIC) team performing the Battle Group Air-Defense Commander 
duties in the Arabian Gulf region.  Designed using multi-agent systems technology, it is a 
fully interactive and customizable program that allows the user to configure a wide 
variety of the simulation parameters to create unique and realistic air-defense scenarios.  
The program simulates the mental processes, decision-making aspects, cognitive 
attributes, and communications of an eleven-member CIC air-defense team performing 
their duties under stressful conditions caused by the requirement to maintain an overall 
situational awareness of the battle group’s airspace.  Below, in Figure 1, is displayed the 
graphical user interface (GUI) of the ADC Simulation. 
 
 
Figure 1.   ADC Simulation Interface. 
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The ADC Simulation was designed to assist in gaining insight and understanding on the 
effects on a CIC team or watchstander of variation in the following variables: 
• Watchstander skill levels 
• Watchstander experience levels 
• Watchstander decision-maker types 
• Watchstander fatigue levels 
• Combat systems equipment readiness level 
• Aircraft density  (number of aircraft) 
• Aircraft types (hostile, unknown, friendly) 
• Scenario threat level 
• Weather conditions 
• AEGIS and air-defense commander battle doctrines 
The ADC Simulation gives the users the capability to design and run scenarios that 
generate realistic problems a CIC team could encounter.  The GUI allows them to then 
watch as these scenarios unfold and observe the performance of the simulated CIC team 
based on the user-specified configuration.  Additionally, the user can modify any of the 
scenario attributes “on-the-fly” to explore different potential outcomes.  Lastly, all of the 
events in the scenario are logged for each watchstander and combat systems equipment, 
which allows for the reconstruction of particular events of interest (i.e. watchstander 
mistakes, misidentification of aircraft chain-of-error analysis, etc.).  The simulation also 
includes a capability to review the performance metrics of each watchstander (number of 
errors, average time to complete tasks) to ascertain the degree to which modifying 
various attributes influences the simulated watchstander’s performance. 
B. SCOPE OF THE CRUISER AIR-DEFENSE SIMULATION PROJECT 
1. ADC Simulation Project Thesis 
The first phase of this project was an extensive review and analysis of formal 
scientific literature (reports, papers, books, etc.) and research on the subject of battle 
group air defense, decision-making under stress, cognitive factors in decision-making, 
air-defense simulations, other air-defense-related projects, and multi-agent systems.  The 
second phase involved the conduct of in-depth, detailed interviews with air-defense 
training experts from the AEGIS Training and Readiness Center (ATRC), San Diego 
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Detachment, to gather direct data from experienced personnel.  The third phase dealt with 
the design and development of the actual ADC Simulation.  The next phase involved a 
comprehensive testing of the simulation using parametric analysis, and the recording of 
the results.  The final phase used the results of the simulation to produce an ADC 
Simulation Realism Survey that was taken by the ATRC air-defense experts to assess the 
level of accuracy of the simulation compared to their professional experiences. 
2. Interviews with Air-Defense Experts 
The interviews with the air-defense experts at the ATRC detachment in San Diego 
focused on the various attributes of the watchstanders with the objective of trying to 
determine the relationships between these attributes and the performance of the CIC 
team, both collectively and individually.  The specific attributes discussed during these 
interviews were skill levels, experience levels, fatigue levels, and decision-maker types.  
A considerable portion of the attribute discussions revolved around the debate of 
differentiating skill from experience in watchstander performance (which will be further 
discussed in Chapter IV as part of the design of watchstanders in the simulation).  These 
topics were further analyzed to determine varying levels of performance for each of the 
attributes  (i.e., Basic, Experienced, and Expert Skill Levels) and a set of skill types were 
assigned for each watchstander.  To complement the skill types, estimates for probability 
of success in the conduct of tasks associated with each watchstander’s skills were 
formulated and maximum task times (based on the air-defense experts’ experiences) were 
assigned. 
3. ADC Simulation Design 
Utilizing the research gathered from the interviews and the formal scientific 
literature research, the ADC Simulation was developed within multi-agent system 
architecture.  The simulation is classified with the following characteristics: 
• Dynamic – The model represents a system as it changes over time. 
• Stochastic – The model contains one or more random variables that 
influence the events in the simulation. 
• Continuous-State Model – The state variables are continuous. 
• Continuous-Time Model – The system state is defined at all times. 
• Exogenous – The model describes activities and events in the environment 
that affect the system. 
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• Stable – Dynamic behavior of the model is independent of time. 
• Closed model – All input is generated internal to the model. 
The ADC Simulation was designed with the following features: 
• Graphical User Interface - Displays the aircraft contacts in the battle 
group’s operational air space with the capability to interact with them to 
determine the CIC team’s assessment of their classification. 
• Implements the following watchstanders: 
• Force Tactical Action Officer (F-TAO) 
• Force Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (F-AAWC) 
• Ship Tactical Action Officer (S-TAO) 
• Ship Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (S-AAWC) 
• Radar Systems Controller (RSC) 
• Electronic Warfare Control Officer (EWCO) 
• Identification Supervisor (IDS) 
• Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC) 
• Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC) 
• Missile Systems Supervisor (MSS) 
• Red Crown Watchstander (RC) 
• Implements for each watchstander the following attributes: 
• Skill Types (various) 
• Experience Level 
• Fatigue Level 
• Decision-maker Type (F-TAO, F-AAWC, S-TAO, S-AAWC) 
• Stimulates the following combat systems equipment: 
• SPY-1B Radar System 
• SLQ-32 Electronic Signal Detection System 
• Link 11 (TADIL A) / Link 16 (TADIL J) System 
• Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) System 
• External Communications System 
• Vertical Launching System (VLS) – Surface-to-Air Missiles 
• Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) 
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• Implements the following external environment attributes: 
• Scenario Weather Options 
• Scenario Threat Level Options 
• Scenario Contact Density (Numbers) Options 
• Scenario Hostile Contact Level (Numbers) Options 
• Implements an option to activate AEGIS doctrine (Auto-special). 
• Implements the following log/data recording features: 
• Overall Scenario Events Log (Major Events) 
• Decision History Log for each Watchstander 
• Readiness Log for each Combat Systems Equipment 
• Performance Metric Log for each Watchstander 
4. Testing and Analysis of ADC Simulation and Conduct of Reality 
Survey 
The final phase of the ADC Simulation Project consisted of the comprehensive 
testing and analysis of the ADC Simulation followed by the assessment of the level of 
reality of the simulation via a survey given to the air-defense experts at the ATRC 
Detachment in San Diego.  As part of testing of the simulation, the following questions 
were postulated and parametric analysis performed to gather data (the number of errors, 
the averaged times to complete tasks): 
• For the RSC watchstander, what is the effect of varying the skill, 
experience, fatigue, and SPY-1B radar equipment readiness levels (singly) 
on individual watchstander and CIC team performance? 
• For the EWCO watchstander, what is the effect of varying the skill, 
experience, fatigue, and SLQ-32 system equipment readiness levels 
(singly) on individual watchstander and CIC team performance? 
• For the F-TAO watchstander, what is the effect of varying the skill, 
experience, and fatigue levels and decision-maker types (singly) on 
individual watchstander and CIC team performance? 
• For the CIC team watchstander, what is the difference in performance 
between a CIC team led by an expert but exhausted F-TAO and consisting 
of a basic/newly qualified but fully rested CIC team opposite a 
basic/newly qualified but fully rested F-TAO leading an expert but 
exhausted CIC team? 
• What is the effect of varying the weather attributes on the CIC team 
performance? 
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Once this data was collected and analyzed, an ADC Simulation Realism survey 
was created which used the results of the testing to develop scenarios for the questions.  
The questions in the survey were designed to elicit responses from the air-defense experts 
on the level of realism if the simulation based on their professional experiences. 
C. RELEVANCE OF THE ADC SIMULATION IN TRAINING FOR THE 
COMPLEX AND CHALLENGING TASK OF AIR-DEFENSE 
OPERATIONS IN THE MODERN ERA 
1. Situation of Concern 
Air Warfare is the most rapid, intense, and devastating type of warfare that the 
U.S. Navy currently trains for, and battle group operations are primarily focused on 
gaining proficiency in this mission area.  Due to the fast pace uncertain, and dangerous 
aspects of air warfare, the battle group commander’s Air-Defense Team (the AEGIS 
cruiser CIC Team) must be trained extensively in the fundamental tenets of these 
operations in order to effectively protect the aircraft carrier, high-value units, and other 
naval ships in the vicinity.  With the immense range of duties and responsibilities, there 
are multitudes of individual watchstation-specific and collective skill sets that must be 
mastered in order to effectively perform the ADC duties.   
2.   Current Training Needs and the ADC Simulation 
a. Current Situation 
The waterfront training teams (AEGIS Training and Readiness Center 
(ATRC detachments) are charged by the fleet type commanders with providing the Air-
Defense Commander (ADC) training to the cruisers, and the quality of the training they 
provide is typically outstanding.  However, the ADC operations are considerably 
complex, and the waterfront training teams are limited by the available training time as 
well as the scope of the training attempted.  Furthermore, interactions (watchstander to 
watchstander, ship to ship, ship to aircraft, watchstander to equipment, etc.) that are part 
of daily operations are numerous and potential ADC team performance deficiencies may 
not be noticed during the limited training periods.   
b. The Need for New Systems to Assist Training Teams 
The limitations of human comprehension of ADC operations due to the 
countless interactions places a barrier on the level, type, and quality of training that can 
be accomplished.  Because there are many different variables to account for in these 
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operations, the training teams and ships must only rely on their collective past 
experiences for producing effective training.  This limits the potential gain of the training 
since the training teams and ships must formulate ADC scenarios for the future based on 
experiences from the past because it is simply too much for humans to analyze all of the 
variables involved.  This begs the question, how can the Navy design training that 
integrate smoothly with the current (and expected future) CIC team proficiency levels 
(skills, experience, equipment setup, etc.) to support and improve the training 
requirements for the ships and waterfront training commands?  This training would need 
to use the valuable experience of the ships and training commands to create scenarios, 
which accurately simulate the enormous complexities inherent in ADC operations.  To 
surpass this limitation, both groups require a system that will enable them to build 
scenarios, based on the current skill and training levels of the ADC team as well as the 
environment they will face, to assist them in training towards more realistic threats. 
c. A Potential Solution 
The ADC simulation could provide a solution to the problems discussed 
above.  After an initial assessment of the training, experience, and equipment readiness 
levels of a specific ship, the initial settings for the ADC team and environment can be 
inputted into the system.  Upon completion of the setup, the program will allow the 
training teams (as well as the ships) to create simulations based upon the ship’s potential 
operational scenarios in order to discover the performance deficiencies.  The training 
teams and ships would use the results from the simulation to provide more focused 
training on the areas where deficiencies were noted.  The ADC Simulation could also be 
useful to battle group staffs to assist in the planning and development of battle group air-
defense tactics and operations.  Also, the program can be employed to validate the 
usefulness of future scenarios intended for use in the training of the ships.  For the 
doctrine-formulation commands, this simulation will give them the opportunity to 
evaluate the validity of theoretical changes to ADC and AEGIS doctrine before 
implementing them in the fleet. 
D. BRIEF HISTORY OF NAVAL AND BATTLE GROUP AIR DEFENSE 
Modern battle group air defense is the collective effort by the naval warships and 
carrier air wing to protect, first, the aircraft carrier and other high value units such as 
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amphibious and supply ships and second, the fleet’s warships from attack, disablement, 
and/or destruction by hostile air, naval, and shore forces.  Essentially, the primary focus 
of battle group air defense is the preservation of its assets to ensure the ability to project 
military power ashore in support of the United States’ strategic objectives.  It is primarily 
an intensive search, detection, and classification process to accurately determine and 
maintain positive identification al all aircraft and surface vessels within the battle group’s 
operational area. 
The topic and problem of naval and battle group air defense was thrust upon the 
United States Navy in the early 1920s when General Billy Mitchell demonstrated the 
vulnerability of naval vessels to air power by sinking a battleship with bombs launched 
from his aircraft, radically altering the vision and conduct of warfare at sea.  As World 
War II would prove, the aircraft carrier, not the battleship, was the primary means by 
which nations (the United States foremost among them) would project military power 
onto foreign shores.  The aircraft carriers became the centerpiece of the United States’ 
strategy to drive back the Imperial Japanese Fleet, recapture its lost possessions, and 
capture victory.  Recognizing the threat of the aircraft carrier, the Japanese quickly 
refocused their attacks from the battleships to the carriers forcing a similar realignment in 
the thinking of the United States Navy.  Additionally, the technology of radar became a 
widely used and effective tool to organize the protection of the battle group.  The massive 
surface fleets of the Navy were now assigned another new primary task:  Defend the 
aircraft carrier.   
Early naval air defenses relied upon massive, uncoordinated fire from anti-
aircraft artillery such as 20mm, 40mm, three-inch, and five-inch 
guns…Air defense was made up of a series of local anti-air battles fought 
close aboard, strictly in self defense.1 
Towards the end of the war, the danger of the kamikazes led to another 
reorganization and innovation in battle group air defense known as defense-in-depth.   
Tactics evolved quickly, including tightly grouped defensive ship 
formations and picket ships for early warning.  Although primitive by 
                                                 
1 Maiorano, Alan G., et al., “A Primer on Naval Theater Air Defense,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 
1996, p. 23. 
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current standards, the concept of effective, coordinated defense-in-depth 
took shape.2 
Following World War II, the 1950s and 1960s ushered rapid advances in 
offensive military technology, which required similar changes in tactics and tactics in 
defensive tactics to protect the battle group.  Foremost among these advances were the 
introduction of jet power and unmanned missiles, especially, anti-ship missiles. 
The advent of unmanned missiles and long-range Soviet bombers led the 
Navy to develop defensive weapons and enhance ship-to-ship 
coordination…In the 1950s, the Navy began deploying three guided SAM 
variants known as 3-T missiles:  long-range Talos, medium-range Terrier, 
and short-range Tartar.  Simultaneously, a large-scale program to convert 
previously non-missile ships to missile shooters was initiated with vessels 
capable of firing one of these missiles.3 
However, the continual advances (speed, maneuverability, and accuracy) in 
offensive anti-ship missile technologies reached a point where, despite the capability of 
the defensive missiles to intercept, the human watchstander became the weak point in the 
overall air-defense system.  The watchstanders were unable to communicate, coordinate, 
and react quickly enough to defend against the most advanced and deadly of missile 
technologies. 
Faster and more reliable means of surveillance and identification data 
exchange were required.  The Navy tactical data system (NTDS) was 
introduced in 1958, the world’s first shipboard tactical data system based 
on programmable computers.  This was an initial step in the integration of 
multi-ship systems in a force-wide air-defense system.4 
Advances in the capabilities of NTDS would allow for quicker and more accurate 
transmission of critical air-defense data for battle group air defense.  Eventually, airborne 
early warning aircraft such as the E-2A Hawkeye (which is still in use as the upgraded E-
2C variant) were deployed to increase the surveillance range of the battle group.  By the 
early 1980s, the long-term AEGIS project reached fruition and the first cruisers carrying 
the powerful SPY-1 phased array radar, which was integrated into a potent command and 
control system, was introduced into the fleet.  “Introduced operationally in 1983, the 
                                                 
2 Maiorano, p. 23. 
3 Maiorano, p. 24. 
4 Mairoano, p. 25. 
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heart of the AEGIS weapon system is the SPY-1 phased array radar, which provides 
automatic detection and fire control quality tracking for hundreds of targets 
simultaneously.”5  The AEGIS cruisers (Ticonderoga class) followed by the AEGIS 
destroyers (Arleigh Burke class) tremendously improved the Navy’s capability to 
perform battle group air defense and countered a multitude of previously dangerous anti-
ship missile threats.  Since the AEGIS fleet’s arrival, the last twenty years have been 
marked by the steady advance/counter-advance of offensive versus defensive weapons.  
The offensive strides in technology were characterized by greater increases in speed and 
lethality of anti-ship missiles.  Similar measures were achieved in defensive missile 
systems, but one of the significant advances in overall battle group air defense occurred 
with the development of Link 11 followed by its more effective follow-on Link 16.  
These battle group data exchange systems (descended from the original NTDS) markedly 
increased the capability of the battle group units to effectively coordinate their detection 
information and actions. 
Battle Group Air Defense has continued to be a primary mission for the United 
States Navy.  In the late 1980s, two incidents highlighted the need for the research into 
two fields of study to enhance naval performance, the psychology of decision-making 
under stress and human factors design.  The first incident involved the USS Stark, which 
was attacked by two Exocet anti-ship missiles and was nearly sunk.  The second incident 
occurred in 1988 and involved the USS Vincennes, which mistakenly shot down a civilian 
Iranian airliner during a surface battle with Iranian naval forces.  Caused by several 
factors involving CIC communications among watchstanders and exacerbated by CIC 
systems produced with poor human-computer interactive design, the Vincennes believed 
it was involved in a coordinated hostile air-sea battle and reacted accordingly.  Both 
incidents caused the United States Navy to reassess the importance of the human being in 
the entire air-defense process, a topic that had previously been relegated to a lower 
priority to that of technological advances.  Some of the most prominent research studies 
and projects that resulted from these incidents are discussed in Chapter II, and the overall 
thrust of these documents assert that the watchstander should always be at the forefront of 
                                                 
5 Mairoano, p. 26. 
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the understanding of the performance of battle group air-defense operations.  The ADC 
Simulation was developed with this premise in mind. 
E. WATCHSTANDER ORGANIZATION OF A CRUISER COMBAT 
INFORMATION CENTER 
1. Overview of a CIC Organization 
Onboard naval ships, the Combat Information Center (CIC) is the nexus of all of 
the ship’s tactical operations, and it is from this location that the commanding officer and 
watch teams coordinate these activities.  Often several different warfare operations are 
being conducted simultaneously from the CIC including Air Warfare (which Battle 
Group Air Defense is a part of), Surface Warfare, Undersea Warfare, and Strike Warfare.  
Information is channeled into the CIC for review, analysis, and assessment by the 
appropriate warfare teams and, following the decisions by the commanding officer or 
Tactical Action Officer; the CIC team, performs the required actions.  Displayed below 
(Figure 2) is the organizational diagram of the CIC air-defense team implemented in the 
ADC Simulation.  Dashed lines indicate indirect leadership control of the watch team 
members under the specified watchstander. 
 
 
Figure 2.   CIC Air-Defense Organization. 
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 The CIC contains a comprehensive assortment of equipment and combat systems 
to support the watch team foremost among them tactical systems consoles.  These 
consoles have a wide variety of uses such as activating weapon systems (launching 
missiles, firing guns), configuring sensory systems (radar, IFF systems), displaying 
contact tracks (aircraft, ships, submarines, etc.), modifying/displaying this track 
information, and communicating externally with other ships and aircraft.  Additionally, 
an internal communications system allows the watchstanders to communication with each 
other. 
2. Brief Description of the CIC Air-Defense Watchstanders 
a. Force Tactical Action Officer (F-TAO) 
The Force Tactical Action Officer is in overall control of the air-defense 
operations for the battle group and is responsible for most of the major decisions.  
Decisions made at lower levels can be overridden by the F-TAO, if deemed necessary.  
Most importantly, the F-TAO makes the final decisions on contact classifications as well 
as weapon batteries release for ship and aircraft missile engagements.  The F-TAO and F-
AAWC work very closely to coordinate the air-defense operations of the battle group. 
b. Force Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (F-AAWC) 
The Force Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator directly runs the air-defense 
identification process within the battle group’s surveillance airspace picture and is 
responsible to the F-TAO for the performance of this process.  The F-AAWC coordinates 
the movement and assignment of friendly aircraft via the external communication circuit 
to other ships and the Red Crown watchstation.  The F-AAWC can order repositioning of 
aircraft and orders for visual intercept/identification of unknown aircraft, but requires the 
authorization of the F-TAO to order an engagement of an aircraft with weapon systems.  
Additionally, the F-AAWC via the F-TAO is responsible for the ordering of weapons 
employment to battle group air-defense ships.   
c. Ship Tactical Action Officer (S-TAO)  
The Ship Tactical Action Officer leads the CIC watch team for the ship 
and is responsible for most of the major decisions made during air-defense operations for 
the S-TAO’s ship only.  The Ship TAO is responsible for the defense of his or her ship 
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and is authorized to employ weapon systems in its defense, if a perceived threat of danger 
from attack is imminent.  On ships not assigned performing the ADC duties, the S-TAO 
is charge of the CIC watch team and works for the F-TAO on the ADC ship. 
d.  Ship Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator  (S-AAWC) 
The Ship Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator directs the aircraft detection and 
classification process within the ship’s airspace and is responsible to the Ship TAO for 
the performance of the team ID process.  Although subordinate to the Ship TAO, the S-
AAWC receives a substantial amount of air-defense tasking from the F-AAWC, who is 
coordinating the overall battle group air-defense process.  Among other responsibilities, 
the S-AAWC controls the movement of friendly aircraft assigned to the ship and, upon 
proper authorization, employs the ship’s self-defense missile weapons system via the 
Missile Systems Supervisor.  On ships not assigned performing the ADC duties, the S-
AAWC directs the CIC team in the performance of the air-defense duties. 
e. Electronic Warfare Control Officer (EWCO) 
The Electronic Warfare Control Officer is responsible for the operation of 
the electronic emissions detection equipment, which is used to detect and classify various 
types of aircraft based on their radar signal emissions.  These radar signal emissions are 
one of the primary means by which the CIC air-defense team distinguishes friendly and 
neutral aircraft from potentially hostile/unfriendly aircraft.  Although working directly for 
the Ship TAO, on the air-defense commander cruiser, the Force TAO and Force AAWC 
also use this watchstander’s reports to assist them in their duties. 
f. Radar Systems Controller (RSC) 
The Radar Systems Controller operates the SPY-1A/B radar systems 
which are the primary means by which aircraft are detected and tracked by the ship.  
Often, radar detections are the first indications of the presence of an aircraft, and the 
initial kinematic data (course, speed, altitude, location) influence the initial assessment of 
the aircraft’s threat potential and priority for observation.  Although working directly for 
the Ship TAO, on the air-defense commander cruiser, the Force TAO and Force AAWC 




g. Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC)  
The Tactical Information Coordinator operates and maintains the Tactical 
Digital Information Link (TADIL) A/Link 11 and TADIL J/Link 16, which 
communicates tactical data among the friendly ships and aircraft in the battle group.  
These interlinks allow the friendly units to possess an expanded view of the battle 
group’s airspace, increasing overall tactical situation awareness.  On the ADC cruiser, the 
TIC has more demanding duties and is responsible for the coordination and control of the 
entire battle group’s Link 11/16 picture.  The quality of this picture is of significant 
importance to the primary air-defense decision-makers (Force TAO, Force AAWC). 
h. Identification Supervisor (IDS)  
The Identification Supervisor is primarily responsible for performing 
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system challenges on unknown aircraft and inputting 
the results of this information (and other relevant identification data) into the CIC track 
database (AEGIS Command and Display system) for viewing by other watchstanders.  
Additionally, when directed, the IDS will initiate query and/or warning procedures 
against specified contacts via the external communications system.  The results of these 
challenges assist the primary decision-makers in the classification of aircraft contacts. 
i. Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC) 
The Combat Systems Coordinator is in charge of the activation, 
monitoring, and deactivation of the primary and secondary combat systems that support 
the CIC.  Combat systems equipment degradations and failures are reported to the CSC 
for resolution and repair.  The CSC also is the primary lead for initiating troubleshooting 
procedures for certain combat systems equipment including the communication systems, 
Link 11/16 systems, and IFF systems.  Additionally, the CSC is directly responsible for 
the input, activation, and deactivation of AEGIS doctrine (weapons, IFF, and 
identification). 
j. Missile Systems Supervisor (MSS) 
The Missile Systems Supervisor is directly responsible for the 
employment (firing) of the ship’s surface-to-air missiles and the self-defense Close-In 
Weapon System (CIWS).  The MSS works directly for the Ship AAWC and receives 
authorizations to activate weapon systems from that watchstander. 
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k. Red Crown (RC) 
The Red Crown watchstander is responsible for checking friendly aircraft 
(both launching from and returning to the aircraft carrier) to verify their identity and 
mission assignment.  These duties require the Red Crown to validate IFF code 
assignments and communicate with the aircraft directly.  After being cleared by Red 
Crown, the aircraft are allowed to proceed on their assignment mission or continue their 
approach to the carrier. 
F. APPLICATION OF MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY IN THE 
ADC SIMULATION 
The ADC Simulation watchstanders were implemented using a multi-agent 
system (MAS) technology where each of them was designed as “agents.”  Within the 
context of this simulation, an agent is a component of software with the following 
characteristics: 
• It is capable of acting in an environment. 
• It can communicate directly with other agents. 
• It is driven by a set of tendencies (in the form of individual objectives or 
of a satisfaction/survival function which it tries to optimize). 
• It possesses resources of its own. 
• It is capable of perceiving its environment (but to a limited extent). 
• It has only a partial representation of this environment. 
• It possesses skills and can offer services. 
• Its behavior tends toward satisfying its objectives, taking account of the 
resources and skills available to it and depending on its perception, its 
representations and the communications it receives.6 
Essentially, the watchstander agents in the ADC Simulation contain intent and 
objectives (perform their assigned duties) communicate amongst each other to achieve 
their objectives, and possess resources (skill, experience, fatigue, and decision-maker 
type attributes as well as combat systems equipment).  They perceive their environment 
to a limited extent since each watchstander agent either receives this information via 
combat systems sensory equipment or through verbal communications (from other 
watchstander agents) or CIC watchstation information display systems.  The 
                                                 
6 Ferber, Jacques, Multi-Agent Systems:  An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence, 
Addison-Wesley, 1999, p. 11.  
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watchstander agents offer services to each other by disseminating information vital to 
their performance of the air-defense duties and operations of the CIC and influence 
within the environment (and other agents) through their actions (i.e. Force TAO 
classification of aircraft as Hostile).   
MAS technology is a blending of the cognitive/social sciences (psychology, 
ethology, sociology, philosophy), the natural sciences (ecology, biology), and the 
computer sciences since they simultaneously model, explain, and simulate natural 
phenomena (in this case human behavior in the ADC Simulation) and provide models for 
self-organization.7  Traditionally programming is often very mechanistic, hierarchical, 
and modular and, subsequently, does not lend itself well to simulating the often 
surprising (whether organized or chaotic) behavior of interactive human and 
environmental systems.  However, MAS technology is less restrictive in its design, which 
produces simulation behavior often more akin to that observed in the real world.  The 
term “multi-agent system” is applied to a system comprising the following elements: 
• An environment, E, that is, a space which generally has a volume. 
• A set of objects, O.  These objects are situated; that is to say, it is possible 
at any given moment to associate any object with a position in E.  These 
objects are passive, that is, they can be perceived, created, destroyed and 
modified by the agents. 
• An assembly of agents, A, which are specified objects (A ⊆ O) 
representing the active entities of the system. 
• An assembly of relations, R, which link objects (and thus agents) to each 
other. 
• An assembly of operations, Op, making it possible for the agents of A to 
perceive, produce, consume, transform and manipulate objects from O. 
• Operations with the task of representing the application of these operations 
and the reaction of the world to this attempt at modification.8 
In the ADC Simulation, the watchstander agents perform their duties within a 
layer of environments (Combat Information inside of the AEGIS cruiser within the battle 
group’s operational area) that contain a multitude of objects (aircraft contacts).  The 
watchstander agents have the capability to execute a set of operations to perceive the 
                                                 
7 Ferber, p. xv. 
8 Ferber, p. 11. 
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environment as well as the objects in it and communicate with each other.  Conversely, 
the objects within the ADC Simulation environment can also perform operations to 
perceive and interact with the AEGIS cruiser (and thus affecting the watchstander agents) 
and aircraft carrier.  These operations are governed by relationships that determine the 
scope and degree to which the operations can occur.  The diagram below (Figure 3) 
provides an overview of the implementation of MAS technology in the ADC Simulation. 
 
 
Figure 3.   ADC Simulation MAS Overview Diagram. 
 
The integration of the agents, and assembly of relations among the agents and 
objects, assembly of operations among the agents and objects into an environment within 
the ADC Simulation produces a highly dynamic and realistic model of a challenging and 
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II. RELATED WORK IN THE AREA OF NAVAL AIR-DEFENSE 
SIMULATION 
A. RELATED WORK INTRODUCTION 
During the research for the design and development of the ADC Simulation, 
extensive resources were discovered relating to the subject of air defense, human-
computer interaction, cognitive modeling, team training systems, naval simulation, and 
threat assessment.  It was noted that the most numerous research into the topic of air 
defense was often sanctioned or supported by the United States Navy or other affiliated 
organizations and a sharp increase in such research, notably in the areas of decision-
making under stressful conditions and air-threat assessment, occurred starting in the late 
1980s.  From reviewing the research, we determined that the likely cause of this surge 
was due to the USS Vincennes incident, which sparked an effort by the Navy to 
understand the underlying factors (mental, physical, and informational) affecting the 
crew’s performance during the shoot-down of the Iranian commercial airliner.  Some of 
this research resulted in follow-on projects by the Navy to develop better Combat 
Information Center (CIC) consoles for the watchstanders to improve performance.  Other 
related work originated in the commercial software development sector where a 
multitude of video games that simulate naval operations have been produced.  The 
following papers, projects, systems, and programs were most relevant to the research, 
development, and implementation of the ADC Simulation: 
• Area Air-Defense Commander (AADC) Battle Management System 
• Tactical Decision Making Under Stress (TADMUS) Decision Support 
System 
• Multi-Modal Watch Station (MMWS) Program 
• Naval Air-Defense Threat Assessment: Cognitive Factors Model 
• Air Threat Assessment:  Research, Model, and Display Guidelines 
• Cognitive and Behavioral Task Implications for Three Dimensional 
Displays Used in Combat Information/Direction Centers 
• Battle Force Tactical Training (BFTT) System 
• Naval Combat Simulation Video Games 
19 
B. AREA AIR-DEFENSE COMMANDER (AADC) BATTLE MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
The Area Air-Defense Commander (AADC) Battle Management System was 
developed by the Navy for more effective coordination of air-defense planning and 
execution for multi-service (i.e. Army, Air Force, Navy, & Marines) and coalition 
(international) operations, following the Gulf War.  The primary mission for an Area Air-
Defense Commander is to develop and execute a theater-wide air-defense plan to support 
the strategic and operational plans of the Joint Forces Commander (JFC) during an 
operation.  Prior to the development of the AADC system, such air-defense planning 
could only be accomplished manually, a laborious task that “used to take 10 to 15 people 
hours or even days to generate air-defense plan.”9  To complicate matters, it was 
necessary to conduct numerous evaluations and war-gaming scenarios against the plan to 
evaluate its effectiveness.  However, this process was significantly limited by the bounds 
of human performance since only a minimum number of scenario variables could be 
modified and tested before the analysis became unwieldy and intractable. 
Designed and developed by John Hopkins University’s Advanced Physics 
Laboratory (APL), the AADC System had to attain two objectives.  First it would 
“provide a single, integrated picture of the battle-space so that a joint commander can 
quickly gather data on air and missile attacks and defend against them.”10  This would 
greatly enhance the AADC’s ability to maintain an accurate view the operational area.  
Second, the AADC System would allow the air-defense staff to rapidly create, modify, 
and evaluate plans through system’s automated uses which substantially reduced the time 
of the process.   
A number of complex issues surround planning and coordinating wide-
area air defense…These variables represent hundreds of courses of action 
combinations that planners must consider…Every time you change a 
variable, you change the results…The AADC can repeatedly war game a 
plan against possible enemy attacks, running a complete scenario up to 25 
times to verify results.11 
                                                 
9 Slabodkin, Gregory, “Navy App Unites Commanders:  Planning Tool Gives Joint Commanders Data 
to Counter Air and Missile Attacks,” Government Computer News, 12 October 1998, p. 46. 
10 Ibid., p .45. 
11 Kenyon, Henry S., “Synthesizing the Big Picture,” Signal, June 2002. 
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Given this capability, the air-defense staff could now evaluate and analyze an air-defense 
plan, including the extraordinary number of possible variables in a scenario, with a 
greater level of confidence than previously possible since a larger number of potential 
outcomes could be explored. 
The AADC System is similar to the ADC Simulation in two ways.  First, both 
programs are designed to improve the Navy’s ability to conduct air defense.  Second, the 
AADC System and ADC Simulation allow the users to modify variables in the programs 
to explore the potential outcomes that might result from those changes.  However, these 
programs differ significantly in their objectives and focus in that the AADC System is 
developed for theater-wide, strategic and operational planning by the AADC while the 
ADC Simulation concentrates on battle group air defense as well as the performance of 
the ADC watchstanders and is implemented using a multi-agent systems architecture.   
C. TACTICAL DECISION-MAKING UNDER STRESS (TADMUS) 
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM  
The Tactical Decision-Making Under Stress (TADMUS) study was one of the 
first comprehensive explorations into the causes of the USS Vincennes incident.   
The congressional investigation of this incident suggested that emotional 
stress may have played a role in contributing to this incident and the 
TADMUS program was established to assess how stress might affect 
decision making and what might be done to minimize those effects.12 
The TADMUS study revealed the Combat Information Center consoles and systems in 
use during the timeframe of the study (late 1980s to early 1990s) contained significant 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) flaws which degraded watchstander performance 
under stressful conditions in high contact density littoral environments.  The direct result 
of these flaws was that  
Teams exhibited periodic losses of situation awareness, often linked with 
limitations in human memory and shared attention capacity.  
Environmental stressors such as time compression and highly ambiguous 
information increased decision biases.13 
The following problems were identified with the short-term memory limitations: 
                                                 
12 Morrison, Jeffrey G., Hutchins, Susan, G., et al., Tactical Decision Making Under Stress 
(TADMUS) Decision Support System, 1996, p. 1. 
13 Ibid., p. 2. 
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• Mixing up track numbers and forgetting track numbers. 
• Mixing up track kinematic data and forgetting track kinematic data. 
• Associating past track related events/actions with the wrong track and 
associating completed own-ship actions with wrong track.14 
A second set of problems were categorized as decision bias-related and included 
the following: 
• Carrying initial threat assessment throughout the scenario regardless of 
new information (framing error). 
• Assessing a track based on information other than associated with the 
track (e.g., old intelligence data, past decision-maker experiences, etc.).15 
All of these problems occurred during the USS Vincennes shoot-down of the Iranian 
commercial airliner, and the results of the study demonstrated the significant negative 
impact the HCI design of the CIC consoles had on the watchstanders.  Once the research 
and analysis of the current CIC systems was completed, the TADMUS program 
embarked on a second phase of research with the goal to develop improved CIC display 
consoles.  This system, known as the Decision Support System (DSS), had the following 
objectives: 
• Minimize the mismatches between cognitive processes and the data 
available in the CIC to facilitate decision-making. 
• Mitigate the shortcomings of current CIC displays in imposing high 
information-processing demands and exceeding the limitations of human 
memory. 
• Display the data in the CIC in graphical rather than numeric 
representations wherever appropriate.16 
The evaluation of the DSS component during training simulations determined that the 
new system greatly improved the overall performance of the air-defense teams, especially 
in the area of situational awareness.  Additionally, the watchstander participants rated the 
DSS component with a higher level of usability than existing CIC console displays. 
The TADMUS and DSS research programs contained two relevant issues to the 
development of the ADC Simulation.  The TADMUS project was among the initial 
                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 2. 
15 Ibid., p. 2. 
16 Ibid., p. 2. 
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studies conducted to examine the cognitive processes of naval air-defense personnel 
during stressful situations.  The mental models proposed to explain the decision-making 
process of these personnel created a foundation for more detailed subsequent work.  
Many of the general principles of watchstander cognition formulated from the TADMUS 
and DSS projects were incorporated into the design of the ADC Simulation.  Second, the 
TADMUS program identified two categories of cognitive errors (short-term memory 
limitation and decision bias) that occurred when watchstanders experienced stressful 
situations while performing air-defense operations.  These errors ultimately led to the loss 
of situational awareness by the watchstanders.  To replicate a reasonable level of realism 
in the program, the watchstanders in the ADC Simulation were designed so that generic 
approximations of the cognitive errors listed above occur (based on a random probability 
function) during scenarios. 
D. MULTI-MODAL WATCH STATION (MMWS) PROGRAM 
The Multi-Modal Watch Station (MMWS) program was a four-year project 
focused on the development of specialized watchstation consoles that incorporated 
improved human-computer interface (HCI) designs to improve the performance of watch-
teams during battle group air defense and land-attack warfare operations. 
MMWS is a concept design for a future command and control decision 
support system intended to serve as a test prototype to develop human-
computer interface (HCI) design recommendations for future Navy 
combat and command/control information systems.17 
Diverging from past, traditional CIC console engineering processes, the MMWS program 
initially performed a detailed analysis of air-defense watchstanders’ behaviors, 
interactions, and processes to determine all of the requirements for their task lists and 
workload.   
Key requirements were identified related to the user tasks or workload and 
included mission, work management, communication, and HCI control.  
User support concepts were developed and refined in relation to work 
management user tasks, which included the ability to assist the user in the 
selection of tasks and work strategies…Further, research in workload 
                                                 
17 Osga, Glenn, et al., Design and Evaluation of Warfighter Task Support Methods in a Multi-Modal 
Watch Station, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR), San Diego, May 2002, p. iii. 
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management led to the refinement of models to access and predict 
workload during real-time tactical operations.18 
The comprehensive design phase was a significant departure from the process typically 
used by military contracting corporations because its primary focus on developing a 
system that supported the user’s task and work requirements as opposed to forcing the 
user to adapt his or her requirements to the system.  The MMWS project also advanced 
another substantial research initiative that could transform shipboard CIC console design.  
Currently, the Navy contracts for the building of large hardware console systems which 
results in an extraordinary cost to maintain the supporting infrastructure for contractors, 
initial installation, repair parts, and the training pipeline for technicians.  During the 
development of the MMWS, “… a Java version of the software was developed to test the 
feasibility of transition for the HCI components into a fielded naval software system.”19  
If adopted as standard for future implementation in future naval ships, this would allow 
the Navy to divorce itself from investing in highly expensive, inflexible hardware system 
and move towards a common computer display system that would run a software 
implementation of the older console systems.  Such a step could substantially reduce the 
cost (production, installation, maintenance, and training) of CIC console systems while 
also ensuring that upgrades would occur more frequently and at a reduced cost. 
The MMWS consoles developed during the project implemented decision-aid 
user-support tools to increase usability and learnability and decrease the potential for 
information overload and errors.  The MMWS research conducted extensive interviews 
and console evaluations with air-defense subject matter experts, which resulted in several 
succeeding versions of the system.  At the conclusion of the project, the team showed a 
suite of MMWS consoles that corrected many of the HCI design problems inherent in the 
current set of AEGIS CIC consoles, which caused information overload, increased the 
likelihood of errors, and aggravated the potential for loss of situational awareness.  
During a comprehensive system evaluation, the project team demonstrated the MMWS 
consoles could reduce the size of the typical air-defense team by 2-3 people while 
increasing their overall performance levels. 




E. NAVAL AIR-DEFENSE THREAT ASSESSMENT:  COGNITIVE 
FACTORS MODEL 
Another investigation examined the cognitive aspects of the threat assessment 
process used by naval air-defense officers during battle group operations are referenced 
here.  The research evaluated personnel during exercises and operations to determine the 
factors in the decision-making of identifying and classifying air contacts.   
Factors are the elements of data and information that are used to assess air 
contacts.  Traditionally, they are derived from kinematics, tactical, and 
other data.  Examples of such data include course, speed, IFF mode, and 
type of radar emitter.20 
The research indicated the watchstanders mentally maintained a range of possible-track 
templates, derived from a set of twenty-two identifying factors, which they used to 
classify contacts and calculate threat assessments.  Some of the most promising factors 
are listed below: 
• Electromagnetic Signal (ES) Emissions 
• Course (with respect to the battle group) 
• Speed 
• Altitude 
• Point of Origin 
• Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Modes 1,2,3, 4, C 
• Flight Profile 
• Intelligence Information 
“Threat assessment is defined…as the process of evaluating aircraft that are flying in the 
vicinity of one’s ship, and determining how much of a threat they represent to the ship as 
well as the battle group.”21  A contact’s factors and other data were compared against 
relevant templates, and the template with the highest degree of fit was used to identify the 
air contact as well as make a threat assessment.  The figure below inferred the threat 
assessment process. 
                                                 
20 Liebhaber, Michael J., et al., Naval Air Defense Threat Assessment:  Cognitive Factors Model, 




Figure 4.   Cognitively Based Model of Threat Assessment22. 
 
This research and the ADC Simulation were consistent because the latter models 
the mental decision-making and threat-assessment processes of the Combat Information 
Center (CIC) watchstanders as part of their process of identifying and classifying air 
contacts.  During the initial stages of research gathering, we conducted in-depth 
interviews with several air-defense experts at the AEGIS Training & Readiness Center 
(ATRC) Detachment in San Diego, which focused on the above contact threat assessment 
and identification processes.  The results of our interviews confirm the previous work’s 
findings about factors, templates, and the contact threat assessment and identification 
processes.  A similar cognitive model, including the factors and templates, was 
implemented in the Air-Defense Simulation for the air-defense decision-making of the 
CIC watchstander agents. 
F. AIR THREAT ASSESSMENT:  RESEARCH, MODEL, AND DISPLAY 
GUIDELINES 
The paper reviews several other studies, including the one cited in Section E in an 
ongoing study into the practice of air threat assessment of contacts during battle group 
air-defense operations.   
The studies provided a theoretical and applied basis for threat assessment 
by defining specific cue-data relationships and detailing the cognitive 
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 22. 
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processes involved in air defense simulation assessment.  Those processes 
were incorporated into a proposed model of threat assessment that was 
successfully validated against threat ratings from experienced air defense 
decision makers.23 
The studies addressed by the paper include the Tactical Decision Making Under Stress 
(TADMUS) program, the subsequent Decision Support System (DSS), and the Basis For 
Assessment (BFA) tool, and several papers covering Naturalistic Decision Making 
(NDM).  The knowledge gained from these studies was used toward developing a new 
threat assessment model (displayed below) and the creation/update of guidelines for 
displaying contact threat assessment data.  The original TADMUS research led to a 
follow-on project, DSS, to implement specialized air-defense displays for watchstanders.  
These displays were designed to enhance the performance of the air-defense personnel by 




Figure 5.   Threat Assessment Model24. 
                                                 
23 Liebhaber, Michael J. and Feher, Bela, Air Threat Assessment:  Research Model, and Display 
Guidelines, p. 1. 
24 Ibid., p. 4.   
27 
Updated threat assessment interface guidelines were recommended: 
• Display a threat assessment window on-screen when a track is hooked. 
• Compute and display the threat ratings of tracks. 
• Show threat rating history. 
• Provide a list of all assessment cues. 
• Order cues by importance to the decision maker. 
• Show the impact of each cue on overall threat rating. 
• Provide a track priority list.25 
Using these recommendations, the authors produced a limited prototype for 
demonstration. 
G. COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL TASK IMPLICATIONS FOR THREE 
DIMENSIONAL DISPLAYS USED IN COMBAT 
INFORMATION/DIRECTION CENTERS 
This paper reviews the behavioral and cognitive task analysis of the Joint 
Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) for the purpose of determining 
whether the implementation of three-dimensional displays would be useful.  The 
objective of JMCIS is to produce a Common Tactical Picture (CTP) for the battle group 
or joint-force commander to ensure the maintenance of battlespace situational awareness.  
As part of this objective, the CTP is designed to integrate the undersea warfare (USW), 
mine warfare (MW), Surface Warfare (SW), Air Warfare (AW), Amphibious Warfare 
(AMW), and C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) battlespace pictures into one comprehensive display.  
During the analysis of the HCI of most combat system displays, this study cited many of 
the problems associated with poor display designs from the TADMUS project including 
short-term memory limitations and loss of situational awareness. 
The researchers identified situational awareness as the primary area concern 
during the task analysis and selected the Applied Cognitive Task Analysis (ACTA) 
methodology (developed by Klein and Associates), which addresses the mental models of 
both novices and experts. 
Situation awareness, as defined by Endsley, is a threefold process 
on of the elements in the environment within a including (1) percepti                                                 
25 Ibid., pp. 7-9. 
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volume of time and space, (2) comprehension of the meaning, and (3) 
projection of status in the near future.  At the first cognitive level, the user 
detects the target cues or objects in the environment.  During the second 
cognitive level, the perceived information is processed and integrated into 
an assessment of the situation.  At the third cognitive level, new projected 
outcomes are formulated for the situation.26 
The study further asserted that situational awareness was also affected by the following 
four factors:  (1) capabilities, (2) training and experience, (3) preconceptions and 
objectives, (4) and ongoing task workload.  Taking into account all of these factors, “as 
task workload and stress increase, decision-makers will often lose a ‘Big Picture’ 
awareness and focus on smaller elements.”27 
The discussion of situational awareness in this study had a particular relevance to 
the development of the ADC Simulation.  The four factors affecting situational awareness 
mentioned above were incorporated into the design of the watchstander agents in the 
simulation.  Our interviews with the air-defense subject matter experts validated the 
conclusions the researchers made concerning situational awareness, especially the factors 
of training and experience with task workload.  
H. BATTLE FORCE TACTICAL TRAINING (BFTT) SYSTEM 
The Battle Force Tactical Trainer System was designed for the fleet-wide training 
of naval units by providing each ship with a comprehensive training system (using the 
existing CIC console architecture) run by a specialized computing system and is 
primarily used for air-defense training of the CIC team. 
The BFTT system…provides Commanding Officers, the Afloat Training 
Organization (ATO) and Battle Group/Battle Force (BG/BF) commanders 
with the ability to conduct coordinated, realistic, high stress combat 
system training for developing war fighting proficiency and maintaining 
combat readiness.28 
On the unit level, BFTT allows the ships to develop realistic training by designing high-
fidelity scenarios which inject actual signal information into the ship combat systems to 
                                                 
26 Eddy, Mark, F. and Kribs, H. Dewey, Cognitive and Behavioral Task Implications for Three 
Dimensional Displays Used in Combat Information/Direction Centers, 27 February 1998, p. 8, 
[http://www.isdnet.org], September 2002.  
27 Ibid., p. 9. 
28 “AN/USQ-T46(V) Battle Force Tactical Training System,” FAS Military Analysis Network, 30 
June 1999, [http://www.fas.org], January 2003. 
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emulate reality.  On a battle force scale, the BFTT system can produce a synthetic theater 
where an entire fleet of ships and staffs (whether in-port or underway) can participate in a 
worldwide war-gaming exercise.  Additionally,  
By leveraging the BFTT scenario generation environment, replay is 
familiar to the operator in terms of map appearance, controls, and track 
features.  It is also an extremely powerful learning tool, displaying both 
the ground truth and the perceived tracks from one or more exercise 
participants.29 
Consequently, upon completion of the training scenario, individual units as well as the 
entire battle force can immediately conduct a review of the scenario events for each of 
the watch-teams and provide them with near-instant feedback on their overall 
performance.  If desired, specific portions of the scenario where a watchstander(s) made a 
mistake could be replayed so that the person could correct the deficiency.   
Although the objective of the BFTT system is considerably different from the 
ADC Simulation there are two aspects that the systems share in common.  First, similar 
to BFTT, the ADC Simulation will allow the user to always see the ground truth for air 
contact identification along with the perceived identification of the aircraft.  Second, the 
ADC Simulation will maintain a record log of all of the actions, inputs and outputs, and 
events for each watchstander as well as for the entire scenario so that event reconstruction 
can be performed. 
I. NAVAL COMBAT SIMULATION VIDEO GAMES:  THE PRECURSOR 
TO MODERN-DAY AIR-DEFENSE SIMULATIONS 
A review of research and system development in naval air-defense simulations, 
past and present, would not be complete without an examination of the video game 
industry’s recreational software programs that attempt to model actual naval operations 
and combat.  Before the Navy began investing considerable funds into modeling and 
simulation, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the software gaming industry had programs 
that simulated naval combat in various location environments.  First-person “shooter” 
games like Unreal Tournament™, Quake™, and Medal of Honor™ have recently 
become templates for several military research projects into the creation of training 
                                                 
29 McGaughey, Sean, “Training Systems:  Concepts, Technologies and Application,” Digital Systems 
Resources, Inc. Website, [http://www.simsysinc.com], January 2003. 
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programs for ground infantry troops.  Conversely, many of these naval games were 
designed with the assistance of former naval officers who served as advisers on the, and 
in some cases, the games were so realistic that military (due to the absence of equivalent 
programs) used them to train personnel.  The following games represent some of the most 
popular and realistic naval simulation games which contained a significant battle group 
air-defense component as part of the game engine. 
1. Strike Fleet:  The Naval Task Force Simulator™ 
Making its debut in 1987, Strike Fleet™ was one of the first and most successful 
video games that simulated naval battle group operations.  The game arrived on the scene 
during the height of tensions between the United States and Iran in the Arabian Gulf and 
included familiar scenarios like oil tanker escort (through the Strait of Hormuz) and 
patrol/combat operations against the Iranian Navy.  Another set of scenarios dealt with 
the British Navy during the Falklands Island conflict.  Strike Fleet™ also had an option 
which allowed the user to participate in a structured campaign (series of scenarios) 
against the Soviet Navy in the Atlantic Ocean and northern European theater.  The game 
introduced a unique game interface that allowed the user to concentrate on high level 
battle group operations during a scenario, or the player could control the individual 
combat performance of ships and helicopters.  This feature offered the players a 
considerable level of fidelity within the game, especially with respect to selection of task 
force size and composition (before the scenario commenced), control of the radar (range, 
active and passive modes), course, speed, and weapons employment (guns, short-range 
missiles, long-range missiles, torpedoes, CIWS, chaff, helicopter sonobuoys).  Rich with 
detailed features and challenging opponents (who employed realistic tactics), Strike 
Fleet™ provided the user with a realistic game that required careful strategic thinking to 
win.30 
                                                 
30 Falstein, Noah, Strike Fleet™ Video Game, Lucasfilm Games, Ltd., Electronic Arts®, © 1987. 
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Figure 6.   Strike Fleet™ Video Game. 
 
2. Fifth Fleet™ 
Fifth Fleet ™, the video game, was introduced in 1994 and immediately set a 
standard for the accurate depiction of naval operations and realistic game play for several 
reasons.  First, the designers developed a different type of engine for a naval simulation 
and implemented a turn-based game, similar to a number of strategic board games and 
role-playing games.  The movement of platforms (ships, aircraft, submarines) across a 
map divided into equal-sized hexagonal grid units was dictated by the speed of those 
platforms.  Also the game more closely emulated actual naval operations by including 
such detailed features as smaller mission-oriented task groups, plans for coordinated air 
strikes and other aircraft missions, weather phenomena, and accurate logistical 
constraints (and consumption) which necessitated task force underway replenishment.  
Second, Fifth Fleet™ was designed as if the player were the fleet commander; therefore, 
numerous features including automation of control of individual units and task forces 
(through artificial-intelligence programming) freed the user from becoming mired in 
repetitive, time-consuming actions.  Third, the game offered the player a variety of 
realistic, mature, politically-charged scenarios, which occurred in the Arabian Gulf and 
Indian Ocean regions and involved military forces from nineteen different countries. 
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Figure 7.   Fifth Fleet™ Video Game. 
 
Fifth Fleet™ contained an impressive breadth and depth of realistic platforms f 
along with highly accurate representations of the weapon systems (missiles, torpedoes, 
guns, etc.).  The game differentiated over one hundred different classes of surface ships 
and submarines and over sixty different types of aircraft.  Lastly, with the rapid 
expansion of Internet capability during the early-to-mid 1990s, Fifth Fleet™ introduced 
Internet game play for naval simulations, allowing users to move beyond simply playing 
against the computer and gave them the opportunity (and thrill) to challenge each other in 
the scenarios.31 
3. Harpoon:  Modern Naval Combat Simulation™ Series Video Games 
The Harpoon™ Series (Harpoon 1-4™) games have been arguably the most 
popular games of the naval combat simulation genre, and they have spanned nearly 
fourteen years, with Harpoon 1™ published in 1989 and the most recent version 
(Harpoon 4™) arriving in March 2003.  Although the game received wide acceptance 
during its first incarnation, the second version, Harpoon 2™ (1994) became wildly 
popular (eventually becoming a video-gaming classic) when it introduced a level of 
realism for never before seen or since surpassed in a naval combat simulation.  The 
Harpoon™ game series engines were based on a realistic war-gaming and operational 
                                                 
31 Rose, Jim, Fifth Fleet™ Video Game, The Avalon Hill Game Company, Stanley Associates, © 
1994. 
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analysis model designed by the creator, Larry David, a former naval analyst and author.  
It featured exceptionally accurate representations of platforms, weather phenomena, 
weapon systems, geography, friendly and opponent tactics, as well as believable 
scenarios and campaigns based on current and future political and/or actual conflicts. 
 
   
Figure 8.   Harpoon Series™ Video Games32. 
 
The Harpoon™ games approached the control of the units and fleet from the task-
force commander level to allow the player to concentrate on the strategic and operational 
missions and capabilities of naval operations.  To facilitate this concept, the game 
employed sophisticated artificial-intelligence engine (for both friendly and enemy 
combatants) to manage the behaviors and actions of those units realistically.  The most 
recent incarnation Harpoon 4 ™ contains the following carefully detailed and accurately 
represented features: 
• A detailed Order of Battle with over 1,000 ships, subs, and aircraft from 
the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Canada, France, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Finland, Denmark, China, 
Australia, and Japan. 
• A highly detailed map of the Northern European region created from 
satellite imagery. 
• A map display with a variety of overlays, including weapons, sensor and 
fuel ranges, as well as bathymetric, weather, cloud cover, threat zone, and 
satellite data. 
• A detailed tactical 3D environment where players can view their ships, 
aircraft, and submarines at critical events. 
                                                 
32 Bond, Larry, Harpoon Series™ Video Games, Strategic Simulations, Inc., © 1989-2003. 
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• An extensive database of units, weapons, and sensors. 
• Accurate sensor and electronic countermeasures modeling.33 
The game also includes capabilities for Internet online game-play against other people.  
The Harpoon™ Series has been considered so accurate in its representation of modern 
naval operations that several nation’s militaries and military-affiliated organizations have 
used the game as part of their training, including the United States (United States Air 
Force Command and Staff College, U.S. Naval Institute), Australia (Australian 
Department of Defense), and Brazil (Brazilian Naval War College).34   
4. Summary 
As discussed above, the video game industry has produced some very realistic, 
robust, and comprehensive naval simulation games that for many years, surpassing even 
some of the military’s best simulations.  Originally designed for entertainment purposes, 
many of these programs were developed with very accurate models of naval operations, 
platforms, tactics, environments, and weapon systems and have only grown more 
accurate over the years.  Consequently, the United States military has been one of the 
leading advocates and contractors for military (and military-relevant) game simulations to 
train its personnel, especially since the actual (live) training is usually extraordinarily 
expensive.   
It is precisely because of this mission that the US Military is the world’s 
largest spender on and user of Digital Game-Based Learning.  The military 
uses games to train soldiers, sailors, pilots, and tank drivers to master their 
expensive and sensitive equipment.  It uses games to teach mid-level 
officers…how to employ joint force military doctrine in battle and other 
situations.  It uses games to teach senior officers the art of strategy.35 
The Harpoon ™ series of games has attained a level of accuracy so similar to actual naval 
operations that it has been used by the military.  However, these games have not been 
extensively used by the military because, despite their accurate operational models, their 
primary purpose is for entertainment value.  Subsequently, they lack many of the key 
                                                 
33 Bond, Larry, “Larry Bond’s Harpoon 4™ Modern Naval Combat Simulation,” 
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35 Prensky, Marc, “True Believers:  Digital Game-Based Learning in the Military,” Digital Game-
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features such as comprehensive logging of events for future analysis (among many 
others) needed to make them suitable and attractive for widespread employment.  The 
capability to review the record following a simulation or training event to formulate 
lessons learned and discover potential areas for improvement is one of the paramount 
objectives for any type of training conducted by the military.  Since the games often 
exclude these features, this limits their overall usefulness.   
The ADC Simulation has much in common with these games because it attempts 
to simulate naval operations such as the air defense of the battle group.  Some of the look, 
feel, and interactivity of the program’s interface was adopted from the strategic games as 
well as the capabilities to structure the simulation environment before commencement 
and modify the time compression/progression of the scenarios.  However, ADC 
Simulation differs from the above video games because its overall objective is to train 
and provide insight for military personnel into the performance of battle group air 
defense with an eye towards understanding the mental processes of the involved 
watchstanders operates to gain experience (and lessons-learned), not entertainment value.   
The wargamer [recreational user] wants a historically valid game, but also 
an enjoyable and entertaining experience; the military gamer wants a 
historically valid game, but both enjoyment and entertainment are 
secondary criteria…Generally, military games may be characterized by an 
extended learning period and an extending playing period – both of which 
combine to often prohibit the lessons learned because of time constraints.  
Thus, certain commercial wargames can offer lessons to the military 
professional.  Such games offer playability, realistic lessons learned, 
and/or game aspects, which the military professional could adapt for his 
own games.36 
We recognized that the inclusion of certain game-related features into the ADC 
Simulation would enhance the usability, playability, and satisfaction of the program 
experience and would improve the training-value of the utility. 
J. COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF THE CRUISER ADC 
SIMULATION PROGRAM 
Although there are many areas of commonality between the ADC Simulation and 
previous research, the simulation occupies a unique and relevant niche in the study and 
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development of naval air defense for the following reasons, which support its usefulness 
reasons: 
• It focuses on the decision-making and other mental processes of the 
watchstanders as a function of the operational environment in which they 
operate. 
• It examines the performance of battle group air defense by studying 
performance of the air-defense watchstanders. 
• It delves into the role of the critical skills necessary for the performance of 
the watchstanders and explores the influence that a watchstander’s various 
proficiency levels has on the performance of the air-defense team. 
• It uses the data from research and interviews with air-defense experts to 
implement the capability to select various proficiency levels, experience 
levels, fatigue levels, and type of decision-maker psychology for each of 
the watchstanders in the simulation. 
• It allows the user to configure the external environmental attributes for the 
simulation (i.e. number of contacts, scenario threat level, weather, 
doctrine, probability and task time settings) to determine the effects of 
such changes on the performance of the watchstanders. 
• It allows the user to configure the CIC equipment operational-readiness 
attributes to determine the effects of such changes on the performance of 
the watchstander. 
• It allows the user to watch the performance of the air-defense team over an 
extended period of time (using time compression) so as to examine the 
positive actions and mistakes the watchstanders make concerning the 
identification of air contacts.  The program will display ground-truth 
information so the user can always compare the actual situation to the 
perceived situation of the watchstanders. 
• It employs a Multi-Agent System architecture to simulate the 
watchstanders, which provides for a realistic reproduction of human 
behaviors within the simulation. 
• It allows the user to record into log files all of the actions, inputs, and 
outputs of each watchstander during a scenario for later analysis and 
review for performance anomalies or searches for chain-of-errors for 
incorrect air-defense identifications or engagements. 
K. RESEARCH QUESTIONS POSED FOR THE CRUISER ADC 
SIMULATION PROGRAM 
During the development of the ADC Simulation, we attempted to gain insight into 
the complex interactions and influences involved in air-defense operations to determine 
the degree to which individual watchstander performance (skill, experience, fatigue), 
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equipment operational readiness, and the external environment (number of contacts, 
weather, etc.) affected the overall performance of the ADC team.  Also, the effect the 
above factors cause on the performance of the individual watchstander was also explored.  
The following questions were posed: 
• What are the collective critical skills necessary for a CIC team to perform 
ADC duties/operations effectively? 
• What are the individual critical skills sets necessary for the primary ADC 
personnel to perform their responsibilities effectively? 
• How do you measure the collective proficiency and performance level of 
an individual ADC watchstander? 
• How do you measure the collective proficiency and performance level of 
an individual ADC watchstander? 
• What are the effects (positive and negative) of one CIC watchstander’s 
performance on another watchstation? 
• How does the decision-making type of the ADC team leadership (F-TAO, 
F-AAWC) affect the overall performance of the team? 
• How does the external environment affect the collective performance of 
the ADC team and the performance of the individual watchstanders? 
• What are the maximum effective performance limits of the ADC team, 
collectively and individually, when the maximum outer environment stress 
is experienced? 
• What influence or effect can degraded performance of critical air-defense 
equipment have on the performance of the ADC team, collectively and 
individually? 
• What influence or effect can degraded human performance due to fatigue 
have on the performance of the ADC team, collectively and individually? 
While conducting interviews at the AEGIS Training & Readiness Center (ATRC) 
Detachment in San Diego and data collection from various sources, insight was gained 
into the understanding of some of the question.  Many of the other questions required the 
completion of the ADC Simulation before they could be answered so that specific 
scenarios could be performed and parametric analysis conducted on the data/results.  
Once this analysis was completed, a survey, consisting of scenarios based on the results 
of the ADC Simulation tests, was given to the experts at the ADC to determine the 
simulation’s realism as compared to their professional air-defense experiences. 
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III. USER-CENTERED DESIGN (UCD) PROCESS OF THE ADC 
SIMULATION HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERFACE (HCI) 
A. NEED FOR UTILIZATION OF USER-CENTERED DESIGN (UCD) 
PROCESS IN DEVELOPING COMPUTER PROGRAM INTERFACES 
Almost everyone in the Navy has a story to tell about a particular piece of 
hardware or a computer program, which greatly frustrated them due to its difficulty to 
use.  Despite the effectiveness or necessity of the equipment or software, usability issues 
that impeded the productivity of the user significantly hampered its utilization.  This 
situation seemed to reach its apex in the 1980s and early 1990s as technological 
innovations such as computers transformed the workplaces on naval ships, submarines, 
bases, and squadrons.  During this period, there were undoubtedly countless instances of 
systems with poor user interfaces that frequently translated into lost productivity and 
increased frustration by the “victims.”  However, the USS Vincennes incident, which 
occurred in 1988, involving the engagement and shoot-down of an Iranian commercial 
airliner, highlights the potential negative impact that combat systems and programs with 
poor usability can contribute to an already dangerous and tense situation.  Without 
recounting the entire situation (other sources provide a comprehensive accounting) or 
trivializing the other major factors involved in the incident, essentially the usability 
design of the Combat Information Center (CIC) consoles, were considered to have 
contributed negatively to the processing and dissemination of vital information to the key 
watchstanders.   
Fortunately, starting in the mid-to-late 1990s, with the growth of the human-
computer interface design community, the importance of engineering usability into 
combat and information systems has increased significantly.   
The last decade of research and practice in user interface design has 
[created] some good models for designing user interfaces.  Getting input 
from users early and continuously throughout the design process, using 
rapid prototyping and iterative design techniques, and conducting formal 
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usability testing are now proven methods for assuring good user 
interfaces.37 
Several principles govern the HCI community when designing effective interfaces with 
good usability. 
• Use Simple and Natural Dialogue 
• Speak the User’s Language (user knowledge, level of understanding) 
• Minimize User Memory Load 
• Ensure Consistency throughout the Interface (improve learnability) 
• Provide Feedback when Users Perform Actions (keep the user informed) 
• Provide Useful and Visible Shortcuts to Improve Usability 
• Provide Clear, Helpful Error Messages (plain language) 
• Prevent User-Initiated System Errors by Careful Design of the Interface38 
To ensure usability, user satisfaction, and good productivity are attained in the 
program, the User-Centered Design (UCD) Process was used to develop the ADC 
Simulation interface.  The following six phases make up the UCD Process and will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next sections: 
• Phase One:   Creation of the Problem Statement 
• Phase Two:   Conduct Requirements Gathering 
• Phase Three:   Conceptual Design of the ADC Simulation 
• Phase Four: Implementation of the ADC Simulation Interface 
• Phase Five: Usability Analysis of ADC Simulation Interface 
• Phase Six: Redesign/Modification of ADC Simulation Interface 
B. UCD PROCESS PHASE ONE:  PROBLEM STATEMENT 
1.  Problem Statement  
The goal of this multi-agent system is to develop an autonomous agent-based 
artificial intelligence simulation of an AEGIS cruiser performing Battle Group Air-
Defense Commander duties.  
                                                 
37 Mulligan, Robert M., Altom, Mark W. and Simkin, David K., “User Interface Design in the 
Trenches:  Some Tips on Shooting from the Hip”, Association of Computing Machinery, March 1991, p. 
232. 
38 Nielsen, Jakob, “Traditional Dialogue Design Applied to Modern User Interfaces,” Communications 
of the ACM:  Human Factors, Graphical and Multimedia Applications, October 1990, Vol. 33, No. 10, p. 
111. 
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2.   Activity/Utility to Users 
The resultant simulation will be used to gain insight and understanding into 
numerous factors that influence (positively or negatively) the effective performance of 
both the CIC ADC Team collectively and watchstation personnel individually.  
Additionally, the simulation will allow for the exploration of team and individual 
watchstation performance during abnormal or high intensity/stress simulations to 
determine the role of skill proficiency levels in the effective execution of ADC duties.  
Furthermore, this simulation will give naval war-fighters at the unit (ship) level the 
ability to experiment with various modifications to ADC tactical doctrine and 
organization to gain insight into potential effect of those changes on CIC team 
performance before implementing them.  Lastly, this simulation will serve as a proof of 
concept to the usefulness of similar simulations in training of ship personnel on various 
team-oriented missions/duties and CIC operations. 
3.   Users 
The potential users of this simulation will be training and doctrine-formulation 
commands, waterfront training teams, and individual combat units (ships). 
4.   Criteria for Judgment 
The primary criteria for judgment will be the usefulness of the simulation to the 
potential users.  This criterion includes the ease of setup, modification, and execution of 
the simulation for the desired output. 
C. UCD PROCESS PHASE TWO:  REQUIREMENTS GATHERING 
1.  Needs Analysis  
a. Situation of Concern 
Air Warfare is the most rapid, intense, and devastating type of warfare that 
the U.S. Navy currently trains for, and battle group operations are primarily focused on 
gaining proficiency in this mission area.  Due to the fast-pace, uncertain, and dangerous 
aspects of air warfare, the battle group commander’s Air-Defense Team (the AEGIS 
cruiser CIC Team) must be trained extensively in the fundamental tenets of these 
operations to effectively protect the aircraft carrier, high-value units, and other naval 
ships in the vicinity.  With the immense range of duties and responsibilities, there are 
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multitudes of individual watchstation and collective skill sets that must be mastered to 
effectively perform the ADC duties.   
b. Need/Utility of System 
(1) Current State.  The waterfront training teams (AEGIS 
Training and Readiness Center (ATRC) detachments) are charged by the fleet type 
commanders with providing the Air-Defense Commander (ADC) training to the cruisers, 
and the quality of the training they provide is typically outstanding.  However, the ADC 
operations are considerably complex, and the waterfront training teams are limited by the 
available training time as well as the scope of the training attempted.  Furthermore, a 
myriad of interactions (watchstander to watchstander, ship to ship, ship to aircraft, 
watchstander to equipment, etc.) that are part of daily operations are numerous and 
potential ADC team performance deficiencies may not be noticed during the limited 
training periods.   
(2) Need.  The limitations of human comprehension of ADC 
operations due to the countless interactions places a barrier on the level, type, and quality 
of training that can be accomplished.  Because there are many different variables to 
account for in these operations, the training teams and ships can only rely on their 
collective past experiences as the basis for producing effective training.  This limits the 
potential gain of the training because training teams and ships are formulating ADC 
scenarios for the future based on experiences from the past.  To surpass this limitation, 
both groups require a system that will enable them to build scenarios, based on the 
current skill and training levels of the ADC team as well as the environment they will 
face, that will allow them to train towards more realistic threats. 
(3) Solution.  The ADC simulation will provide a solution to 
the problems discussed above.  After an initial assessment of the training, experience, and 
equipment readiness levels of a specific ship, the initial settings for the ADC team and 
environment can be inputted into the system.  Upon completion of the setup, the program 
will allow the training teams (as well as the ships) to create simulations based upon the 
ship’s potential operational scenarios to discover the performance deficiencies.  The 
training teams and ships will use the results from the simulation to provide more focused 
training in the areas where deficiencies were noted.  Also, the program can be employed 
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to validate the usefulness of future scenarios intended in the training of the ships.  For the 
doctrine-formulation commands, this simulation will give them the opportunity to 
evaluate the validity of theoretical changes to ADC and AEGIS doctrine before 
implementing them in the fleet. 
c. Features of System 
The ADC Simulation will allow for the observation and collection of data 
in three main categories, Individual Watchstander performance, CIC team performance, 
and Overall Simulation performance. 
Individual Watchstanders: 
 
Determine the effect of varying… 
 
• Skill levels on a single watchstander’s performance. 
• Experience levels on a single watchstander’s performance. 
• Type of decision-maker (F-TAO/F-AAWC) on a watchstander’s performance. 
• Fatigue levels on a single watchstander’s performance. 
• Equipment operational level on a single watchstander’s performance. 
• Contact density on a single watchstander’s performance. 
• Contact type (hostile, unknown, etc.) on a single watchstander’s performance. 
• Atmospheric conditions on a single watchstander’s performance. 




Determine the effect of varying… 
 
• Skill levels on collective CIC team performance. 
• Experience levels on collective CIC team performance. 
• Type of decision-maker (F-TAO/F-AAWC) on collective CIC team performance. 
• Fatigue levels on collective CIC team performance. 
• Equipment operational level on collective CIC team performance. 
• Contact density on collective CIC team performance. 
• Contact type (hostile, unknown, etc.) on collective CIC team performance. 
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• Atmospheric conditions on collective CIC team. 
• AEGIS doctrine on CIC team performance. 




• Run simulations over user-determined period of time (time compression 
available). 
• Allow user to view CIC team’s contact ID process (and engagement process if 
applicable). 
• Allow users to see errors made by CIC team as they happen. 
• Allow users to interact with the CIC team agents to view current decision logs and 
modify various attributes. 
 
2. User Analysis 
a. Utility of the Simulation 
Since this program is designed to simulate ADC operations, the pool of 
users will probably be restricted to the following three groups:  AEGIS waterfront 
training commands (ATRC detachments), AEGIS ships (ADC personnel), and 
AEGIS/ADC doctrine formulation commands.  For them, there are two significant 
benefits of this simulation listed below: 
• The training commands and ships will employ the simulation to provide 
some foresight into the future performance of shipboard watch-teams 
under various scenarios.  The information/results gained from running 
these simulations will assist them in providing more focused and effective 
training for these watch-teams.   
• The doctrine formulation commands will use the simulation to conduct 
evaluations on potentially new/theoretical AEGIS and ADC doctrine 
changes to provide some data on the performance of those modifications.  
This data could then be analyzed and reviewed before moving to the field-
testing phase of the implementation. 
b. Collective Team Skills and Experience Required (User 
Characteristics) 
Although a single user highly experienced in ADC, could effectively use 
the simulation, it is more likely that a team of users representing the various skills and 
watchstation backgrounds will be employed to initially set up and use the program.  The 
following is a list of the qualifications, skills, and experience a team, which plans on 
using the simulation should possess: 
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• Naval officers with 5 or more years of fleet experience 
• Senior enlisted personnel (E-6 and above) with 10 or more years of 
experience 
• All personnel familiar with Battle Group ADC operations 
• Personnel familiar with the performance/conduct of the following 
watchstations and their requisite skills:  F-TAO, F-AAWC, S-TAO, S-
AAWC, Red Crown, TIC, IDS, RSC, CSC, MSS, EWCO 
• Personnel familiar with carrier launch & recovery air operations 
• Personnel familiar with aircraft, flight intercept, and control operations 
• Personnel familiar with AEGIS Core Tactical Doctrine 
• Personnel who understand the basic operation of personal computers 
including Windows programs 
c. Frequency of Simulation Use 
The simulation program usage will probably vary depending upon where a 
ship is in the training/work-up cycle.  If it is somewhere in the middle of the training 
cycle, it will probably be used (by the waterfront training teams and ships) fairly often (3-
5 times a week) to provide information to guide the ship’s training plan.  However, if the 
ship has completed the training cycle and is deployed, it may be used less frequently (1-2 
times a month). 
3. Task Analysis 
During the preliminary design of the ADC Simulation interface, four primary 
tasks were identified along with several associated subtasks for each task. 
 
Primary Task 1: Input Watchstander Attributes: 
 Subtask 1.A:  Set Skill levels 
Subtask 1.B:  Set Experience levels 
Subtask 1.C:  Set Fatigue levels 
Subtask 1.D:  Set Decision-maker Type levels 
 
Primary Task 2:  Input Equipment Setup: 
 Subtask 2.A:  Set Equipment Readiness levels 
 Subtask 2.B:  Input Equipment Setup (Radar, Data Links) 
 
Primary Task 3:  Input Scenario Setup 
 Subtask 3.A:  Set Atmospheric Conditions 
 Subtask 3.B:  Set Contact Density 
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 Subtask 3.C:  Set Scenario Threat level 
 
Primary Task 4:  Input Doctrine Setup 
Subtask 4.A:  Set ADC Battle Doctrine 
Subtask 4.B:  Set AEGIS Doctrine 
 
Although many of these subtasks tasks are listed individually, it is very likely that 
upon implementation some of these tasks will be centralized into one interface window.  
For example, the subtasks in Primary Task #1 could be combined into one input window 
for each watchstander to simplify the interface (increase the ease-of-use) for the user. 
D. UCD PROCESS PHASE THREE:  CONCEPTUAL DESIGN OF ADC 
SIMULATION PROGRAM 
1. Conceptual Design Introduction 
Phase Three of the UCD Process commenced the actual definition and 
categorization of the critical components that comprised the ADC Simulation and was 
completed in the following four steps.  First, the team conducted comprehensive 
interviews with experienced air-defense Subject Matter Experts (SME) from the AEGIS 
Training and Readiness Center (ATRC) Detachment in San Diego California and the 
Fleet Technical Support Center Pacific (FTSCPAC) to collect data about battle group air-
defense operations onboard an AEGIS cruiser.  These personnel possessed between five 
to fifteen years of naval air-defense experience, and all of them were considered experts 
in this field.  The interviews covered the following topics: 
• Air-Defense Identification & Threat Assessment Process 
• Battle Group Air Defense & Aircraft Operations 
• Collective Skills Required for Effective ADC Team Performance 
• Individual Watchstander Skills Required for Effective Performance 
• Differences Between Skill & Experience 
• Measures of Effectiveness (Successful Task Performance) of Skill 
• Measures of Effectiveness of Experience 
• Affect of Fatigue on Individual Watchstander Performance 
• Affect of Fatigue collectively on ADC Team Performance 
• Affect of Individual Watchstander Performance on ADC Team 
Performance 
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• Affect of CIC Equipment Readiness on Individual and ADC Team 
Performance 
• Affect of External Environment on Individual and ADC Team 
Performance 
• Classification of Different Types of Decision-makers for F-TAO & F-
AAWC 
• Affect of Different Types of Decision-makers on ADC Team Performance 
• Affect of Watchstander Mistakes on ADC Team Performance 
• Affect of Different Levels of Individual Watchstander Skill & Experience 
Proficiencies on ADC Team Performance 
• Classifying Different Levels of Skill, Experience, and Fatigue 
Following this research collection effort, the Subject Matter Experts’ data was analyzed 
and used to develop the conceptual foundation and structure for the design of the 
simulation. 
Second, the fundamental components of the simulation were determined, which in 
this case were the agents (watchstanders) and the objects (various items in both the 
interface and the simulation itself).  Upon completion of this step, the attributes of the 
agents and the objects were ascertained and listed.  Third, the relationships between each 
agent and the other agents and objects in the simulation was explicitly defined with the 
same task performed for each object.  Lastly, utilizing the information from determining 
the relationship among agents and objects, all of the actions (for each agent and object) 
were defined.  When this process was finished, the team had generated a well-defined, 
comprehensive, high-level view of the interrelationships, interactions, and processes that 
would occur in the ADC Simulation, which simplified the development of the actual 
prototype discussed in Section D, UCD Process Phase Four and helped to reduce a 
number of potential user-interface errors.  Following is the conceptual design of the 
simulation that was used to produce the first program interface (Section E).  After the 
Phase Five Usability Analysis was completed, minor adjustments were made to the 
conceptual design, which were reflected in the subsequent program interface displayed in 
Section G. 
2. Conceptual Design 
a. Agents 
• Force Tactical Action Officer (F-TAO) 
• Ship Tactical Action Officer (TAO) 
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• Force Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (F-AAWC) 
• Ship Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (AAWC) 
• Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC) 
• Radar Systems Coordinator (RSC) 
• Missile Systems Supervisor (MSS) 
• Red Crown Watchstander (RC) 
• Electronic Warfare Control Officer (EWCO) 
• Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC) 
• Identification Supervisor (IDS) 
b. Objects 
• Simulation Scenario 
• Simulation Interface:  Shortcut Control Buttons 
• Simulation Interface:  Tactical Display 
• Simulation Interface:  Tactical Display Contact Icons  (Air, Surface) 
• Simulation Interface:  Contact Display 
• Simulation Interface:  CIC Agent Display 
• Simulation Interface:  CIC Agent Display Icons 
• Simulation Interface:  Agent Attributes Display 
• Simulation Interface:  Menu Bar 
• Simulation Interface:  CIC Equipment Display Icons 
• Simulation Interface:  CIC Equipment Pop-up Menu 
• Simulation Interface:  Contact Pop-up Menu 
• CIC Equipment (various types) 
• Simulation Interface:  Agent Pop-up Menu 
• Agent Decision History Log (one for each agent) 
• Equipment Status Log (one for each piece of equipment) 
• Scenario Event Log (one for each scenario executed) 







c. Necessary Attributes of Agents 
Decision/Psych Profile:  Type: 
 
Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Type of Decision-Maker Aggressive, Balanced, Reserved 
Situation Assessment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Tactical Situation Maintenance Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Communication Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Information Management Expert, Experienced, Basic 
AD Battle Doctrine Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Combat Leadership Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Platform Knowledge Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 1.   F-TAO. 
 
Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Situation Assessment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Tactical Situation Maintenance Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Communication Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Information Management Expert, Experienced, Basic 
AD Battle Doctrine Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Combat Leadership Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Platform Knowledge Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 2.   TAO. 
 
Decision/Psych Profile:  Level: 
 
Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Type of Decision-Maker Aggressive, Balanced, Reserved 
Situation Assessment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Tactical Situation Maintenance Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Communication Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Information Management Expert, Experienced, Basic 
AD Battle Doctrine Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Combat Leadership Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Platform Knowledge Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 3.   F-AAWC. 
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Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Situation Assessment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Tactical Situation Maintenance Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Communication Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Information Management Expert, Experienced, Basic 
AD Battle Doctrine Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Combat Leadership Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Platform Knowledge Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 4.   AAWC. 
 
Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Situation Assessment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Tactical Situation Maintenance Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Communication Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Information Management Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Systems Troubleshooting Expert, Experienced, Basic 
AEGIS Doctrine Employment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Platform Knowledge Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 5.   CSC. 
 
Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Situation Assessment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Tactical Situation Maintenance Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Radar EM Fundamentals Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Atmospheric/Environmental Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Radar Sensitivity Calibration Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Radar Power Level Calibration Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Radar System Troubleshooting Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Communication Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Radar Jamming Evaluation Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Radar Land/Sea Interface Cal. Expert, Experienced, Basic 
AEGIS Core Doctrine Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 








Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Missile Systems Employment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Situation Assessment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
CIWS Employment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Missile/CIWS Troubleshooting Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Communication Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 7.   MSS. 
 
Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Communication Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Aircraft Control Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Carrier Operations Expert, Experienced, Basic 
IFF System Operation Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 8.   Red Crown. 
 
Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Situation Assessment Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Tactical Situation Maintenance Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Radar EM Fundamentals Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Atmospheric/Environmental Expert, Experienced, Basic 
ES Equipment Operation Expert, Experienced, Basic 
ES Analysis/Classification Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Equipment Troubleshooting  Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Communications Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 9.   EWCO. 
 
Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Link Equipment Operation Expert, Experienced, Basic 
B.G. Link Equip Knowledge Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Link Communication Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Link Coordination Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Link Resolution Expert, Experienced, Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 10.   TIC. 
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Attribute Sets Proficiency Levels for Attributes 
Information Input Expert, Experienced Basic 
IFF Challenge Expert, Experienced Basic 
Query & Warning Evaluation Expert, Experienced Basic 
Communications Expert, Experienced Basic 
Watch Experience Level Expert, Experienced, Newly Qualified 
Fatigue Level Rested/Alert, Tired, Exhausted 
 
Table 11.   IDS. 
 
d. Necessary Attributes of Objects 
(1) Simulation Scenario. 
• Atmospheric Conditions (weather conditions, temperature) 
• Contact Density 
• Scenario Threat Level 
• Contact Arrival Rate 
• Hostile/Unknown Contact Aggressiveness Level 
• AEGIS Doctrine 
• Air-Defense Doctrine 
 
(2) Simulation Interface:  Shortcut Control Buttons Display. 
• Start/Continue Simulation Button 
• Pause Simulation Button 
• Stop Simulation Button 
• Increase Time Compression 
• Decrease Time Compression 
 
(3) Simulation Interface:  Tactical Display. 
• Air, Surface Contacts (clickable) 
 
(4) Simulation Interface:  Tactical Display Contact Icons. 







(5) Simulation Interface:  Contact Data Display. 
• Contact Data Display Window 
• Data for this display via left mouse button click on a Tactical Display 
Contact Icon 
 
(6) Simulation Interface:  CIC Agent Display 
• CIC Agent Icons (clickable)  
• CIC Equipment Icons (clickable) 
 
(7) Simulation Interface:  CIC Agent Display Icons (Agents). 
• Agent Attributes (specific to the agent) 
 
(8) Simulation Interface:  Agent Attributes Display. 
• Agent Attribute Display Window 
• Data for this display via left mouse button click on an Agent Display Icon  
 
(9) Simulation Interface:  Menu Bar 
• Scenario Utilities 
• Watchstander Attributes 
• CIC Equipment Setup 
• Scenario External Attributes 
• Doctrine Setup 
 
(10) Simulation Interface:  CIC Equipment Display Icons 
(Equipment) 
 
• Equipment Status (specific to the equipment) 
 
(11) Simulation Interface:  Agent Pop-up Menu (mouse right 
button click) 
 
• Display Agent Decision History Log 




(12) Simulation Interface:  CIC Equipment Pop-up Menu 
(mouse right button click) 
 
• Display CIC Equipment History Log 
• Modify CIC Equipment Attributes/Status 
 
(13) Simulation Interface:  Contact Pop-up Menu (mouse right 
button click) 
 
• Modify Contact Type/Attributes 
 
(14) CIC Equipment (various types) 
• Types of Equipment 
• SPY-1B Radar 
• Link 16 Tactical Data System 
• Link 11 Tactical Data System 
• SLQ-32 System, OJ-451 CIC Consoles 
• Readiness Levels (for each type) 
• Fully Operational 
• Partially Degraded 
• Severely degraded  
• Non-operational 
 
(15) Agent Decision History Log (one for each agent) 
• History Log 
 
(16) Equipment Status Log 
• Status/History Log 
 
(17) Scenario Event Log 









• ***CIC-perceived/assigned Data*** 
• Contact # - The simulation assigned index number for the contact 
• Track # - The CIC/Agent assigned index number 
• Classification - Hostile, Suspect, Unknown, Neutral, Friendly 
• Speed - Measured in Nautical miles per hour 
• Course - Measured in degrees true (0-359) 
• Bearing - Measured in degrees true (0-359) 
• Altitude - Measured in feet above sea level 
• ES Emissions - specific electronic equipment signal emissions 
• Type of Contact - (air, surface) 
• Specific platform - (Mig-27, F-14, patrol boat, destroyer) 
• ***Actual Data*** 
• Contact # - The simulation assigned index number for the contact 
• Track # - The CIC/Agent assigned index number 
• Classification - Hostile, Suspect, Unknown, Neutral, Friendly 
• Speed - Measured in Nautical miles per hour 
• Course - Measured in degrees true (0-359) 
• Bearing - Measured in degrees true (0-359) 
• Altitude - Measured in feet above sea level 
• ES Emissions - specific electronic equipment signal emissions 
• Type of Contact - (air, surface) 
• Specific platform - (Mig-27, F-14, patrol boat, destroyer) 
e. Agent Relationship 
• Each agent has a set of watchstander attributes that can be set/modified in 
the Watchstander Attributes menu. 
• Each agent has a one-to-one relation with the Agent Icons in the Agent 
Attribute Display and CIC Agent Display. 
• Each agent has a one-to-one relation with one Decision History Log. 
• Each agent has a zero-to-many relation with contacts (processing 
contacts). 
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• Each agent’s decision history log has one associated pop-up menu to 
display the log. 
• Each agent has a one-to-many relation with the CIC equipment. 
• Each agent has a one-to-many relation with other agents 
(communications). 
• Each agent has a one-to-one relation with an associated pop-up menu. 
• Each Simulation Scenario contains a set of CIC watchstander agents. 
f. Object Relationships 
• Each contact has a one-to-one relation with the Contact Data Display. 
• Each contact has a one-to-one relation with the Tactical Display. 
• Each contact has a one-to-many relation with agents (processed by 
agents). 
• Each contact has a one-to-one relation with the Tactical Display Icons. 
• Each contact has a one-to-many relation with CIC equipment (processed 
by equipment). 
• Each piece of CIC equipment has a one-to-one relation with CIC Agent 
Display. 
• Each piece of CIC equipment has a one-to-one relation with a CIC Agent 
Display Equipment Icon. 
• Each piece of CIC equipment has a one-to-one relation with the 
Equipment Status Log. 
• Each Equipment Status Log has a one-to-one relation with an associated 
pop-up menu. 
• Scenario Log has a one-to-one relation with an associated scenario. 
• Each Simulation Scenario Object contains the following objects: 
• Shortcut Control Buttons Display 
• Tactical Display 
• Contact Data Display 
• CIC Agent Display 
• Agent Attributes Display 
• Menu Bar 
• CIC Agent Display:  Equipment Icons (one for each watchstation) 
• CIC Agent Display:  Agent Icons (one for each agent) 
• Tactical Display:  Contact Icons (one for each contact object) 
• Agent Decision Log (one for each agent) 
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• CIC Equipment Status Log (one for each piece of equipment) 
• Scenario Event Log (one for each Scenario executed) 
• Contacts (multiple numbers) 
• Agent Pop-up Menu (associated with a selected CIC agent) 
• Contact Pop-up Menu (associated with a selected contact) 
• CIC Equipment Pop-up Menu (associated with a specific piece of 
equipment)  
g. Actions on Agents and Objects 
• Agents:  Change Attributes 
• Shortcut Control Button Display:  Select/Deselect Start/Continue Sim., 
Pause Sim., Stop Sim., Increase Time Compression, Decrease Time 
Compression buttons  
• Tactical Display:  Display, Move, & Delete Contact(s) 
• Agent Attributes Display:  Display Agent Attribute Data 
• Agent Pop-up Menu:  Display Agent Decision History Log, Change Agent 
Attributes 
• CIC Equipment Pop-up Menu:  Change Setup, Display CIC Equipment 
Status Log 
• CIC Equipment:  Change equipment readiness & setup (via CIC 
Equipment Pop-up Menu) 
• Contact Pop-up Menu:  Display/Change Contact Attributes 
• Contacts:  Change Attributes (via Contact Pop-up Menu) 
• Menu Bar:  Open, Close, Create, Save, Start/Continue, Pause, Stop 
Scenarios, Increase/Decrease Scenario Time Compression 
• Agent Decision History Log:  Append Decision Data, Delete Log 
• CIC Equipment Status Log:  Append Status Data, Delete Log 
• Scenario Event Log:  Append Scenario Event Data, Delete Log 
3. Visual Design 
During the Phase Three development of the ADC Simulation, preliminary pencil 
sketches of the simulation interface were designed.  These sketch designs covered the 
initial interfaces for the main simulation interface window as well as all of the expected 
menus and pop-up input menus that would appear from the selection of menu items.  
“The idea here is to get something visible early.  Sketches, of both screens and of task 
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flows, are useful as a first step for getting quick feedback.”39  These designs were 
presented to personnel experienced with combat information center air-defense 
operations to collect feedback early in the simulation development process.  Using pencil 
drawings implies to the reviewers that the interface design is still in the preliminary 
stages and thus constructive comments are more easily obtained (preventing resistance 
due to fear of insulting the developer).  Six sketch designs were created with one listed 
below, and the other five drawings are displayed in Appendix A.  The results of the initial 
design sketches are provided in the following section. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Preliminary Conceptual Sketches of ADC Simulation GUI. 
 
4. Early Analysis 
Two experienced reviewers were selected to review the preliminary sketches and 
provide feedback regarding the effectiveness of the ADC Simulation interface design.  
Their comments are listed below. 
 
 
                                                 
39 Mulligan, Robert M., Altom, Mark W. and Simkin, David K., “User Interface Design in the 
Trenches:  Some Tips on Shooting from the Hip”, Association of Computing Machinery, March 1991, p. 
234. 
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a. Reviewer #1 Comments 
(1) Recommendations. 
• Tactical Display:  Highlight a contact when it has been selected with the 
mouse. 
• CIC Watchstander Display:  Highlight agent or watchstation/equipment 
when it has been selected with the mouse. 
• Since the Tactical Display is the centerpiece of the simulation, prevent 
pop-up windows from displaying on top of it. 
• Employ auditory cues to alert the user when unusual or anomalous events 
occur (i.e. misidentified contact, cruiser shoots a missile) to ensure the 
user’s attention is focused on the associated situation. 
• Implement a sub-window at the bottom of the simulation screen that 
displays the top three most important contacts of interest. 
• Use tool-tips to display the contact’s track number and actual (as opposed 
to the CIC perceived) basic data such as altitude, speed, and course. 
(2) Comments on Recommendations. 
• Will implement. 
• Will implement. 
• Will attempt to implement.  Controlling the location of a pop-up window 
is not always possible. 
• Will implement. 
• Most likely will not implement in this form.  The symbols used in the 
simulation distinguish among hostile, friendly, and unknown contacts as 
well as whether they are surface or air contacts.  Additionally, the hostile, 
unknown, and red contact types will be classified by color, red, yellow, 
and blue, respectively.  If the recommended feature is implemented, it will 
probably be used to list the hostile contacts for ease of reference. 
• Will implement. 
b. Reviewer #2  
(1) Recommendations. 
• If appropriate, change the “Scenario Utilities” menu name to “File” since 
most of the menu’s actions are similar to options found in most Microsoft 
“File” menus.  This will enhance the understandability and learnability of 
the simulation. 
• Shortcut Control Button Display:  Add a display to show the current time 
compression ratio. 
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• When the simulation program is initially loaded, implement a default 
setting for all of the watchstander attributes, CIC equipment settings, 
scenario external attributes, and doctrine setup so the user can run the 
program immediately.  (Currently, the design is for the user to manually 
configure all of these features before running the simulation, or they will 
receive an error prompting them to complete the task.) 
• Use the Java Help Set API to organize help information throughout the 
simulation. 
(2) Comments on Recommendations. 
• Will take this under consideration.  Although this is an appealing 
recommendation, there are some options under that menu which did not 
lend themselves to the typical “File” menu actions. 
• Will implement with one possible modification.  The “Time Compression 
Ratio” display may be placed underneath the simulation “time elapsed” 
display to allow the user one place to look for time-related information. 
• Will implement with two modifications.  First, upon attempting to run the 
simulation for the first time (with the default settings), the user will be 
asked whether they he or she would like to re-configure the scenario 
settings.  The second modification will be to allow the user to use a setup 
wizard to configure the scenario to desired settings. 
• Will implement.  This recommendation originated from a discussion of 
involving the implementation of a “Help/Amplification” button on the 
Watchstander Attributes, CIC Equipment Setup, Scenario External 
Attributes, and Doctrine Setup menu-item pop-up input windows to 
provide the user some amplifying information concerning the various 
setting options (i.e. Basic, Experienced, Expert).  We intended to include 
this capability in the simulation, and Reviewer #2 recommended that this 
capability could be further organized in a larger simulation “Help Feature” 
utilizing the Java Help Set API. 
E. UCD PROCESS PHASE FOUR:  ADC SIMULATION INTERFACE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
During Phase Four, we used the design sketches to implement a working 
prototype of the ADC Simulation interface.  The prototype was developed using the Java 





Figure 10.   Early Implementation of ADC Simulation GUI before Usability Analysis. 
 
F UCD PROCESS PHASE FIVE:  USABILITY ANALYSIS OF ADC 
SIMULATION INTERFACE 
1. Usability Analysis Introduction 
The Usability Analysis phase is an essential (and often ignored) portion of a 
software or hardware system evaluation and, as discussed earlier, can often lead to more 
profound problems later for the users of the system.  A working, interactive prototype of 
the ADC Simulation interface was developed (see t Figure 3) for the evaluation of the 
system for several reasons.   
[First,] building the prototype forces critical thinking about details of the 
interface, brining to the surface issues that are not obvious when looking 
at static screens.  [Second,] live demos of the prototype are important for 
getting buy-in for your design…[Third,] the prototype can also, of course, 
provide valuable usability data to feed the iterative design process.  
Finally, the prototype itself . . . becomes part of your user interface 
requirements.40 
Subject Matter Experts (SME) from the AEGIS Training and Readiness Center (ATRC) 
Detachment in San Diego, California, were selected to evaluate the ADC Simulation 
interface thoroughly.                                                    
40 Ibid. 
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Before the evaluation occurred, we generated a comprehensive list of common 
tasks that a potential user of the system would need to perform to test the usability of the 
interface, and these tasks were then evaluated by the team.  This pre-test was conducted 
to calculate preliminary performance data that was used to construct the task list data-
recording sheet.  Two types of task attributes of the evaluators were analyzed:  (1) initial 
performance of certain tasks and (2) the learnability of the system.  The Initial 
Performance attribute tested the evaluators ability to perform a task based on the 
intuitiveness and comparative familiarity of the interface with other previously 
experienced (and possibly similar interfaces) and with generally “seems like the logical 
action to take” to complete the task.  The Learnability attribute examined the level of ease 
or difficulty required to learn how to use the interface.  This attribute was measured by 
prompting the evaluators to perform certain tasks either similar in some manner or 
identical to previously performed tasks in earlier in the session.  To capture the 
performance of the evaluators, two metrics were selected when they conducted a task, (1) 
total time to complete the task and (2) number of errors while performing the task.  Prior 
to commencing a trial, each SME was informed the objective of the evaluation was to test 
the overall usability of the ADC Simulation and that their performance (whether positive 
or negative) was indicative of the system’s “user-friendliness” (or lack thereof), not a 
measure of their personal skill or intelligence.  This statement was given primarily to set 
the evaluator at ease so they would provide the maximum amount of feedback concerning 
the interface.  
2. Task List Overview 
The following set of tasks was part of the evaluation of the simulation.  A 
majority of the tasks require the user to set various attributes of the simulation program 
via either the menu bar options or icons and buttons in the GUI.  These tasks are 
representative of the majority of the tasks that will be performed by the user when 
running the fully operational simulation.  Following the SME’s evaluation of the ADC 
Simulation, they were given a survey to rate the usability of the interface and were 
provided a post-testing feedback session to discuss the design of the interface with the 
developer.  The results of the usability analysis are listed below and in Appendix B 
(detailed data and comparison charts/graphs). 
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TASK # TASK NAME 
1 Open Scenario Menu 
2 Open Watchstander Attributes Menu 
3 Open CIC Equipment Setup Menu 
4 Open Scenario Doctrine Setup Menu 
5 Open Scenario External Attributes Menu 
6 Open Simulation Logs Menu 
7 Change the Maximum time it takes a Watchstander to complete a Task 
8 Select a contact to display data in the Contact Data Display Window 
9 Select the F-TAO watchstander to display data in the Agent Attributes 
Window 
10 Open a contact’s Pop-up Options Window 
11 Open the F-TAO Pop-up Options Window 
12 Increase the Time Compression of the Simulation 
13 Pause the Simulation 
14 Pause the Simulation (Alternate method) 
15 Set the Situation Assessment Skill Level to Expert for the Force TAO (F-
TAO) 
16 Set the Fatigue Level to Exhausted for the RSC 
17 Set the SPY-1B Radar Equipment Readiness Level to Non-Operational 
18 Set the ADC Doctrine Query Range to 30 NM & Warning Range to 20 NM 
19 Set the Scenario Threat Level to Red 
20 Open the Scenario Event Log 
21 Open the SLQ-32 System Status Log 
22 Set the Performance Probabilities Watchstander Fatigue levels to (0.5, 0.7, 
0.9) 
23 Change the Maximum time for the F-TAO Watchstander to complete a task 
24 Change the speed of the Hostile Air contact to 500 KTS 
25 Change the F-AAWC Experience Attribute to Expert 
26 Change the Link Equipment Status to Partially Degraded 
 
Table 12.   List of Tasks 
 
3. Subject Profile 
The subjects for this study came from the AEGIS Training & Readiness Center 
(ATRC) Detachment, San Diego, CA.  The evaluation of the AEGIS Cruiser Combat 
Information Center (CIC) Air-Defense Simulation was conducted on 12-13 September 
2002 at the ATRC Detachment.  The subjects’ air-defense experience ranged between 10 
to 20 years, and their ranks spanned E-7 (Chief Petty Officer) to O-3 (Lieutenant). 
• Subject #1:  Chief Petty Officer/E-7 (Operations Specialist) 
• Subject #2:  Senior Chief Petty Officer/E-8 (Operations Specialist) 
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• Subject #3:  Senior Chief Petty Officer/E-8 (Fire Control Technician) 
• Subject #4:  Chief Petty Officer/E-7 (Operations Specialist) 
• Subject #5:  Lieutenant/O-3 (Surface Warfare Officer/Prior Enlisted) 
4. Data Collection 
A set of twenty-six tasks was formulated as part of the evaluation of the CIC Air-
Defense Simulation GUI.  These tasks ensured the subjects interacted with all of the 
major aspects of the simulation to collect a comprehensive set of data about user 
performance.  Two performance metrics were recorded during the evaluation process:  
number of errors committed while performing the task and total time to successfully 
complete the task. 
TASK # USABILITY 
ATTRIBUTE 
VALUE TO MEASURE 
1 Initial Performance # of Errors  Length of time to successfully complete task 
2 Initial Performance Length of time to successfully complete task 
3 Initial Performance Length of time to successfully complete task 
4 Initial Performance # of Errors 
5 Initial Performance Length of time to successfully complete task 
6 Initial Performance # of Errors 
7 Initial Performance # of Errors  Length of time to successfully complete task 
8 Initial Performance Length of time to successfully complete task 
9 Initial Performance # of Errors 
10 Initial Performance # of Errors 
11 Initial Performance Length of time to successfully complete task 
12 Initial Performance # of Errors  Length of time to successfully complete task 
13 Initial Performance # of Errors   Length of time to successfully complete task 
14 Initial Performance # of Errors  Length of time to successfully complete task 
15 Learnability Length of time to successfully complete task 
16 Learnability # of Errors 
17 Learnability # of Errors 
18 Learnability Length of time to successfully complete task 
19 Learnability Length of time to successfully complete task 
20 Learnability # of Errors 
21 Learnability Length of time to successfully complete task 
22 Learnability # of Errors  Length of time to successfully complete task 
23 Learnability # of Errors 
24 Learnability # of Errors  Length of time to successfully complete task 
25 Learnability # of Errors   Length of time to successfully complete task 
26 Learnability # of Errors   Length of time to successfully complete task 
 
Table 13.   Usability Analysis Attributes. 
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5. Analysis of Task Data 
For each task, either the primary and secondary measurement values or two 
primary measurement values are provided.  In the case of the former set of measurement 
values, the primary value has the best case, worst case, and target level for the 
measurements included with the average value for that measurement.  For the latter set of 
measurement values, they both include the best cases, worst cases, and target levels for 
those measurements.  Following each summary table are comment blocks for noteworthy 
errors and memorability/learnability issues that were encountered during the evaluations.  
The best case, worst case, and target levels for number of errors and times to complete 
tasks were determined during the initial development of the task list.  Listed in Appendix 
B is a summary breakdown of the key data collected from the five subjects’ evaluations 
of each task they were requested to perform.   
6. Analysis of Subject Evaluation Surveys 
After each session, the subject was given a survey to record his evaluation of the 
usability of the simulation.  Based on the results of the surveys, the subjects generally 
evaluated the simulation’s interface favorably.  The survey was divided into the 
following four categories: 
• Screen Layout 
• Overall Display Layout relative for menu-bars and pop-up menus 
• Menu Location & Wording 
• Task Completion 
a. Screen Layout 
The average survey scores ranged between 3.8 and 4.4 out of a scale of 5, 
which indicated the subjects generally felt the simulation’s Screen Layout was between 
“Acceptable” and “Best Possible.”  The individual subjects’ breakouts are displayed in 
Figure 18, but out of a total of forty possible selections for this category (eight per subject 
for 5 subjects), thirteen (13) were rated with a score of 5.0, sixteen (16) with a score of 
4.0, and eleven (11) with a score of 3.0.  There were no areas rated below 3.0. 
b. Overall Display Layout Relative for Menu-Bars and Pop-Up 
Menus  
The average survey scores ranged between 4.0 and 4.4 out of a scale of 5, 
which indicated the subjects generally felt the simulation’s Overall Display Layout was 
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near “Best Possible.”  The individual subjects’ breakouts are displayed in Figure 20, but 
out of a total forty possible selections for this category (eight per subject – 5 subjects), 
fifteen (15) were rated with a score of 5.0, fifteen (15) were rated with a score of 4.0, and 
ten (10) with a score of 3.0.  There were no areas rated below 3.0. 
c. Menu Location and Wording  
The average survey scores were 3.8 out of a scale of 5, which indicated the 
subjects generally felt the simulation’s Menu Location & Wording was between 
“Acceptable” and “Best Possible”, but closer to the “Acceptable” middle value.  The 
individual subjects’ breakouts are displayed in Figure 22, but out of a total fifteen 
possible selections for this category (three per subject for 5 subjects), six (6) were rated 
with a score of 5.0 and nine (9) with a score of 3.0.  There were no areas rated below 3.0.  
The lower scores in this category are possibly due to some of the difficulty a couple of 
the subjects encountered when trying to perform tasks involving the selection of menus 
(regular & pop-ups) that were not intuitive for them.  Details for some of these 
difficulties were discussed in the “Analysis of Task Data” and “Overall Simulation 
Analysis” sections in Appendix B, and their remedies provided in the 
“Recommendations” section below. 
d. Ease of Performance of the Task Completion List  
The average survey scores ranged between 3.6 and 4.2 out of a scale of 5, 
which indicated the subjects generally felt the ease of performance of the simulation’s 
Task Completion list was between “Acceptable” and “Best Possible.”  The individual 
subjects’ breakouts are displayed in Figure 24, but out of a total twenty-five possible 
selections for this category (five per subject for 5 subjects), eight (8) were rated with a 
score of 5.0, seven (7) were rated with a score of 4.0, and ten (10) with a score of 3.0.  
There were no areas rated below 3.0.  Again, the lower scores in this category are 
possibly due to some of the difficulty a couple of the subjects encountered when trying to 
perform tasks involving the selection of menus (regular & pop-ups) that were not 






After each evaluation session, the events of the session were reviewed with the 
participant, and requests were solicited for recommendations to improve the usability of 
the simulation.  The subjects provided the following recommendations: 
a. Subject #1 
• Place information sub-window displays (i.e. Contact Data & Watchstander 
Attribute Displays) on one side of the screen and action/interface displays 
(i.e. CIC Agent & Shortcut Control Button Displays) on the other side. 
• Change the “Watchstander Tasks & Skills” menu to another name (“Task 
& Skill Modifiers” recommended) to prevent confusion with the 
“Watchstander Attributes” menu.  
• Upgrade the CIC Agent Display icons to have all of the “Watchstander 
Attribute” options from the menu bar in the icon’s pop-up menu. 
b. Subject #2 
• On the Shortcut Control Button Display and “File” menu, change the 
usage of the term “Simulations” to “Scenario” to promote increased 
familiarity.  This term is more recognizable/understandable to the potential 
users of the system. 
• Upgrade the CIC Agent Display icons to have all of the “Watchstander 
Attribute” options from the menu bar in the icon’s pop-up menu. 
• Implement a “Zoom In/Out” feature for the map in the Tactical Display. 
c. Subject #3 
• Implement a “Zoom In/Out” feature for the map in the Tactical Display. 
• Increase the font size in the Simulation Interface. 
• Rename the “Start/Continue Simulation” button on the Shortcut Control 
Button Display and in the “File” menu to “Run/Continue” to prevent 
confusion with “Open Scenario.” 
• Upgrade the CIC Agent Display icons to have all of the “Watchstander 
Attribute” options from the menu bar in the icon’s pop-up menu. 
d. Subject #4 
• Rename the “Watchstander Tasks & Skills” menu to another name 
(“Probabilities & Tasks” recommended) to prevent confusion with the 
“Watchstander Attributes” menu. 
• Implement an optional “Simulation Setup Wizard” feature to assist with 




e. Subject #5 
• Rename the “Watchstander Tasks & Skills” menu to another name 
(“Probabilities & Tasks” recommended) to prevent confusion with the 
“Watchstander Attributes” menu. 
• Upgrade the CIC Agent Display icons to have all of the “Watchstander 
Attribute” options from the menu bar in the icon’s pop-up menu. 
G. UCD PROCESS PHASE SIX:  INTERFACE MODIFICATION/REDESIGN 
Phase Six of the UCD process involved the modifying of the Air-Defense 
Simulation interface to implement user-design alterations.  Eligible modifications were 
drawn from the quantitative data (charts and graphs) derived from the usability analysis 
as well as from the qualitative comments provided by the Subject Matter Experts.  The 
figure below displays the updated program interface following the changes. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Updated ADC Simulation GUI following Usability Analysis. 
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IV. DESCRIPTION OF THE ADC SIMULATION PROGRAM 
DESIGN AND STRUCTURE 
A. PROGRAM LANGUAGE AND SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS FOR ADC 
SIMULATION 
The ADC Simulation was written in the Java Language (Java Development Kit 
Version 1.3.1) and was developed using the JBuilder 5© Application Development 
Environment.  The simulation was designed to run on a system with the following 
requirements: 
• Pentium 3 or equivalent and higher. 
• Minimum 256 megabytes of RAM (512 megabytes preferred). 
• A system with Java Development Kit Version 1.3.1 or higher installed. 
• Screen display of 1600 x 1200 pixels. 
The processing power and memory requirements are emphasized because the ADC 
Simulation is a multithreaded program, which places substantial demands on the 
computer system.  Multithreading is a feature of the Java Language, which allows various 
components in a program (in this case the ADC Simulation) to employ time division 
multiple access or timesharing on a computing systems resources (single process and 
memory) to perform multiple tasks in a simulated parallelism.  This capability of the Java 
language was essential to the development of the ADC Simulation because the program 
attempts to emulate a human activity and process that occurs in parallel. 
B. DISCUSSION ABOUT MULTI-AGENT SYSTEMS 
The ADC Simulation watchstanders were implemented using a multi-agent system 
(MAS) technology where each was designed as an “agent”.  Within the context of this 
simulation, an agent is a component of software that: 
• Is capable of acting in an environment; 
• Can communicate directly with other agents; 
• Is driven by tendencies (in the form of individual objectives or of a 
satisfaction/survival function which it tries to optimize); 
• Possesses resources of its own; 
• Is capable of perceiving its environment (but to a limited extent); 
• Has only a partial representation of this environment; 
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• Possesses skills and can offer services; 
• Has behavior that tends toward satisfying its objectives, taking account of 
the resources and skills available to it and depending on its perception, its 
representations and the communications it receives.41 
The watchstander agents in the ADC Simulation contain intent and objectives (perform 
their assigned duties), communicate amongst each other to achieve their objectives, and 
possess resources (skill, experience, fatigue, and decision-maker type attributes as well as 
combat systems equipment).  They perceive their environment to a limited extent since 
each watchstander agent either receives this information via combat systems sensory 
equipment or through verbal communications (from other watchstander agents) or CIC 
watchstation information display systems.   The watchstander agents offer services to 
each other by disseminating information vital to their performance of air-defense duties 
and operations of the CIC, and influence within the environment (and other agents) 
through their actions (i.e. Force TAO classification of aircraft as Hostile).   
MAS technology is a blending of the cognitive/social sciences (psychology, ethology, 
sociology, philosophy), the natural sciences (ecology, biology), and the computer 
sciences since they simultaneously model, explain, and simulate natural phenomena (in 
this case human behavior in the ADC Simulation) and provide models for self-
organization.42  Traditionally programming is often very mechanistic, hierarchical, and 
modular and, subsequently, does not lend itself well to simulating the often surprising 
(whether organized or chaotic) behavior of interactive human and environmental systems. 
However, MAS technology is less restrictive in its design, and this produces simulation 
behavior often more akin to that observed in the real world.  The term “multi-agent 
system” is applied to a system comprising the following elements: 
• An environment, E, that is, a space which generally has a volume. 
• objects, O.  These objects are situated; that is to say, it is possible at any 
given moment to associate any object with a position in E.  These objects 
are passive, that is, they can be perceived, created, destroyed and modified 
by the agents. 
                                                 
41 Ferber, Jacques, Multi-Agent Systems:  An Introduction to Distributed Artificial Intelligence, 
Addison-Wesley, 1999, p. 11.  
42 Ferber, p. xv. 
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• An assembly of agents, A, which are specified objects (A ⊆ O), 
representing the active entities of the system. 
• An assembly of relations, R, which link objects (and thus agents) to each 
other. 
• An assembly of operations, Op, making it possible for the agents of A to 
perceive, produce, consume, transform and manipulate objects from O. 
• Operations with the task of representing the application of these operations 
and the reaction of the world to this attempt at modification.43 
In the ADC Simulation, the watchstander agents perform their duties within a layer of 
environments (Combat Information inside of the AEGIS cruiser within the battle group’s 
operational area) that contain a multitude of objects (aircraft contacts).  The watchstander 
agents can execute operations to perceive the environment as well as the objects in it and 
communicate with each other.  Conversely, the objects within the ADC Simulation 
environment can also perform operations to perceive and interact with the AEGIS cruiser 
(and thus affecting the watchstander agents) and aircraft carrier. These operations are 
governed by relationships that determine the scope and degree to which the operations 
can occur.    
The watchstander agents possess several attributes which enhance their simulated 
performance as human watchstanders. The agents have been imbued with a pervasive 
intent that drives them to attempt to accurately detect, evaluate, and classify as many 
aircraft contacts as possible and to take appropriate measures to protect the battle group.  
This intent to achieve their objective requires a substantial level of collaboration, 
cooperation, and communication. 
1. Coordinated Collaboration 
The simulated CIC watch team’s performance of the air-defense duties can be 
categorized as coordinated collaboration among the watchstander agents.  Coordinated 
collaboration assumes that the agents have compatible goals but possess insufficient 
skills and resources.   
Complex collaboration supposes that the agents have to coordinate their 
actions to procure the synergic advantages of pooled skills…Coordinated 
collaboration is the most complex of cooperation situations, since it 
                                                 
43 Ferber, p. 11. 
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combines task allocation problems with aspects of coordination shaped by 
limited resources.44 
The compatible goals, but insufficient skills and resources closely describe the 
environment of the CIC (both actual and simulated).  Conducting the battle group air-
defense duties and managing its battlespace requires an enormous amount of resources, 
and one agent (or person) would be unable to perform these requirements singly.  There 
simply is not enough time to adequately conduct these operations alone or enough 
capacity to absorb, process, and act on the information provided, effectively and 
efficiently.  The successful performance of the air-defense duties is primarily due to the 
collaborative combination of the different sets of skills, experiences, and other attributes 
of the watchstanders assigned to various watchstations that allows them to coordinate 
their information and activities to achieve their objectives together. 
2. Anticipative-Reactive Agents 
Another aspect of the watchstander agents that bears examination is the nature of 
their behavior in the performance of their duties specifically relating to planning (or 
failure to plan) for future events.  This concept is known as cognitive/reactive opposition 
and is defined as the  
capacity or lack of capacity to anticipate future events and to prepare for 
them.  Reactive agents, by the very fact that they have no representation of 
their environment or of other agents are incapable of foreseeing what is 
going to happen, and thus anticipating by planning what actions to take.  
Cognitive agents, on the other hand, by their capacity for reasoning based 
on representations of the world, are capable…of memorizing situations, 
analyzing them, foreseeing possible reactions their actions, using these to 
decide on conduct during future events, and so planning their own 
behavior.45 
With these two ends of the spectrum fixed, where do the watchstander agents in the ADC 
Simulation fall?  The watchstander agents’ performance model more closely resembles 
the description of reactive agents, but they also possess a moderate level of anticipative 
behavior.  In a general sense, the watchstander agents do not conduct complex planning 
for future events, but on a less sophisticated level, they have anticipative behaviors.  At 
                                                 
44 Ferber, p. 67. 
45 Ferber, p. 19. 
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the individual watchstander agent level, many of the agents who must evaluate aircraft 
contacts as part of their duties use a prioritization selection process (described in Section 
M of this chapter) to determine which contact they will evaluate next.  This selection 
process employs all contact’s descriptive cues and attributes to predict its threat potential 
to the battle group.  At the CIC team level, the entire air-defense process can be described 
as an organized, predictive attempt to use all team’s resources to detect and track the 
aircraft contacts of the greatest potential threat and take appropriate actions to reduce, 
mitigate, or eliminate those threats before rendered incapable to do so (by attack). 
3. Adaptation and Evolution 
Adaptation and Evolution are two important concepts in multi-agent systems that 
deal with the discussion of learning and evolution, respectively.  “We can see the 
problem of structural and behavioral adaptation of an assembly of agents in two different 
ways:  either as an individual characteristic of the agents – and we then talk of learning – 
or as a collective process brining reproductive mechanisms into play, which we call 
evolution”.46  Evolution is not incorporated into the ADC Simulation because the 
program only deals with a complex problem that only occurs within a very finite period 
of time.  Although adaptation was also not explicitly implemented in the simulation, to a 
limited extent it occurs as a byproduct of the CIC team’s attempt to classify the aircraft 
contacts and take appropriate actions to respond to them.  The act of classifying the 
aircraft shifts the perceptions of the watchstanders resulting in a corresponding shift in 
their behavior in evaluating and acting on the contact in the future. 
4. Cooperation within the Multi-Agent System 
Cooperation among agents occurs when they engage in a common action after 
identifying and adopting a common goal, an essential element in social activity.47  
Cooperation is an essential attribute in an actual CIC performing air defense, and this 
concept was implemented into the development of the ADC Simulation CIC team.  
However, it is difficult to quantify or qualify the occurrence of cooperation within a 
multi-agent system by examining the simulation’s internal specifications.  Based on E H. 
Durfee and T. Bouron discussions, Ferber defined the verification of cooperation  
                                                 
46 Ferber, p. 52. 
47 Ferber, p. 70. 
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…as a description of the activity of an assembly of agents by an external 
observer who need have no access to the mental states of the agents…For 
example the behavior of ants is described as cooperative, this is because, 
when we observe them, we observe a certain number of phenomena which 
are used as indicators of cooperative activity.  The idea of a cooperation 
indicator is of particular interest, for it allows us to get away from the 
internal characteristics of agents and consider their observable behavior.48  
Consequently, the following indicators were postulated to describe cooperative activity: 
• The coordination of actions, which concerns the adjustment of the 
direction of agents’ actions in time and space. 
• The degree of “parallelization”, which depends on the distribution of tasks 
and their concurrent execution. 
• The sharing of resources, which concerns the use of resources and skills. 
• The robustness of the system, which concerns the system’s aptitude for 
making up for any failure by an agent. 
• The non-redundancy of actions, which characterizes the low rate of 
redundant activities. 
• The non-persistence of conflicts, which testifies to the small number of 
blocking situations. 
An observer can determine whether cooperative behavior is occurring by applying these 
indicators of which the first four are relevant to the ADC Simulation.  As for the first 
indicator, the coordination of actions and cooperation of the watchstander agents results 
in an adjustment in their actions, which is typified when a watchstander makes an initial 
detection of an aircraft contact.  Once the first report of the contact is transmitted, the 
other key sensory watchstanders will focus their attention on the aircraft contact with the 
purpose of collecting all relevant information about it as quickly as possible and passing 
it to the Force TAO for a subsequent classification.  This focused response by the 
watchstander agents reduces the overall time required to gather the contact’s necessary 
data while providing the Force TAO with as much information as possible to make an 
informed decision regarding its classification than otherwise would have been possible 
without cooperation.   
The second indicator, parallelization of effort (based on distributed tasks and their 
concurrent execution), occurs within the simulated CIC team as a product of the 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
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watchstander agent’s performance of their watchstation duties.  Each agent has a different 
but vital role to perform in the air-defense process, and they execute their duties in 
parallel with each other to achieve the collective objective.   
Sharing of resources, the third indicator, is also present in the simulation as 
demonstrated by the watch team coordination discussed above.  The watchstander agents 
can be considered, to a certain extent, resources and skills themselves that are available to 
the Force TAO in the performance of the air-defense duties.  Whenever the Force TAO or 
other watchstander makes a request or order to another watchstander, the subsequent 
performance of that task by the specified agent is an example of the sharing of that 
watchstander’s time and skills. 
The fourth indicator, robustness, is a cornerstone of both actual and simulated 
CIC operations.  Each of the sensory watchstanders provides a different aspect of the air-
defense picture to help the Force TAO visualize the overall situation, and it is expected 
that some of the watchstander information provided may conflict.  The purpose of having 
these varied sensory pictures (radar, IFF, Link 11/16, ES, queries/warnings, and visual 
identification) is to deliver to the Force TAO enough information that if conflicts do 
exist, either the incorrect data will easily be discovered (and discarded) or the Force TAO 
realizes the ambiguity of the situation and takes appropriate actions to alleviate its 
nebulousness.  In either case, the multiple data inputs by the CIC watch team are 
designed to overcome failures and mistakes by one or more watchstanders. 
5. Connector-Based Multi-Agent Systems (CMAS) 
Many of the interactions and communications among watchstander agents are 
coordinated by the use of interface components called connectors.  As defined by John 
Hiles, connectors coordinate the activities of multiple agents.  
In our software world connectors have the following operations.   They 
can be extended, which means that their type information is known outside 
of the agent, or they can be retracted, in which case the type information 
is pulled back inside the agent.  An extended connector is waiting for a 
complementary or matching connector.  When two connectors match, the 
operation is called a connection.49 
                                                 
49 Hiles, John, Integrated Asymmetric Goal Organization (IAGO): A Multiagent Model of Conceptual 
Blending, The MOVES Institute, 2002, p.10. 
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In the ADC Simulation, connectors are used in the communication aspects between the 
CIC watchstanders, communications between the watchstanders and aircraft contacts, and 
to govern the actions of the CIC watchstanders on the aircraft contacts (i.e. query, engage 
with missiles, etc.).  Each of the watchstander agents has connectors that can integrate 
with any of the other agents, if an information exchange is desired.  This capability is 
most frequently manifested in the passing of message reports concerning the attributes of 
aircraft contacts under evaluation.  Sets of connectors also exist to allow the watchstander 
agents to interact with the aircraft contacts through both communications and actions.  
The implementation of connectors into the simulation produced a significant level of 
flexibility in the communications and interactive aspects of the program because it 
enabled the agents as well as the objects (aircraft) to establish and maintain a more 
realistic interface. 
C. OVERALL VISUAL DESIGN OF THE SIMULATION 
1. Tactical Display 
The Tactical Display, show below in Figure 12 is the center of visual activity  
in the ADC Simulation program.  It is on this screen where the user is provided a view of 
the Arabian Gulf region to observe the events the interaction between the AEGIS cruiser 
and the aircraft contacts throughout the operational area.  The Tactical Display shows the 
movement of the aircraft contacts across the battle group’s airspace and uses color 
backgrounds to indicate the status of the aircraft with respect to the CIC team’s air-
defense process.  In the ADC Simulation, aircraft contacts only have three classifications, 
Friendly, Neutral, and Hostile, and these classifications are used when the user looks at 
the actual identification information in the CIC Contact Display (discussed in the next 
section).  Friendly aircraft consist of only U.S. aircraft while Neutral aircraft are always 
commercial airliners.  Iranian and Iraqi military aircraft are designated as Hostile 
regardless of their intentions (i.e., they are still hostile even on a patrol and not exhibiting 
an attacking behavior).   
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Figure 12.   ADC Simulation Tactical Display. 
 
Though these classifications provide clear boundaries for distinguishing types of aircraft, 
in the reality of the perceived environment of the CIC team five classification types are 
possible, Friendly, Neutral, Unknown, Suspect, and Hostile.  These additional 
classifications used by the Navy acknowledge that a CIC team may never have complete 
information on an aircraft contact.  The Suspect classification indicates that an aircraft’s 
overall behavior is potentially hostile, but enough data does not exist to reach that 
conclusion.  By classifying an aircraft as Suspect, it cues the team to give it a greater 
attention since it could be more of a threat than other aircraft.  The Unknown 
classification is the “catch-all” category for the CIC team for aircraft with inadequate 
information to make a relevant decision about identification.  In the ADC Simulation, all 
aircraft contacts are initially classified as Unknown.  Figure 4 shows the classification 




Figure 13.   ADC Simulation Aircraft Classification Icons. 
 
If the aircraft’s background is highlighted in green, then it has not been detected and 
processed by the Radar Systems Controller watchstander.  Conversely, if the background 
color is yellow, the Force TAO has classified the aircraft incorrectly (i.e. classified 
hostile when it was a friend).  The Tactical Display is also interactive and allows the user 
to select contacts to view their data, modify aircraft contact attributes (discussed in a 
following section), and modify other scenario attributes. 
If the aircraft’s background is highlighted in green, it has not been detected and processed 
by the Radar Systems Controller watchstander.  Conversely, if the background color is 
yellow, the Force TAO has classified the aircraft incorrectly (i.e. classified hostile when 
it was a friend).  The Tactical Display is interactive and allows the user to select contacts 
to view their data, modify aircraft contact attributes (discussed in a following section), 
and modify other scenario attributes. 
2. Contact Data Display 
This (shown below in Figure 14) displays two sets of data concerning an aircraft 
contact selected by the user in the Tactical Display window.  The first set of data labeled 
“CIC Actual Data” is the ground truth information containing the valid data about the 
aircraft.  The second set of data labeled “CIC Perceived Data” displays the data 




Figure 14.   Contact Data Display. 
 
If the watchstanders have made errors during their assessment of the contacts, 
then information in this part of the display will differ from that in the CIC Actual Data 
portion. 
3. Scenario Control Buttons 
The Scenario Control Buttons display provides the user with shortcuts for tasks 
frequently used during the running of scenarios.  These options include increasing  
 
Figure 15.   Scenario Control Buttons Display. 
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the time compression, decreasing the time compression, starting / continuing a scenario, 
pausing a scenario, and stopping a scenario.  The display is listed above in Figure 15. 
4. CIC Watchstander Display and Watchstander Attributes Display  
The CIC Watchstander Display (Figure 16) is an interactive component that gives 
the user both a top-view look at the team and the option to modify various watchstander 
attributes.  The interactive portion of the display consists of watchstander icons (circles) 
which can be selected with the mouse.  If the user clicks on an icon, the corresponding 
watchstander’s attributes (skills, experience, etc.) will be displayed in the Watchstander 
Attributes Display (also shown below in Figure 5).  In the CIC Watchstander Display,  
watchstander icons are color-coded.  Icons in blue designate watchstanders who are 
primarily assigned to collect and assess sensory information about aircraft contacts for 
dissemination to the CIC team.  Icons shown in red are primarily decision-makers who 
act on the information provided by the sensory watchstanders and give orders to the 
watchstanders in yellow who are the primary personnel to carry out defensive and 
offensive actions. 
In addition to these icons, each of the watchstanders has a Mental Activity 
Indicator (MAI) at the top of the watchstation location.  The MAI displays the status of 
the task currently being performed by the watchstander and will flash red (high priority), 
yellow (medium priority), or green (low priority).    
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Figure 16.   CIC Watchstander Display and Watchstander Attributes Display. 
 
The MAI provides an indication of the mental load and stress the watchstander is 
experiencing and will correspond to the level of overall activity in a given scenario. 
D. ADC SIMULATION PROGRAM:  MENU OPTIONS 
The following is an outline of the available options from the Main Menu Bar. 
  
 
Figure 17.   ADC Simulation Main Menu Bar. 
 
The following is a listing of the available options from the Main Menu Bar. 
1.   File Menu Options 
• Open Scenario (not implemented) 
• Close Scenario (not implemented) 
• Close & Save Scenario (not implemented) 
• Set Scenario Time Length 
• Run/Continue Scenario 
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• Pause Scenario 
• Stop Scenario  
• Increase Time Compression 
• Decrease Time Compression 
• Scenario Sound ON/OFF Option 
• Run Scenario Setup Wizard 
• Exit Program 
2.   Watchstander Attributes Menu 




• Set Experience Levels 
• Newly Qualified 
• Experienced 
• Expert 
• Set Fatigue Levels 
• Fully Rested 
• Tired 
• Exhausted 
• Set Decision-Maker Type 
• Cautious 
• Balanced 
• Aggressive  
3. CIC Equipment Setup Menu 
• Set Equipment Readiness Levels 
• Fully Operational 
• Partially Degraded 





• Set Scenario Equipment Failure Option 
• Enabled 
• Disabled 
• Input Equipment Settings (not implemented) 
4.   Scenario External Attributes Menu 
• Set Weather Conditions 
• Clear Weather 
• Heavy Rain 
• Heavy Clutter 








• Set Hostile Contact Level 
• Low 
• Medium  
• High 
5.   Doctrine Setup Menu 
• Set Air Defense Commander Doctrine (not implemented) 
• Set AEGIS Doctrine 
6. Simulation Logs Menu 
• Open Scenario Event Log 
• Open Watchstander Decision History Log 
• Open CIC Equipment Status Log 
• Open Watchstander Performance Log 




7. Task Times and Probabilities Menu 
• Modify Attribute Probabilities 
• Set Maximum Task Times 
8. Time Factor Ratio and Simulation Time Windows 
These windows inform the user of the current time in the simulation and the ratio 
of simulation time to standard time.  Scenarios always start at 1200 hours and use 
military time references.  The highest level of time compression allowed in the simulation 
is sixty-four seconds of simulation elapsed time for every second of elapsed actual time 
(64:1). 
E. DESIGN/STRUCTURE OF AIRCRAFT CONTACTS  
1.   Overview 
The aircraft contact is the fundamental object in the simulation and, consequently, 
has the greatest level of detail (aside from the agents), complexity, and behaviors.  
Similar to air defense in the real world, the entire simulation (specifically the 
watchstander agents) is focused on the detection, processing, and classification of these 
contacts by the CIC team and producing the resultant log and performance data.  As 
Figure 6 shows, an aircraft contact object is divided into two components, the Actual 
Contact Data module and the CIC Team Perceived/Determined Contact Data module.  
The Actual Contact Data module contains the correct attributes of the contact and is only 
available to the user via the GUI display (Contact Data Display).  The CIC 
Perceived/Determined Contact Data module contains the perceived characteristics/data 
concerning the specified contact and is based on the watchstander agents’ analysis of the 
contact, which is affected by experience levels, skill levels, fatigue levels, etc.  Data 





Figure 18.   Generalized Aircraft Contact Object. 
 
An aircraft contact has the following perceived and actual attributes: 
• Track Number (e.g. 50001) 
• Course (0-359 degrees true) 
• Speed (0-1800 nautical miles per hour) 
• Altitude (0-60000 feet) 
• Electronic Signal (ES) Emissions (based on radar type) 
• IFF Mode 1 
• IFF Mode 2 
• IFF Mode 3 
• IFF Mode 4 
• IFF Mode C 
• Point of Origin 
• Classification (Hostile, Suspect, Unknown, Neutral, Friend) 
• Radar Cross Section (Large Aircraft, Fighter Aircraft, Missile) 
In addition, the aircraft has the following administrative attributes that are used by the 




• Whether contact is currently detected by radar 
• Whether contact has been evaluated by a watchstander (one for each 
watchstander) 
• The last time a watchstander evaluated the contact (one for each 
watchstander) 
• Whether the contact is closing on the AEGIS cruiser 
2. Aircraft Behaviors 
a. Neutral Aircraft 
In the simulation, neutral aircraft (commercial airliners) have a small set 
of behaviors that determine their flight profiles.  These aircraft will typically only be 
flying profiles that take them from a starting location to a destination point.  The aircraft 
will change courses sometimes to adjust their flight path and once within a specified 
distance from their destination airport, they will commence a landing/descent profile.  If 
the neutral aircraft’s descent is in the vicinity (and approach) of the AEGIS cruiser, this 
could become a significant concern for the CIC team.  The following is are neutral-
aircraft behaviors: 
• Fly from intra-theater airport to intra-theater airport. 
• Fly from off-screen location to intra-theater airport. 
• Fly from intra-theater airport to off-screen location. 
• Do Landing/Descent flight profile for approach to destination airport. 
• Do Retreat/Alter course flight profile (caused by warning from cruiser). 
• Respond to query from AEGIS cruiser. 
• Respond to warning from AEGIS cruiser. 
• Experience in-flight casualty to aircraft radar (loss of radar/ES signal). 
• Experience in-flight casualty to aircraft IFF system (loss of IFF signal). 
b.   Hostile Aircraft 
The hostile aircraft in the ADC Simulation possess the most robust and 
dynamic behavior of all aircraft contacts.  These aircraft either start their flights at 
airports in either Iran or Iraq or in random locations within one of those countries.  They 
have the potential for varied flight profiles and can have a multiple number of waypoints 
assigned to their missions.  The combination of dynamic behavior and multiple 
waypoints creates a varied level of unique situations that can potentially stress the CIC 
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watch team.  The Scenario Threat Level also influences this behavior, and the higher the 
level, the more likely a hostile contact will attack the battle group.  The hostile contacts 
consist of either fighter or patrol aircraft and have the following behaviors: 
• Fly from intra-theater airport to multiple waypoints within the theater and 
back to the home airport. 
• Fly from intra-theater airport to off-screen location. 
• Fly from intra-theater location (other than an airport) to multiple 
waypoints within the theater and back to an airport. 
• Fly from intra-theater location (other than an airport) to multiple 
waypoints within the theater and back to original intra-theater location. 
• Fly reconnaissance in the vicinity of the AEGIS cruiser and/or aircraft 
carrier (multiple waypoints that circle at varied ranges). 
• Do High/Low Speed and High/Low Altitude approach to AEGIS cruiser 
and/or aircraft carrier without attacking (followed by a retreat). 
• Do High/Low Speed and High/Low Altitude approach to AEGIS cruiser 
and/or aircraft carrier that finishes with an ASM attack. 
• Do Landing/Descent flight profile for approach to destination airport. 
• Do Retreat/Alter course flight profile (caused by warning from cruiser).  
• Respond to query from AEGIS cruiser. 
• Respond to warning from AEGIS cruiser. 
• Experience in-flight casualty to aircraft radar (loss of radar/ES signal). 
• Experience in-flight casualty to aircraft IFF system (loss of IFF signal). 
c. Friendly Aircraft 
The friendly contacts in the ADC Simulation are either fighter or support 
(E-2C Hawkeye) aircraft directly controlled by the CIC team.  They assist the ADC and 
have the following behaviors: 
• Alert launch from the aircraft carrier. 
• Conduct visual intercept and identification of an aircraft contact. 
• Conduct intercept and engagement of an aircraft contact. 
• Fly/Return to assigned patrol location. 




3. Aircraft Contact Generation Module 
Within the ADC Simulation, neutral, hostile, and friendly aircraft contacts are 
created by the Aircraft Contact Generation Module (ACGM), which then injects them 
into the running scenario.  For hostile and neutral aircraft, the module generates these 
aircraft based on the attributes of Contact Density and Hostile Contact Level.  Friendly 
aircraft are created by the ACGM when specifically ordered by the Force TAO or Force 
AAWC agents (which have directed the carrier’s alert aircraft to launch).  Surface-to-Air 
Missiles (SAM) and Anti-ship Missiles (ASM) contacts are only created when either the 
AEGIS cruiser (via the watch team) or the hostile aircraft order missile launches.  The 
ACGM is executed once every second and has the following probability of creating an 
aircraft based on the following Contact Density options: 
• Contact Density Low – 0.0067 (1 out of 150 chance) 
• Contact Density Medium – 0.01 (1 out of 100 chance) 
• Contact Density High – 0.02 (1 out of 50 chance) 
Given these probabilities, for every new contact generated, the probability it is hostile is 
based on the following Hostile Contact Level options: 
• Hostile Contact Level Low – 0.05 (1 out of 20 chance) 
• Hostile Contact Level Medium – 0.10 (1 out of 10 chance) 
• Hostile Contact Level High – 0.25 (1 out of 4 chance) 
F. RELEVANT SIMULATION POP-UP WINDOWS 
1. Modify Contact Attributes Window (Figure 19) 
The Modify Contact Attributes Window allows the user to interact directly with 
aircraft contacts and change most of their attributes.  Modifiable attributes include speed, 
altitude, classification (actual), IFF modes, and the aircraft’s radar electronic signature.  




Figure 19.   Modify Contact Attributes Popup Window. 
 
2. Scenario Setup Wizard Selection Window  (Figure 20) 
The Scenario Setup Wizard Selection Window offers the user several options for 
configuring a scenario quickly.  The user can choose from configuring just the 
watchstanders, CIC equipment, or external scenario attributes, or can configure all of 
these options.   
 
 





3. Select Specific Contact Window  (Figure 21) 
This popup window gives the user the opportunity to specifically select an aircraft 
contact for observation by inputting its track number.  If a valid track number is entered, 
the aircraft’s information appears in the Contact Data Display window. 
 
 
Figure 21.   Select Specific Contact Popup Window. 
 
4. Scenario Run Time Input Window  (Figure 22) 
The Scenario Run Time Input window allows the user to set the total time in 
hours the simulation will run.  The default is five hours of simulated run time. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Scenario Run Time Input Popup Window. 
 
G. DESIGN/STRUCTURE OF WATCHSTANDER AGENTS 
1. Watchstander Attributes 
a. Skills 
In the ADC Simulation, skill attributes specify the capability of a 
watchstander to perform a specified task related to that skill.  For example, the Radar 
System Controller’s Radar Operations and Track Evaluation Skill would be employed 
every time the RSC evaluated potential aircraft radar detection.  To determine the success 
of performing a given task, each skill for a watchstander has an assigned probability of 
success based on the skill level assigned to the watchstander.  There are three levels for 
skill attributes, Basic, Experienced, and Expert, for which the associated probabilities of 
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success values are 0.70, 0.80, and 0.90.  Little information found to provide guidance for 
determining skill levels or the probability of success values associated with them.  
Consequently, during the interview with the ATRC detachment San Diego air-defense 
experts, this topic was discussed in great detail.50  From these interviews, a consensus 
was formed that the three skill levels would be appropriate.  The Basic level was 
considered to be a watchstander who had between zero to six months of time performing 
the given skill.  A watchstander assigned the Experienced level had six months to a year 
of time performing the skill including either an entire ship inter-deployment training 
cycle and/or half of a deployment.  An Expert watchstander had performed the skill for 
over a year including an entire deployment.  Assignment of the skill level is left to the 
user of the ADC Simulation.  Since the values of the probability of success were highly 
subjective, a way is provided to modify them if further studies were conducted or the user 
simply disagrees with them.  The criteria used to determine a watchstander’s skill level 
was not considered to be absolute because all air-defense experts could easily recount 
past experiences where a watchstander who had been performing certain tasks (as part of 
their watchstation) for an extended period time were still operating at a skill level not 
commensurate with the length of time. 
Additionally, each skill had an associated maximum task performance 
time.  For many of the skills, the values had to be determined with the same interview 
methods discussed above. 
b. Experience 
During the interviews with the air-defense experts, a question of high 
interest to us was whether there was a difference between skill and experience in this 
domain.51  The overwhelming response from the interviews was an affirmation that a 
difference existed, and experience influenced the performance of a skill.  As stated above, 
skill level is the probability of success in a specified task.  Experience was considered to 
be an attribute that was strongly linked to the amount of time the watchstander had been 
qualified to perform in a given watchstation.  The experience levels were categorized as 
                                                 
50 Interviews with Air-defense Experts at AEGIS Training & Readiness Center (ATRC) Detachment, 
San Diego, Conducted by LT Sharif Calfee, USN, 14-15 August 2002. 
51 Ibid. 
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Newly Qualified, Experienced, and Expert.  It was noted that the experience level often 
influenced the time a watchstander needed to complete a task as well as the quality and 
accuracy of the performance.  Consequently, we postulated that the experience attribute 
would have two effects on the watchstander performance.  First, the higher the level of 
experience, the less time for the watchstander to perform a task: for the Experienced and 
Expert attributes, a ten percent and twenty percent reduction in time, respectively.  
Second, for watchstanders that evaluate aircraft contacts as part of their duties (Force 
TAO, Force AAWC, Ship TAO, Ship AAWC, RSC, EWCO, TIC, IDS, and RC), there is 
an Evaluation Confidence attribute for each contact (for every watchstander) that is 
updated every time the watchstander assesses a contact.  Each time the watchstander 
selects a contact for evaluation, a conclusion (based on probability) is made as to whether 
the watchstander’s confidence level for that aircraft’s assessment is high enough to 
maintain the original evaluation.  The more evaluations conducted on a contact by the 
watchstander, the more confident the agent will be in the original assessment (and less 
likely to change it).  For all watchstanders, the baseline Evaluation Confidence value 
begins at thirty, but the update value is increased at a different rate for Newly Qualified, 
Experienced, and Expert levels (two, four, and six points, respectively).  Additionally, 
there is a maximum confidence threshold level that is based on the watchstander’s 
experience level and is assigned ninety five (95), ninety (90), and eighty five (85) for 
Newly Qualified, Experienced, and Expert respectively.  This means that the higher the 
experience level, the more confident the watchstander will become in its assessments of 
the aircraft contacts. 
Since applicable experimental data on this facet of watchstander 
performance could not be found, values were selected after consultations with the air-
defense experts.  To account for this subjectivity, the user can modify the experience 
level attributes in the Task Times and Probability menu (discussed in Section L). 
c. Fatigue 
The fatigue attribute in the simulation allows the user to set a static level 
of readiness for each watchstander.   
Although well-trained and physically fit naval personnel have a 
tremendous reserve capacity and can function under high stress workloads 
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for surprisingly long periods of time…sustained conditions like that found 
during long periods of general quarters (GQ) can lead to fatigue and sleep 
deprivation, the cost being degraded performance.  The negative effects of 
sustained readiness during Condition I [General Quarters] or II [relaxed 
GQ/Battle stations] are cumulative, and involve degradation of critical 
thinking, reaction time, accuracy, memory, coordination, communication 
and crew mission integrity.52    
Based on the interviews with the air-defense experts and a review of this report, a simple 
qualitative model was implemented to incorporate declining performance related to 
fatigue, and three attribute levels were selected, Fully Rested, Tired, and Exhausted.  A 
Fully Rested watchstander was considered to have received a minimum of five hours of 
rest without having performed any kind of heavy physical labor (underway replenishment 
duties or working detail moving supplies) or stood any watch (between the rest period 
and commencing the watch duties).  A Tired watchstander was a person who had 
received a minimum of three hours of sleep or had been performing watchstation duties 
for at least six hours without interruption (for rest) in a fairly demanding environment.  A 
watchstander who had performed a heavy level of physical labor before assuming 
watchstation duties also applies.  An Exhausted watchstander was considered to have 
received less than three hours of sleep, performed a heavy level of physical labor before 
assuming watchstation duties, or had been performing these duties in excess of six hours 
in a demanding environment.  In the simulation, the fatigue attribute was designed to 
affect the skill attributes of watchstanders by penalizing the probability value for a 
watchstander completing a task as well as the length of time to complete the task (greater 
probability of a longer time).53  A skill performance penalty does not apply for a Fully 
Rested watchstander, but a Tired and Exhausted watchstander are penalized –0.10 and –
0.20 to the agent’s probability value for successful performance of a task. 
d. Decision-Maker Types 
During the initial phase of the formal literature review and air-defense expert 
interviews, there was no plan to incorporate a Decision-maker type attribute, but this 
                                                 
52 Burr, R. G., Palinkas, L. A., Banta, G. R., Congleton, M. W., Kelleher, D. L. and Armstrong, C. G., 
Physical and Psychological Effects of Sustained Shipboard Operations on U.S.. Navy Personnel:  Naval 
Health Research Center, San Diego, 1990, p. 4. 
53 Interviews with Air-Defense Experts at AEGIS Training & Readiness Center (ATRC) Detachment, 
San Diego, Conducted by LT Sharif Calfee, USN, 14-15 August 2002. 
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concept was proposed while discussing CIC watchstander attributes.  Many of the experts 
believed strongly in the need to include such an attribute because all of them felt that the 
differences among types of primary decision-makers in the CIC (Force TAO, Force 
AAWC, Ship TAO, Ship AAWC) moderately influenced the overall aircraft 
classification process.  Three types of decision-makers proposed from the discussions 
were Cautious, Balanced, and Aggressive, and it was determined that the attribute would 
relate to the length of time the watchstander gave before making a classification decision 
about an aircraft contact.  In the simulation, the maximum time values assigned for the 
Cautious, Balanced, and Aggressive options were thirty, twenty, and fifteen seconds 
respectively.  The time assigned for a specific evaluation varies based on a probability 
between zero and the maximum time value.  Since applicable experimental data on this 
facet of watchstander performance could not be found, values were selected after 
consultations with the air-defense experts. 
2. Watchstander Communication 
The essence of the operation/performance of a watchstander is the receipt, 
processing, and transmissions of messages during the simulation.  A watchstander 
receives many requests and orders as well as generates requests for other watchstanders.  
All of these are translated into messages within the simulation, and the watchstander 
agent processes these messages according to priority.  Whenever a watchstander 
transmits a message, there is a check against the watchstander’s Communication Skill 
attribute to determine whether the message was passed to the other watchstanders 
successfully (with an associated probability).  Additionally, experience level and 
maximum communication task time determine an delay for the transmission of the 
message to the other watchstanders. 
The watchstander agent message handling and task execution process was 
implemented as shown in Figure 7.  The structure includes an input-message reception 
queue, a message-priority processor, priority queues (low, medium, high), an action 
processor, and an output message transmission queue.  Watchstander agents place 
order/request messages into another watchstander’s input-message queue where they will 
be processed for execution. 
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Figure 23.   Message Handling Structure for all Watchstander Agents. 
 
a. Input/Receive Message Queue 
The Input/Receive Queue receives messages from other watchstander 
agents and combat systems equipment.  The messages in this queue are scanned, sorted, 
and forwarded to another set of queues based on the priority of the message (high, 
medium, low) by the Message Priority Processor. 
b. Watchstander Message Priority Processor 
The Message Priority Processor pulls messages from the Input/Receive 
queue, checks their priority, and places them into the appropriate priority queue. 
c. High/Medium/Low Priority Message Queue  
These are the priority queues that contain the sorted messages for 
action/processing by the watchstander agent.  The watchstander agent will process these 
messages according to the priority level.  Once a message has been processed and the 
required action conducted, a report message may be transmitted to other watchstander 
agents. 
d. Watchstander Action Processor  
The action processor pulls an order message (based on priority) from one 
of the queues and performs the task indicated.  The watchstander agent’s skill and 
experience attributes are applied to the order and the task is performed (or attempted, 
since the watchstander could fail to perform it).  If the task is successfully completed, the 
Watchstander Action Processor generates a report message and places it in the 
Output/Transmit Message queue. 
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e. Output/Transmit Message Queue  
The Output/Transmit Message Queue contains the outgoing messages for 
transmission to the other watchstander agents.  
 
# Name/Action From To 
1 ALL ANY Report ES Contact EWCO 
2 EWCO ANY Request ES Contact ANY 
3 Report SLQ-32 System Casualty ALL HIGH 
4 Report Radar Contact ALL ANY 
EWCO 
RSC 
5 ALL HIGH Report SPY-1B Radar Casualty RSC 
6 ALL ANY Report IFF Contact IDS/RC 
7 Report IFF System Casualty IDS/RC ALL HIGH 
8 Report Communications System Casualty IDS/RC ALL HIGH 
9 Report VLS Casualty MSS ALL HIGH 
10 Report CIWS Casualty MSS ALL HIGH 
11 Report Missile Engagement Kill Status MSS/RSC ALL HIGH 
12 Report Link 11/16 System Casualty TIC/CSC ALL HIGH 
13 Report Link 11/16 Contact TIC ALL ANY 
14 Order IDS to perform Query of an aircraft FTAO/STAO ALL HIGH 
15 Order IDS to perform Warning of an aircraft FTAO/STAO ALL HIGH 
16 Order Missile Engagement of an aircraft FTAO/STAO ALL HIGH 
17 Order Aircraft Engagement of an aircraft FTAO/STAO ALL HIGH 
18 Order Aircraft Intercept/Visual Identification of an aircraft FTAO/STAO ALL HIGH 
19 Report FTAO Classification of an aircraft/missile FTAO ALL ANY 
20 Report CIWS Kill Status of an aircraft/missile MSS/RSC ALL ANY 
21 Report IDS Query/Warning results IDS ALL HIGH 
 
Table 14.   Listing of Watchstander Messages. 
 
3. Watchstander Agents Skill Listings 
• Force Tactical Action Officer (F-TAO) 
• Situation Assessment 
• Information Management 
• Battle Doctrine 
• Platform Knowledge 
• Force Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (F-AAWC) 
• Situation Assessment 
• Information Management 
• Battle Doctrine 
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• Platform Knowledge 
• Ship Tactical Action Officer (S-TAO) 
• Situation Assessment 
• Information Management 
• Battle Doctrine 
• Platform Knowledge 
• Ship Anti-Air Warfare Coordinator (S-AAWC) 
• Situation Assessment 
• Information Management 
• Battle Doctrine 
• Platform Knowledge 
• Combat Systems Coordinator (CSC) 
• Situation Assessment 
• Combat Systems Troubleshooting 
• Platform Knowledge 
• AEGIS Doctrine Employment 
• Communications 
• Radar Systems Controller (RSC) 
• Radar Operations & Track Evaluation 
• Radar Jamming/Deception Track Evaluation 
• Radar Casualty Troubleshooting 
• Communications 
• Electronic Warfare Control Officer (EWCO) 
• Situation Assessment 
• Information Management 
• Battle Doctrine 
• Communications 
• Identification Supervisor (IDS) 
• Situation Assessment 
• Information Management 
• Battle Doctrine 
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• Communications 
• Tactical Information Coordinator (TIC) 
• Battle Group Link Equipment Knowledge 
• Link Communication 
• Battle Group Link Coordination/Resolution 
• Communications 
• Red Crown (RC) 
• Aircraft Control 
• Carrier Operations 
• IFF System Operations 
• Communications 
• Missile Systems Supervisor (MSS) 
• Missile Systems Employment 
• CIWS Employment 
• Missile/CIWS Systems Troubleshooting 
• Communications 
H. COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER (CIC) COMBAT SYSTEMS 
EQUIPMENT 
1. Overview 
The performances of the CIC equipment in the ADC Simulation were simplified 
to avoid a substantially complex software component to simulate their operations while 
still ensuring that the qualitative performance was maintained.  Additionally, this 
abstraction prevented the need to use information classified by the United States Navy, 
restricting the potential audience.   
The CIC equipment can be assigned one of four levels of readiness: Fully 
Operational, Partially Degraded, Highly Degraded, and Non-operational.  Each has an 








 Fully Operational Partially 
Degraded 
Highly Degraded Non-operational 
Probability Value 
out of 1 
1.0 0.75 0.50 0.0 
 
Table 15.   CIC Equipment Levels of Performance. 
 
These values indicate the probability of success of the given equipment in performing a 
task (i.e. the SPY-1B radar detecting a contact) based on the level of system degradation 
(if any).  Equipment that is fully operational will always be able to perform a task 
successfully (although using the SPY-1B Radar as an example, it still may not be able to 
detect a contact). 
In addition to presetting the operational readiness levels of CIC combat systems 
equipment, if the user has activated the Scenario Equipment Failure Option then any of 
the systems could sustain a casualty based on a random probability.  When a casualty 
occurs, the watchstander agents will respond and attempt to troubleshoot the origins of 
the degradation.  If successful, the watchstander will return a repair time; otherwise, the 
watchstander will have to continue to troubleshoot until successful. 
In the ADC Simulation, the combat systems equipment was implemented as 
objects within the watchstander agents, which simplified interaction with them.  The 
following systems are associated with the specified watchstander agents: 
 
Combat Systems Equipment Watchstander 
SPY-1B Radar System Radar Systems Controller 
SLQ-32 System Electronic Warfare Control Officer 
IFF System Identification Supervisor 
Link 11/16 System Tactical Information Coordinator 
External Communications System Identification Supervisor 
Vertical Launching System Missile Systems Supervisor 
Close-In Weapon System Missile Systems Supervisor 
 
Table 16.   Systems Associated with Specified Watchstander Agents. 
 
2. SPY-1B Radar System 
The SPY-1B Radar System is the primary air search and tracking radar on AEGIS 
cruisers and is a central component in the AEGIS Weapon System.  An advanced phased-
array radar, it can simultaneously track hundreds of aircraft contacts while conducting 
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search operations to detect new aircraft.  A powerful and highly sensitive system, the 
radar can track aircraft hundreds of miles from its location.  Additionally, the ship’s 
surface-to-air missiles are guided using the SPY-1B Radar and, consequently, a serious 
casualty to the radar affects the performance of those missile engagements.   
Due to classification restrictions, actual SPY-1B phased array radar formulas 
could not be used, so the radar had receiver operating characteristics from Swerling II 
statistics as shown below.54 
PD (Required) = PF (1/(1 + CNR (Required))) 
To implement the formula, a baseline probability of detection (PD) for the SPY-1B radar 
and Probability of False Alarms (PF) had to be selected, then the Carrier-to-Noise Ratio 
(CNR) from the Swerling II statistics charts.  The probability of detection was selected 
from the AEGIS SPY-1B Radar Sphere Calibration Test Procedure (Naval Sea Systems 
Command) used by ships to perform system calibration evaluations. 
PD  (Required) = 0.5 for a 0.254 meters (ten inch diameter) sphere at 27.78 kilometers 
(15 nautical miles). 
PF  (Required)  = 10-4 
Based on the above selections, the Swerling II chart yielded a CNR of 16 decibels (dB). 
These values are then applied to the formula below to solve for K. 
CNR (Required)  = K * ( σ / R (Required)4 ) 
σ  = Radar Cross Section of the calibrated sphere = π  * (radius of sphere)2 
     = π  * (0.127 meters)2 = 0.5067 meters squared 
After manipulating the formula and inserting the known values (from above), K is 
calculated to be 1.881 x 1020 (no units) for the calibrated sphere.  Once the value of K is 
determined, the above formula can be used to calculate the CNR for an aircraft contact at 
any range (CNR (Detected)).  Additionally, the RCS value σ updated to account for the radar 
cross section of the aircraft, and the values of one (1), one hundred (100), and one 
thousand (1000) square meters is used for the missiles, fighter aircraft, and large aircraft 
                                                 
54 Harney, Robert C., Combat Systems:  Volume 1. Sensor Elements, 06 September 2002, pp. 347-349. 
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(patrol, commercial airliner), respectively.  This slightly modified formula is listed 
below: 
CNR (Detected)  = K * ( σ / R (Detected)4 ) 
The value of the aircraft’s CNR (Detected) is then applied to the initial formula, which has 
been slightly modified also to calculate the probability of detection of any aircraft 
desired.   
PD (Detected) = PF (1/(1 + CNR(Detected))) 
This will now yield the probability of detection for a given aircraft contact. 
3. SLQ-32 Electronic Signal Detection System 
The SLQ-32 System is used to detect the electronic signals emitted by aircraft and 
shipboard radar systems.  The signals detected are then analyzed by the watchstander 
with the assistance of the system computer, and a platform (ship and/or aircraft) or listing 
of platforms is displayed.  The SLQ-32 system only provides a degree bearing to the 
electronic signal so the watchstander must attempt to estimate its distance by the strength 
of the signal received.  In the ADC Simulation we can detect the following ES signals: 
• Iraqi Fighter Aircraft 
• Iraqi Patrol Aircraft 
• Iranian Fighter Aircraft 
• Iranian Fighter Aircraft 
• Iranian Patrol Aircraft 
• Commercial Aircraft 
• F/A-18 Hornet Aircraft (Friendly Fighter) 
• E-2C Hawkeye Aircraft (Friendly Support Aircraft) 
• Hostile Fire Control Radar (Hostile Aircraft or Missile) 
• Friendly Missile 
“Hostile fire control radar” detection indicates that either an aircraft or an anti-ship 
missile has targeted the cruiser or carrier and is ready to fire missiles, or it is a missile 
homing in on the ship. 
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Due to classification restrictions, actual SLQ-32 system operational models could 
not be used, so an abstracted model was created using a generic representation to achieve 
similar qualitative performance.  This model is displayed in the table below: 
 
ES Signal Detection Ranges Probability of Detection 
0 – 25 nautical miles 0.99 
26-50 nautical miles 0.95 
51-100 nautical miles 0.85 
101-150 nautical miles 0.70 
151-200 nautical miles 0.50 
201-250 nautical miles 0.35 
> 250 nautical miles 0.25 
 
Table 17.   Abstracted Model SLQ-32 System Operational Model. 
 
4. Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) System 
The Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) System is designed to recognize friendly 
and neutral aircraft.  “With supersonic aircraft and swift antiaircraft missiles, there is no 
time to identify friendly forces by visual means.  IFF is an electronic system which can 
determine the intent of an aircraft with the speed of the fastest computers.”55  In addition 
to military aircraft, civilian aircraft operate modified IFF systems.  IFF operates through 
an interrogation-response electronic system.  The interrogation system on an aircraft or 
ship sends out an interrogation message pulse that, when received by the transponder 
systems on another platform, makes it respond with that platform's specified IFF codes.  
When the IFF response code is received, the originating IFF system will analyze the 
signal and display the results to the appropriate watchstanders.  There are five categories 






                                                 






Mode 1 Used by military air traffic control to determine the type of 
aircraft or its mission. 
Mode 2 Used by military to specify the aircraft’s identification 
number (usually displayed on its tail) 
Mode 3/A Used by civilian and military aircraft internationally to 
uniquely identify aircraft under positive control by air traffic 
control towers at airports. 
Mode 4 Encoded (Encrypted) signal used by the military to 
differentiate friendly aircraft from everyone else. 
Mode C Used by civilian and military aircraft to report their altitude. 
 
Table 18.   Five Categories for the IFF Systems. 
 
Due to classification restrictions, actual IFF system operational models could not 
be used so a simplified model was created to achieve similar qualitative performance.  
This model is displayed in the table below: 
 
IFF Signal Detection Ranges Probability of Detection 
0 – 25 nautical miles 0.99 
26-50 nautical miles 0.95 
51-100 nautical miles 0.85 
101-150 nautical miles 0.70 
151-200 nautical miles 0.50 
201-250 nautical miles 0.35 
> 250 nautical miles 0.25 
 
Table 19.   Abstracted Model IFF System Operational Model. 
 
5. Link 11 (TADIL A)/Link 16 (TADIL J) System 
Link 11 and Link 16 are the primary means by which ships and aircraft transmit 
their air and surface picture to other units and overall situational awareness is maintained 
by the battle group commander and air-defense commander.  Although Link 16 is the 
newer and more modern system, they both are tactical data-exchange systems.  A 
diagram of Link 16 architecture is displayed below in Figure 24.  One of the primary 
differences between the two systems is that Link 11 requires a Net Control Station (NCS) 




Figure 24.   Link 16 Example. 
 
Link 11 used poll-response where each platform was directed by the NCS to transmit its 
information, and once a polling cycle was complete, the NCS transmitted the updated 
battlespace picture to everyone.  Link 16 allowed all participant units to transmit 
simultaneously.  Link 16 has some additional improvements including communications-
jamming resistance and increased data rate.  Link 11/16 operations in the ADC 
Simulation were simplified so that only aircraft contacts at a range greater than seventy 
(70) nautical miles from the AEGIS cruiser would be inputted into the Link for the TIC 
watchstander to evaluate. 
6. External Communications System 
The External Communications System handles the voice communications 
between the AEGIS cruiser and other aircraft and ships.  There are typically two types of 
voice communications, satellite and standard radio.  In the simulation, only the standard 
radio communication is implemented to simplify matters. 
7. Vertical Launching System (Surface-to-Air Missiles) 
The Vertical Launching System (VLS) stores as well as launches various types of 
missiles located in the magazines.  The VLS is capable of launching surface-to-air 
missiles (Standard Missile), Tomahawk Cruise Missiles, and Vertical Launched 
Antisubmarine Rockets (VLA).  In the ADC Simulation, only the surface-to-air missiles 
are implemented; they are assigned a 0.70 probability of intercepting their target and have 
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a range of eighty nautical miles.  Only two missiles are launched against a target at any 
time.  If the missiles fail to intercept their target, two additional missiles will be fired. 
8. Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) 
The Close-In-Weapons System (CIWS), also known as the Phalanx, is the twenty-
millimeter shipboard self-defense system that contains its own radar and fire control 
system.  The CIWS was designed as the last defense against incoming anti-ship missiles 
and fires at an incredible rate of 3000-4500 rounds per minute.  The CIWS can be 
operated in several different modes from completely automated to manual targeting and 
firing.  In the simulation, the CIWS has a range of one nautical mile, is assigned a 0.50 
probability of hitting its target, and has a range of one nautical mile.   
I. SIMULATION LOG RECORDS AND EVENT RECONSTRUCTION 
1. Overview 
The ADC Simulation records every event that occurs within a scenario so that it 
can be later reviewed and analyzed by the user.  Four categories of record logs are 
maintained along with a fifth type that allows the user to more finely search the other 
logs.  They are the Scenario Log, Watchstander Decision History Log, CIC Equipment 
Status Log, the Watchstander Performance Log, and the Parse/Analyzer Log.  Each of 
these records events in chronological order, and events can originate with the 
watchstander or reports initiated by other watchstanders (or equipment). 
2. Scenario Events Log 
The Scenario Events Log maintains a high-level record of all events within a 
scenario.  These events help the user to form a broad understanding of the simulated CIC 
team’s overall perception of the battle space.  An example Scenario Events Log is 
displayed below in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25.   Scenario Events Log. 
 
3. Watchstander Decision History Log 
The Watchstander Decision History Log provides a detailed account of an 
individual watchstander agent’s actions and inputs for later review.  Each watchstander in 
the CIC team has a separate decision history log to record events significant to that 
watchstation.  An example of a Decision History Log is displayed below in Figure 26. 
 
 




4. CIC Equipment Readiness Log 
The CIC Equipment Readiness Log provides a detailed account of combat 
systems operational performance for later review.  Each piece of CIC equipment has a 
separate decision history log to record events significant to that watchstation.  An 
example of a CIC Equipment Readiness Log is displayed in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27.   CIC Equipment Readiness Log. 
 
4. Watchstander Performance Log 
The Watchstander Performance Log maintains the overall performance metrics 
for each watchstander as well as the overall CIC team performance.  An example of the 




Figure 28.   Watchstander Performance Log. 
 
To track the performance of the CIC team, the values of average initial detection time of 
aircraft, average initial classification time of aircraft, and average correct classification 
time of aircraft are calculated.  For the individual watchstanders, the metrics for number 
of errors, number of total actions attempted by the watchstander, percentage of errors in 
attempted actions, average of primary watchstander task time, and the communications 
time (how long to transmit a message) average are maintained.   
5. Parser/Analyzer Log 
In the ADC Simulation, the Parse/Analyzer Log is a tool to extract desired 
information about aircraft contacts.  The Parse/Analyzer accepts as an input the track 
number of an aircraft and then searches through all logs to retrieve the log entries about 
that aircraft.  An example of the Parser/Analyzer Log is displayed in Figure 29. 
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Figure 29.   Parser/Analyzer Log. 
 
J. ADC SIMULATION EXTERNAL/ENVIRONMENTAL ATTRIBUTES 
1. Overview  
The ADC Simulation allows the user to modify some of the external attributes of 
the simulation.  These attributes influence the CIC watch team by adding external stresses 
and overall workload to their situation as the levels of the selected options increase. 
2. Atmosphere/Weather 
There are three options for the weather conditions attribute, clear weather, heavy 
rain, and heavy clutter environment.  The primary effect the weather attributes has on a 
scenario is to detection and communications systems such as the SPY-1B radar, SLQ-32 
System, IFF System, and Link 11/Link16 System.  The heavy clutter option causes a ten 
percent penalty reduction to probability of successful detection value for the above 
systems. 
 
Figure 30.   Weather Conditions Window. 
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3. Contact Density 
The Contact Density attribute controls the number of aircraft contacts (neutral and 
hostile) that are inputted into a scenario.  The number of contacts arriving in the 
simulation directly influences the workload of the watchstanders in the CIC. 
 
 
Figure 31.   Contact Density Window. 
 
4. Scenario Threat Level 
The Scenario Threat Level attribute directly influences several other areas in a 
scenario.  First, this attribute affects the parameters used by the CIC watch team (Force 
TAO and Force AAWC specifically) to classify aircraft contacts.  The higher the threat 
level, the more likely the team is to classify aircraft as Suspect or Hostile.  The second 
area influenced is the aggressiveness level of the hostile contacts.  In Scenario Threat 
Level White, there is a low probability of attack for the hostile aircraft, but as the threat 
level increases, the probability of their attack will rise accordingly. 
 
Figure 32.   Scenario Threat Level Window. 
 
5. Hostile Contact Level 
The Hostile Contact Level determines the overall probability of the appearance of 
Hostile aircraft contacts in the scenario, which ultimately affects the CIC watch team, if 
these contacts initiate aggressive behaviors.  Additionally, the watch team is impacted 
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because the more hostile contacts classified by them, the more resources (time, focus) 
will be required to maintain track on them, which could lead to distractions from other 
hostile aircraft. 
 
Figure 33.   Hostile Contact Level Window. 
 
K. ADC SIMULATION DOCTRINE ATTRIBUTES 
1.  Overview 
Within the simulation there are two types of doctrine that the watchstanders 
follow in the performance of their air-defense duties, AEGIS Doctrine and Air Defense 
Doctrine. 
2.  AEGIS Doctrine 
AEGIS Doctrine is situational parameters that are predetermined by the CIC 
Watch team and input into the AEGIS Weapons System to assist them in the performance 
of their duties.  AEGIS Doctrine consists of Auto-Standard Missile Doctrine, Auto-
Special (Missile) Doctrine, IFF Doctrine, Identification Doctrine, and Drop-Track 
Doctrine.  The first two are considered weapons doctrine and are used to reduce reaction 
time and human errors when an airborne contact meets the predefined parameters for a 
hostile, imminent, and dangerous threat to the ship.  Depending on the specifications, 
these doctrine will either engage the surface-to-air missile systems to point where they 
are ready to fire (awaiting the human watchstander to push the Fire button) or will 
actually consummate the engagement if programmed to do so.  The weapons doctrine can 
be of significant assistance to the watch team, especially, if the ship is faced with a 
potential threat that is rapidly approaching them or detected very late thereby reducing 
the engagement time.  In the simulation, the only AEGIS doctrine that has been 
implemented was the Auto-Special Doctrine.  The input screen for Auto-Special Doctrine 
is displayed in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34.   AEGIS (Auto-Special) Doctrine Popup Window. 
 
The other type of doctrine, non-weapons doctrine, assists the watch team with 
managing the air-defense identification process by alleviating the watchstanders of many 
of the time-consuming tasks of manually evaluating aircraft contacts.  The IFF doctrine is 
designed to automatically interrogate aircraft contacts based on the parameters (ranges, 
bearings) set by the watch team.  The Identification (ID) doctrine uses the parameters 
selected by the watch team (altitude, speed, course, etc.) to automatically classify certain 
aircraft tracks that meet the criteria.  This doctrine is typically used to attempt to identify 
neutral aircraft such as commercial airliners which have fairly predictable kinematic 
attributes.  The last type of doctrine is Drop-Track doctrine and is employed by the watch 
team to manage the number of aircraft tracks displayed on the CIC console screens and 
processed by both the AEGIS Weapon System and watchstanders.  The Drop-Track 
doctrine assists in heavy clutter environments by eliminating much of the clutter detected 
by the radar (falsely as real aircraft contacts) before it is displayed on the screen (which 
would require the watchstanders to waste resources to evaluate). 
L. DISCUSSION OF PROBABILITY AND SKILL-TIME VALUES IN ADC 
SIMULATION 
Several of the attribute values used in the ADC Simulation were selected through 
subjective processes (i.e. interviews).  A component was incorporated into the simulation 
to allow the users to modify certain skill-associated maximum task times and attribute 
probability values for each watchstander.  This capability gives the simulation significant 
flexibility with respect to the accuracy of watchstander performance attributes because as 
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research studies in these areas are completed, the resulting times and values can be used 
to update the program. 
 
 
Figure 35.   Skill Probabilities Modification Window. 
 
M. AIR-DEFENSE CONTACT IDENTIFICATION, THREAT ASSESSMENT 
AND CLASSIFICATION IN THE SIMULATION 
Air defense in the ADC Simulation was developed using information from the 
research discussed and the interviews of the air-defense experts from the ATRC 
detachment in San Diego.  It can be divided into three phases: (1) initial contact detection 
and information reporting; (2) contact classification; and (3) action response to the 
specified aircraft contact.  The first phase is marked by the detection of an aircraft contact 
by one of the primary sensory input watches (RSC, EWCO, TIC, IDS, or Red Crown 
agents), which in turn inform the rest of the simulated CIC team to initiate the evaluation 
process.  The second phase consists of the Force TAO and Force AAWC agents (primary 
decision-makers) and Ship TAO and Ship AAWC agents, analyzing the information 
provided by the sensory input and conducting an initial classification of the contact.  
Phase three starts with the Force TAO and/or Force AAWC agents giving orders to the 
primary action watchstations (Ship TAO, Ship AAWC, CSC, MSS, and IDS) to perform 
tasks to either gain more information about the aircraft contact or to engage the contact to 
protect the battle group.  The following tasks apply to phase three: 
• Order IDS to query aircraft contact. 
• Order IDS to conduct warning of aircraft contact. 
• Order Ship AAWC (via Ship TAO) to conduct intercept and visual 
identification of aircraft contact with friendly aircraft. 
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• Order Ship AAWC (via Ship TAO) to conduct intercept and engagement 
of aircraft contact with friendly aircraft. 
• Order MSS (via Ship TAO and Ship AAWC) to conduct intercept and 
engagement of aircraft contact with cruiser’s surface-to-air missiles. 
The Ship TAO agent can also order the last two actions if there is a perceived imminent 
danger to the ship. 
An area of particular interest is the contact detection and information collection 
by the key sensory watch agents.  Similar to the performance in an actual CIC, when a 
watchstander agent detects a new contact not previously examined by any other agents, it 
will pass a message alert to the CIC.  This message cues the other sensory watch agents 
(upon completion of their currently task) to focus their attention on the new aircraft 
contact to gather relevant information.  The result of the collaboration is a level of 
synchronization that mirrors actual CIC behavior and delivers vital information about the 
new contact to the primary decision-maker watches very quickly.  The process is 
displayed in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Watchstander Agent Collaborative Contact Detection and Reporting 
Process. 
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Most watchstander agents in the simulation must evaluate aircraft contacts continuously 
as part of their duties, which requires a prioritization similar to those used by an actual 
CIC team.  Below are tables showing the prioritization criteria for each.  There are four 
criteria available: new contact, closest contact to the cruiser / carrier, contact approaching 
the cruiser / carrier, and longest period of time since the last look.  Not all watchstander 
agents in the simulation use the same criteria.  Certain watchstations only require (and 
can only support) a few criteria to prioritize the selection process appropriately while 
others need all of them to perform realistically.  Additionally, during the contact selection 
and evaluation process, the watchstander agents were implemented so they will 
periodically reevaluate aircraft contacts, which is a behavior consistent with observations 
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Table 27.   Red Crown Contact Selection Prioritization Criteria. 
 
 
Figure 37.   Generic Air Contact Classification Path. 
 
N. AIR-DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING:  INSIDE THE HEADS OF THE F-
TAO AND F-AAWC WATCHSTANDER AGENTS 
In an actual AEGIS cruiser CIC, the Force TAO and Force AAWC watchstanders 
(as well as the Ship TAO and Ship AAWC) are responsible for making classification 
decisions about the aircraft contacts evaluated by the watch team, and the same pattern is 
used in the ADC Simulation.  These watchstanders are presented with a variety of data 
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about the aircraft contacts from various sources, known as cueing information, that they 
use to conduct the assessments.  Such assessments occur in the form of templates that 
indicate the expected behaviors of the aircraft contacts and are categorized as Hostile, 
Suspect, Neutral, Unknown, and Friend.  The evaluation input cues used by the simulated 
watchstanders are listed below. 
 
# Contact Input Cues/Factors Category 
1 Altitude 
2 Speed 
3 Radar Electronic Signal 
4 Course 
5 Point of Origin 
6 IFF Mode 
7 Query/Warning Response 
 
Table 28.   Evaluation Input Cues Used by the Watchstanders. 
 
To implement the cognitive and decision-making aspects of the watchstander air-
defense classification, an artificial neuron configuration was used.  Artificial neurons 
(often incorporated into networks called neural networks) can closely parallel those 
processes in humans.  A neuron consists of: 
• Input values - These data may come from the environment or the 
activation of other neurons. 
• Real-valued weights - The weights are used to describe connection 
strengths. 
• An activation level – The neuron’s activation level is determined by the 
cumulative strength of its input signals where each input is scaled by the 
connection weight along the input line.  The activation level is thus 
computed by taking the sum of the scaled inputs. 
• A threshold function. – This computes the neuron’s final or output state by 
determining how far the neuron’s activation level is below or above some 
threshold value.56 
Displayed in Figure 38 is the design of the artificial neuron for the watchstander agent 
classification component.  
 
                                                 
56 Luger, George F., Stubblefield, William A., Artificial Intelligence:  Structures and Strategies for 
Complex Problem Solving, Addison-Wesley Longman, Inc., 1998, pp. 663-664. 
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Figure 38.   Contact Classification Artificial Neuron. 
 
Each input value has associated weights determined by the accuracy and 
“convincing strength” of the attribute.  The convincing strength refers to the believability 
or persuasiveness of the input value as a function of its source.  For example, in the ADC 
Simulation, if conflicting information were received from two different attributes such as 
the radar electronic signal (ES) and IFF mode-one input cues, the radar ES cue would 
have a higher convincing strength because it is verifiable by the cruiser’s own sensor 
equipment and is very difficult to fake.  Conversely, the IFF mode values can be 
modified by the pilot of an aircraft and this opens them to use for deception. 
Classifications (Hostile, Suspect, Neutral, Unknown, and Friend) are 
differentiated using threshold values that are dependent on the current scenario threat 
level.  As the threat level is changed, these threshold values change.  The default 










Threat Level White 
Thresholds 
Threat Level Yellow 
Thresholds 
Threat Level Red 
Thresholds 
Hostile ≥ +600 ≥ +500 ≥ +450 
Suspect 500 – +599 +450 – +499 +400 – +449 
Neutral 400 – +499 +300 – +449 +200 – +399 
Unknown -399 – +399 -399 – +301 -399 – 199 
Friend ≤ -400 ≤ -400 ≤ -400 
 
Table 29.   Default Classification Threshold Values. 
 
To classify aircraft, the appropriate simulated watchstanders evaluate all 
attribute/input cue information about the contact and sum the relevant values.  The 
contact is then categorized based on which threshold bin into which the value falls.  The 
scoring (weighted) values for the various input cues are displayed below.  
 
# Contact Input 
Cues/Factors Category 
Contact Input Cues/Factors Score Value 
(Weight) 
1 Altitude Very High +20 
2 Altitude High +40 
3 Altitude Medium +60 
4 Altitude Low +80 
5 Altitude Very Low +100 
6 Speed Very Fast +100 
7 Speed Fast +80 
8 Speed Medium +60 
9 Speed Slow +50 
10 Speed Very Slow +40 
11 Radar Electronic Signal Hostile Fire Control Radar +800 
12 Radar Electronic Signal Hostile Aircraft Radar +300 
13 Radar Electronic Signal Unknown Aircraft Radar +50 
14 Radar Electronic Signal Neutral Aircraft Radar +80 
15 Radar Electronic Signal Friendly Aircraft Radar -400 
16 Course Closing/Approaching Cruiser +50 
17 Course Opening/Departing Cruiser 0 
18 Point of Origin Hostile Point of Origin +100 
19 Point of Origin Unknown Point of Origin +80 
20 Point of Origin Neutral Point of Origin +50 
21 Point of Origin Friendly Point of Origin -100 
22 IFF Mode IFF Mode 1 +50 
23 IFF Mode IFF Mode 2 +50 
24 IFF Mode IFF Mode 3 +50 
25 IFF Mode IFF Mode 1 – Friend Codes -50 
120 
# Contact Input 
Cues/Factors Category 
Contact Input Cues/Factors Score Value 
(Weight) 
26 IFF Mode IFF Mode 2 – Friend Codes -50 
27 IFF Mode IFF Mode 3 – Friend Codes -50 
28 IFF Mode IFF Mode 4 - Friend +600 
29 IFF Mode IFF Mode 4 – None +50 
30 IFF Mode IFF Mode C +50 
31 Query/Warning Response Favorable Response -50 
32 Query/Warning Response No Response 25 
33 Query/Warning Response Unfavorable Response 100 
 
Table 30.   Scoring (Weighted) Values for the Various Input Cues. 
 
Contacts have the highest probability of being categorized as unknown because 
often only partial information is available about the aircraft.  As more of the input cueing 
data becomes available, the aircraft’s classification will move towards neutral, suspect, or 
hostile assessments.  The most difficult and infrequent classifications are hostile and 
friend.  These require either a tremendous preponderance of the necessary input cues of 
lesser convincing strength or a few cues of significant persuasiveness to attain them. 
Upon implementation of an artificial neuron, an extensive testing period is 
typically necessary to train the component to produce the optimum output, which in this 
case would be the more reliable and accurate classification results.  Only a moderate level 
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V. RESEARCH QUESTION RESULTS AND EVALUATION OF 
THE SIMULATION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION INTRODUCTION 
1. Overview 
Using the research questions discussed in Chapter One as a guide, five sets of 
specific questions were selected as the focus of parametric testing and analysis of the 
ADC Simulation.  These question sets explored the influence of watchstander and 
scenario attributes on the performance of the RSC Agent, EWCO Agent, and Force TAO 
Agent individually and the CIC team collectively.  For four sets of questions relating to 
the RSC, EWCO, Force TAO agents and scenario weather, a single attribute was 
modified at a time (for just the single watchstander or scenario attribute) while the rest of 
the watchstander and scenario attributes were fixed.  Two separate CIC team-skill, 
experience, and fatigue attribute profiles were created and tested to determine the 
differences in performance.   
2. Testing Methodology 
a.   Scenario Default Settings 
Unless otherwise indicated, the following settings were used in the tests: 
 
1) Watchstanders 
  - Skill levels:     Experienced 
  - Experience level:    Experienced 
  - Fatigue level:  Fully Rested 
  - Decision-maker Type:   Balanced 
 
  2) CIC Equipment    
- Readiness level:  Fully Operational 
 
  3) External Environment 
  - Contact Density:  Medium 
  - Threat Level:  White 
  - Hostile Contact Number: Low 







b. Number of Runs 
For each attribute (or set of attributes) modified, ten scenario runs were 
conducted, which resulted in 170 individual tests divided into the following categories: 
• 40 runs for the RSC agent testing 
• 40 runs for the EWCO agent testing 
• 40 runs for the F-TAO agent testing 
• 20 runs for the CIC Watch Team testing 
• 30 runs for the Scenario weather testing 
c. Limitation of Variability in Testing 
Consistent performance across multiple evaluation runs during parametric 
testing is to the validity of the results, and consequently, some modifications to the 
simulation were necessary.  To limit the effect of non-essential variables in the scenarios 
that could affect the results of the testing, the following aspects of the simulation were 
fixed to ensure consistent performance: 
• Kinematic attributes of aircraft contacts (course, speed, altitude) 
• Designated aircraft contact starting locations (4 points selected) 
• All aircraft created at a specified point having the same destination point 
• Finite number of aircraft contacts for each test run (50 contacts) 
• Generation of new contacts disallowed 
• Defensive measures by AEGIS Cruiser (i.e. launching missiles) 
disallowed 
• All contacts created as neutral aircraft (commercial airlines) having ES 
and IFF attributes 
3. Philosophy of Testing and Data Results Analysis 
Before reviewing the data results from the testing, it is necessary to discuss the 
philosophy underpinning the testing.  Sometimes simulations are considered to be exact 
replicas of the systems they represent and consequently, the results are viewed with a 
level of trust not commensurate with the underlying model design.  This belief often 
leads to the mistaken conclusion that simulations (and the results/outputs they produce) 
can be used in lieu of actual testing, which is typically more difficult and costly to 
perform, and spurs the impetus towards the development of simulations in the first place.  
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Such views can be dangerous since, if not placed in the proper context, simulations could 
lead their users to incorrect assessments.   
Except for the most basic cases, every simulation represents a complex system 
through a simplified model that attempts to recreate the qualitative behavior, output, and 
performance of its real world counterpart.  It is this simplification aspect that must be 
emphasized to the user so it is understood the simulation does not produce clear-cut 
results which can be immediately applied to actual problems.  Viewed in its proper 
context, the combination of a simulation model and careful analysis of the results 
produces potential insight into the understanding of a complex system’s dynamics and 
internal relationships.  However, this insight must never be confused with 
comprehensively finding the causes of real world events.  Simulation results can best be 
used to provide guidance in determining possible areas of continued exploration that must 
be pursued through empirical testing in the real world to ensure accurate validation. 
4. Philosophy of the Use of the ADC Simulation  
Since most of the characteristics of the individual watchstander agents were 
developed using expected-behavior models (and are implemented as functions), the test 
results from these areas should be examined with an eye towards verifying their proper 
performance.  The results of the simulation scenarios can then be used for guidance and 
inference into areas that will require real world testing to validate.  The ADC Simulation 
as well as other agent-based simulation models can offer a way to conduct scientific 
analysis of complex systems such as the inputs, outputs, and interactions of a CIC team.  
As the model becomes more refined through the inclusion of additional realistic detailed 
information and validation with real world performance, the simulation can be used with 
a greater sense of trust in its results. 
5. Simulation Testing Input Settings and Measurements Lists 
a. Inputs and Functions 
The following aspects of the ADC Simulation were implemented.  These 
aspects govern many of the fundamental performance characteristics of the AEGIS 




• Watchstander agents 
• CIC equipment 
• The external scenario environment 
• Aircraft contact behaviors and performance 
b. Independent Variables 
The following areas of the ADC Simulation are independent variables that 
can be modified/set by the user before and during the scenarios: 
• Watchstander agent attribute levels (skill, experience, etc.) 
• CIC equipment readiness levels 
• External scenario attribute levels/options 
• AEGIS doctrine settings 
• Attribute probability values 
• Maximum task times 
c. Dependent Variables 
The following aspects and relationships in the ADC Simulation are 
dependent variables: 
• Performance relationships among the watchstanders 
• Aircraft contact classifications by the CIC team 
• Subsequent CIC team actions based on the classifications 
• Overall performance of the CIC team in air-defense duties 
d. Test Categories 
• Watchstander (W/s) Average Task Time: the average amount of time for 
the watchstander to complete tasks during a test run. 
• Watchstander Average Message (Msg.) Transmit Time: the average 
amount of time for the watchstander to transmit messages during a run. 
• Watchstander Task Error Percentage: the percentage of errors during the 
attempted completion of watchstander tasks out of the total number of 
attempts to perform a task. 
• CIC Average Initial Detection Radar Time: the average time for between 
the time contacts are created and the time they are detected by the AEGIS 
cruiser (SPY-1B radar and CIC team). 
• CIC Average Initial Classification Time: the average time between the 
time contacts are initially detected and the time they are initially classified 
by the CIC team. 
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• CIC Average Correct Classification Time: the average time between the 
time contacts are initially detected and the time they are correctly 
classified by the CIC team. 
• CIC Classification Error Percentage: the percentage of aircraft contact 
classification errors committed by the CIC team out of the total number of 
attempts. 
• Average Number of Attempted CIC Classifications: the average of the 
number of attempted CIC classifications performed by the CIC team 
during a test run. 
B. RADAR SYSTEMS CONTROLLER (RSC) AGENT TESTING AND 
ANALYSIS RESULTS 
1. Expected Results Based on Air-Defense Expert Interviews 
It was expected that as the skill attributes were increased from basic to expert, the 
watchstander task error percentage and the CIC team classification error percentage 
would decrease.  The increase in the experience attributes from newly qualified to expert 
was expected to decrease in the RSC agent’s task and communication times as well as 
decrease CIC team times, especially the average initial radar detection time.  The increase 
in the fatigue attributes from fully rested to exhausted was expected to produce an 
increase in the agents' task error percentage and the CIC-team classification error 
percentage.  Lastly, the modification of the SPY-1B radar readiness attributes from fully 
operational to highly degraded was expected to increase both watchstander times (task 
and message transmission) and CIC-team times. 




W/s Avg. Task 
Time 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
W/s Task Error 
Percentage 
Basic 3.76 1.16 17.40% 
Experienced 3.78 1.19 13.40% 




CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 








Avg. # of 
Attempted CIC 
Classifications 
Basic 150.80 103.83 111.54 8.10% 21.00 
Experienced 136.39 108.89 111.77 9.92% 24.20 
Expert 134.90 109.47 103.82 11.36% 19.56 
 
Table 31.   Radar Operations Skill Tests. 
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Experience Level W/s Avg. Task 
Time 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
W/s Task Error 
Percentage 
Newly Qualified 3.58 1.20 19.60% 
Experienced 3.45 1.27 19.20% 




CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 








Avg. # of 
Attempted CIC 
Classifications 
Newly Qualified 153.29 106.94 113.32 10.18% 22.60 
Experienced 145.61 105.08 129.00 7.29% 24.70 
Expert 166.94 102.09 82.26 15.63% 22.40 
 
Table 32.   Experience Level Tests. 
 
Fatigue Level W/s Avg. Task 
Time 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
W/s Task Error 
Percentage 
Fully Rested 3.58 1.20 19.60% 
Tired 3.45 1.27 19.20% 
Exhausted 3.64 1.24 22.20% 
 
Fatigue Level CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 








Avg. # of 
Attempted CIC 
Classifications 
Fully Rested 153.29 106.94 113.32 9.09% 24.20 
Tired 145.51 105.08 129.00 11.71% 20.50 
Exhausted 166.94 102.09 82.26 12.83% 22.60 
 




W/s Avg. Task 
Time 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
W/s Task Error 
Percentage 
Fully Operational 3.55 1.27 21.00% 
Partially Degraded 3.67 1.09 18.89% 





CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 













142.27 105.45 86.37 10.68% 20.60 
Partially 
Degraded 
143.37 105.43 107.66 11.62% 22.00 
Highly 
Degraded 
148.72 107.69 91.00 11.17% 20.60 
 
Table 34.   SPY-1B Radar Tests. 
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3.  Analysis of Results and Recommendations 
a. Radar Operations Skill Results 
There was a moderate decrease in the watchstander error percentage 
between the basic and experienced levels, but an unexpected rise for the expert attribute.  
The CIC team classification error percentage did not produce a significant trend data and 
for the expert attribute, the error percentage rose moderately.  Also, for the average 
number of attempted classifications, there was an increase between the basic and 
experienced level, and a drop at the expert level.  There were no readily apparent reasons 
for these trends so additional tests are recommended to determine whether trends will 
develop over a larger number of tests.  For the CIC test categories that did not produce 
trends, there is a possibility that the individual watchstander’s skill level had a minimal 
influence on the overall CIC performance and possibly was overcome by one or more 
other variables in the test scenario (i.e. other watchstanders). 
b. Experience Level Results 
With the exception of a minor decrease in the CIC initial classification 
time category, there were no indications of trends in the rest of the data.  There is a 
possibility that the individual watchstander’s experience level had a minimal influence on 
the overall CIC performance and possibly was overcome by one or more other variables 
in the test scenario (i.e. other watchstanders). 
c. Fatigue Level Results 
There was a minor increase in watchstander errors as fatigue levels 
increased, which also corresponded to an increase in the CIC classification error rate 
(although an insignificant increase between newly qualified and experienced).  For the 
CIC test categories that did not produce trends, there is a possibility that the individual 
watchstander’s fatigue level had a minimal influence on the overall CIC performance and 
possibly was overcome by one or more other variables in the test scenario (i.e. other 
watchstanders). 
d. SPY-1B Radar Results 
There was a very minor increase in the watchstander average task time as 
radar became more degraded, and a moderate increase in times for the CIC average initial 
detection time and initial classification time (although a very small increase between fully 
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operational and partially degraded).  For the CIC test categories that did not produce 
trends, there is a possibility that the radar status had a minimal influence on the overall 
CIC performance and possibly was overcome by one or more other variables in the test 
scenario (i.e. other watchstanders). 
C. ELECTRONIC WARFARE CONTROL OFFICER (EWCO) AGENT 
TESTING AND ANALYSIS RESULTS 
1. Expected Results Based on Air-Defense Expert Interviews 
It was expected that as the skill attributes were increased from basic to expert, the 
watchstander task error percentage and the CIC team classification error percentage 
would decrease.  The increase in the experience attributes from newly qualified to expert 
was expected to decrease in the EWCO agent’s task and communication times as well as 
decrease CIC team times, especially the average initial radar detection time.  The increase 
in the fatigue attributes from fully rested to exhausted was expected to produce an 
increase in the agents' task error percentage and the CIC-team classification error 
percentage.  Lastly, the modification of the SLQ-32 system readiness attributes from fully 
operational to highly degraded was expected to increase both watchstander times (task 
and message transmission) and CIC team times. 
2. Results from the Simulation (See Appendix C Section A for Graphs) 
 
ES Analysis Skill W/s Avg. Task 
Time 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
W/s Task Error 
Percentage 
Basic 3.79 1.14 22.20% 
Experienced 3.78 1.14 15.60% 




CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 








Avg. # of 
Attempted CIC 
Classifications 
Basic 139.06 128.94 117.71 8.14% 25.80 
Experienced 140.99 129.59 95.03 7.22% 29.10 
Expert 141.62 126.75 131.11 5.82% 29.20 
 







Experience Level W/s Avg. Task 
Time 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
W/s Task Error 
Percentage 
Newly Qualified 3.27 1.22 23.40% 
Experienced 3.69 1.34 19.20% 




CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 








Avg. # of 
Attempted CIC 
Classifications 
Newly Qualified 142.29 119.29 132.76 15.56% 25.70 
Experienced 141.96 126.22 146.77 9.51% 26.30 
Expert 132.42 130.93 112.50 9.65% 25.90 
 
Table 36.   Experience Level Tests. 
 
Fatigue Level W/s Avg. Task 
Time 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
W/s Task Error 
Percentage 
Fully Rested 3.78 1.18 15.00% 
Tired 3.64 1.13 22.80% 
Exhausted 3.59 1.14 18.00% 
 
Fatigue Level CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 








Avg. # of 
Attempted CIC 
Classifications 
Fully Rested 142.01 125.58 135.13 9.12% 28.50 
Tired 140.10 121.74 120.93 8.96% 26.80 
Exhausted 154.57 114.31 122.08 11.20% 25.90 
 
Table 37.   Fatigue Level Tests. 
SLQ-32 System 
Operational Readiness 
W/s Avg. Task 
Time 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
W/s Task Error 
Percentage 
Fully Operational 3.76 1.11 20.60% 
Partially Degraded 3.78 1.08 18.40% 





CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 













162.37 127.67 124.52 10.73% 26.10 
Partially 
Degraded 
188.06 131.43 145.40 13.65% 24.90 
Highly 
Degraded 
166.80 153.45 150.10 12.45 % 26.50 
 




3.  Analysis of Results and Recommendations 
a. ES Analysis Skill Results 
A decreasing trend was observed in the watchstander error percentage 
between the basic and experienced levels, but an unexpected rise between the 
experienced and expert attribute, although the error percentage at the expert level was 
still lower than the basic level.  There was no explanation for this occurrence so 
additional tests are recommended to determine whether a steadily decreasing trend will 
develop over a larger number of tests.  The CIC team classification error percentage 
produced a decreasing trend from basic to expert.  Also, the average number of attempted 
classifications had a steady increase, although the rise between the experienced and 
expert level may not be statistically significant.  Additional tests would also help to 
determine whether a more significant trend will develop.  For the CIC test categories that 
did not produce trends, there is a possibility that the individual watchstander’s ES 
Analysis skill level had a minimal influence on the overall CIC performance and possibly 
was overcome by one or more other variables in the test scenario (i.e. other 
watchstanders).  Empirical tests are needed to confirm the validity of the results. 
b. Experience Level Results 
Contrary to expectations, an increasing trend was observed in the 
watchstander average task time as the experience level was modified from newly 
qualified to expert.  There was a notable decrease in the watchstander task error 
percentage and CIC classification error percentage as the experience level increased, but 
there were no other trends observable in the rest of the test times. 
c. Fatigue Level Results 
Contrary to expectations, there was a there was a minor increase in the 
watchstander average task time as the fatigue levels increased.  The fully rested 
watchstander agent test may have consisted of a larger set of tasks times that, due to 
inherent (and proper) variability in the watchstander design, produced a set of data with 





d. SLQ-32 System Results 
There was a notable increase in the CIC averaged initial classification and 
averaged correct classification times as the system readiness transitioned from fully 
operational to highly degraded. 
D. FORCE TACTICAL ACTION OFFICER (F-TAO) AGENT TESTING AND 
ANALYSIS RESULTS 
1. Expected Results Based on Air-Defense Expert Interviews 
It was expected that as the skill attributes were increased from basic to expert, the 
watchstander task error percentage and the CIC team classification error percentage 
would decrease.  The increase in the experience attributes from newly qualified to expert 
was expected to cause a decrease in the Force TAO agent’s task and communication 
times as well as a decrease in CIC-team times, especially the average initial radar 
detection time.  The increase in the fatigue attributes from fully rested to exhausted was 
expected to produce an increase in the agent’s task error percentage and the CIC-team 
classification error percentage.  Lastly, the increase in the decisionmaker-type attributes 
from cautious to aggressive was expected to decrease the watchstander and CIC times 
while increasing the CIC classification error percentage. 





W/s Avg. Task 
Time 














Basic 15.34 1.34 149.37 275.03 314.26 14.59% 
Experienced 14.99 1.23 151.02 248.60 282.22 9.25% 
Expert 15.06 1.20 180.37 272.60 317.61 7.75% 
 




W/s Avg. Task 
Time 
















14.84 1.20 172.20 246.73 266.59 13.25% 
Experienced 14.70 1.18 169.34 257.29 238.71 11.50% 
Expert 14.60 1.19 153.17 239.12 213.78 10.50% 
 







W/s Avg. Task 
Time 














Fully Rested 14.63 1.24 175.99 250.99 269.55 7.00% 
Tired 15.26 1.30 165.03 257.06 275.95 12.00% 
Exhausted 14.81 1.23 158.29 257.46 233.34 14.00% 
 




W/s Avg. Task 
Time 














Cautious 15.31 1.11 160.55 288.95 306.77 14.00% 
Balanced 14.79 1.31 171.32 245.23 272.84 12.25% 
Aggressive 14.32 1.13 171.87 228.05 300.90 12.00% 
 
Table 42.   Decision-maker Type Tests. 
 
3.  Analysis of Results and Recommendations 
a. Situation Analysis Skill Results 
As expected, there was a noticeable decline in the CIC aircraft 
classification error percentage as the skill level increased from basic to expert.  However, 
an increase in the CIC averaged initial radar detection time was observed, and there was 
no explanation for this occurrence so additional tests are recommended to determine 
whether a steadily decreasing trend will develop over a larger number of tests in this area.  
For these categories, there is a possibility that the individual watchstander’s fatigue level 
had a minimal influence on the overall CIC performance and possibly was overcome by 
one or more other variables in the test scenario (i.e. other watchstanders). 
b. Experience Level Results 
It was observed that as the experience level increased from newly 
qualified to expert, there was a corresponding (and in most cases expected) decrease in 
watchstander averaged task times, watchstander averaged message transmission times 
(minimal), CIC averaged initial radar detection times, CIC averaged correct classification 
times, and classification error percentages.  These results suggest that for the Force TAO 
there is a significant effect of the watchstander’s experience level on individual and 




c. Fatigue Level Results 
An increase in the classification error percentage was noted as the fatigue 
level was transitioned from fully rested to exhausted.  Also, there was corresponding 
decrease in the CIC averaged initial radar detection time although a reason for this 
decline could not be ascertained 
d. Decision-Maker Type Results 
As expected it was observed that the watchstander averaged task times and 
CIC averaged initial classification time decreased as the decision-maker type transitioned 
form cautious to aggressive.  It was also noted that the there was a corresponding decline 
in classification error percentage, which was not expected.  There was no explanation for 
this occurrence so additional tests are recommended to determine whether a steadily 
decreasing trend will develop over a larger number of tests in this area the validity of the 
results. 
E. COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER (CIC) WATCH TEAM ATTRIBUTE 
PROFILE TESTING AND ANALYSIS 
1. Expected Results Based on Air-Defense Expert Interviews 
a. Trial Profile Summary 
Trial #1 is a scenario where the Force TAO’s skill and experience 
attributes are set to expert while the fatigue attribute is set to exhausted.  For the rest of 
the CIC team, their skill and experience attributes are set to basic and newly qualified 
respectively, while their fatigue attribute is set to fully rested.  In Trial #2, the Force 
TAO’s skill and experience attributes are set to basic and newly qualified respectively, 
while the fatigue attribute is set to well rested.  For the rest of the CIC team, their skill 
and experiences attributes are set to expert while their fatigue attribute is set to exhausted.  
The objective of the trials was to gain insight into which Force TAO/CIC team would 
perform better given the above settings. 
b. Expectations 
It was expected that the Force TAO / CIC team in Trial #2 would 
outperform the team in Trial #1 (with respect to the CIC classification error percentage) 
because the sensory input watchstanders (RSC, TIC, IDS, and EWCO) from Trial #2 
would make fewer contact assessment mistakes, which would help the basic/newly 
qualified Force TAO in overcoming the watchstander’s minimal qualifications.  For the 
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individual watchstander results (relating to the Force TAO), it is expected that the Force 
TAO agent in the first trial (expert attributes) would outperform the Force TAO agent 
from the second trial. 
2. Results from the Simulation (See Appendix C Section A for Graphs) 
 
CIC Watch Team 
Tests 
W/s Avg. Task 
Time (F-TAO) 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
W/s Task Error 
Percentage 
Trial #1 15.46 1.23 8.30 




CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 








Avg. # of 
Attempted CIC 
Classifications 
Trial #1 175.92 271.87 274.21 14.59% 56.90 
Trial #2 124.86 339.42 349.54 19.79% 48.00 
 
Table 43.   CIC Watch Team Attribute Profile Tests. 
 
3.  Analysis of Results and Recommendations 
As expected, the Force TAO agent for the first trial performed better than the 
Force TAO in the second trial for trial.  The only area where the Force TAO and CIC 
team in the second trial outperformed the other team was in the CIC's averaged initial 
radar detection time.  With respect to the simulation, this suggests that an expert and 
exhausted Force TAO working with a basic/newly qualified CIC team that is well rested 
may perform better than the other team.  
F. COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER (CIC) WATCH TEAM TESTING 
AND ANALYSIS OF WEATHER OPTIONS 
1. Expected Results Based on Air-Defense Expert Interviews 
It was expected that as the weather attributes were increased from clear to heavy 
clutter, the CIC team times would increase due to degradation of the combat systems 










W/s Avg. Task Time 
(F-TAO) 
W/s Avg. Msg. 
Transmit Time 
Clear Weather 15.03 1.14 
Heavy Rain 14.55 1.16 




CIC Avg. Initial 
Radar Detect 
Time 








Avg. # of 
Attempted CIC 
Classifications 
Clear Weather 194.54 257.30 294.30 15.97% 38.20 
Heavy Rain 183.56 270.29 310.11 12.53% 43.10 
Heavy Clutter 172.13 260.74 242.47 11.60% 43.10 
 
Table 44.   Weather Option Tests. 
 
3.  Analysis of Results and Recommendations 
Contrary to expectations, decreasing trends were noted in the watchstander 
averaged task times (minimal), CIC averaged initial radar detection times, and CIC 
classification error percentage categories, which suggests that the weather has an opposite 
effect on the CIC team performance. 
G. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY OF THE ATRC DETACHMENT, SAN 
DIEGO AIR-DEFENSE EXPERTS 
1. Survey Overview 
An ADC Simulation realism survey was administered to the nine air-defense 
experts at the ATRC Detachment in San Diego.  Survey questions (organized in sections) 
were developed based on the results of the testing and analysis of the ADC Simulation to 
explore the realism of the program’s performance/output as related to the experts’ 
professional air-defense experiences.  This method of comparison was selected over the 
direct observation and assessment of ADC Simulation scenarios to minimize skewed 
responses due to biases related to the responder desire to evaluate the program differently 
(because the survey administer was also the simulation developer).  Also, we wished to 
compare the air-defense experts’ evaluation of the simulation test results with as few 
other factors as possible, and some of the results used to formulate the scenario questions 
were produced using an initial set of simulation tests that would be conducted again.  In 
these cases, the air-defense expert responses can viewed as an expected characteristic or 
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behavior for that particular attribute, which can then be examined in the model and 
modified if necessary. 
The survey required each responder to rate the person’s level of agreement or 
disagreement with the simulation results based on their professional experience and 
provided a range of choices from (1)-Strongly Disagree to (7)-Strongly Agree.  For each 
question posed in the survey, there was a subsequent optional question that offered the 
responder to consider whether the results outcome expressed in the first question (if the 
person’s experiences were contrary to the results) could occur given a certain set of 
conditions.  Also, for the final set of questions in the survey (Section Five), the second 
question asked whether the results from the first question were something the experts 
should be concerned about for training CIC teams in performing air-defense duties. 
2. RSC Watchstander Questions and Results 
a. Questions Posed 
(1) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the RSC radar operations skill attribute (Basic, Experienced, 
Expert) was changed.  The results showed that the RSC’s radar task performance 
improved and the number of errors committed errors decreased as the skill level 
increased (Basic Æ Expert). 
(2) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the RSC experience level attribute (Newly Qualified, 
Experienced, Expert) was changed.  The results showed that the RSC’s watchstander 
radar task performance improved and the number of errors committed errors decreased as 
the experience level increased (Newly Qualified Æ Expert). 
(3) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the RSC fatigue level attribute (Fully Rested, Tired, 
Exhausted) was changed.  The scenario results showed that the RSC’s watchstander radar 
task performance times worsened and the number of errors committed errors increased as 
the fatigue level increased (Fully Rested Æ Exhausted). 
(4) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the SPY-1B radar system attribute (Fully Operational, 
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Partially Degraded, Highly Degraded) was changed.  The scenario results showed that the 
RSC’s watchstander radar task performance worsened as the equipment readiness level 
increased (Fully Rested Æ Exhausted). 
(5) The scenario results showed that the CIC team performance (Average 
Classification Times & Number of Errors Committed) improved/decreased as the RSC’s 
skill and experience levels increased, and worsened as the Fatigue levels increased. 
b. Results (See Appendix C Section B for Graphs) 
 
RSC Questions Average Mean Std. Dev. 
1.  Skill Modification 6.11 6 0.93 
Contrary Responses N/A N/A N/A 
2.  Experience Modification 6 6 1.00 
Contrary Responses N/A N/A N/A 
3.  Fatigue Modification 5.33 5 1.32 
Contrary Responses 3 3 N/A 
4.  SPY-1B Radar Modification 5 5 0.71 
Contrary Responses 4 4 N/A 
5.  CIC Team Performance wrt RSC 5 5 1.00 
Contrary Responses 4 4 N/A 
 
Table 45.   Results of RSC Questions. 
 
c. Analysis and Recommendations 
For the skill and experience questions, the average of the responses was in 
the strongly-agree category (6.11 and 6 respectively) with no contrary responses.  For the 
fatigue question, most experts agreed with the results of the test runs (5.33 average 
response) although one person could not think of a set of circumstances that would 
produce such results (3.0 contrary response).  For the SPY-1B radar question, most 
experts agreed with the results of the test runs (5.0 average response) although one person 
could think of a set of circumstances that would produce such results (4.0 contrary 
response) but that they did not strongly agree this situation could reasonably occur.  
Lastly, the survey response indicated that most experts agreed with the CIC team 




3. EWCO Watchstander Questions and Results 
a. Questions Posed 
(1) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the EWCO ES analysis skill attribute (Basic, Experienced, 
Expert) was changed.  The results showed that the EWCO’s radar task performance 
improved and the number of errors committed errors decreased as the skill level 
increased (Basic Æ Expert). 
(2) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the EWCO experience level attribute (Newly Qualified, 
Experienced, Expert) was changed.  The results showed that the EWCO’s watchstander 
radar task performance improved and the number of errors committed errors decreased as 
the experience level increased (Newly Qualified Æ Expert). 
(3) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the EWCO fatigue level attribute (Fully Rested, Tired, 
Exhausted) was changed.  The results showed that the EWCO’s watchstander radar task 
performance times worsened and the number of errors increased as the fatigue level 
increased (Fully Rested Æ Exhausted). 
(4) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the SLQ-32 system attribute (Fully Operational, Partially 
Degraded, Highly Degraded) was changed.  The results showed that the EWCO’s 
watchstander radar task performance worsened as the equipment readiness level 
increased (Fully Rested Æ Exhausted). 
(5) The results showed that the CIC team performance (Average 
Classification Times & Number of Errors Committed) improved/decreased as the 







b. Results (See Appendix C Section B for Graphs) 
EWCO Questions Average Mean Std. Dev. 
1.  Skill Modification 6.22 6 0.83 
Contrary Responses 5 5 N/A 
2.  Experience Modification 5.89 6 0.78 
Contrary Responses 4 4 N/A 
3.  Fatigue Modification 5.44 6 1.01 
Contrary Responses 5 5 N/A 
4.  SLQ-32 System Modification 5.44 5 1.13 
Contrary Responses 4 4 N/A 
5.  CIC Team Performance wrt EWCO 5.44 6 1.51 
Contrary Responses 4 4 N/A 
 
Table 46.   Results of EWCO Questions. 
 
c. Analysis and Recommendations 
For skill, experience, fatigue, SLQ-32 system, and EWCO performance with 
respect to CIC team questions, average responses were in the agree to strongly agree 
category (6.22, 5.89, 5.44, 5.44 and 5.44 respectively) with only one contrary response 
for each question.  However, for each of these contrary responses, the person agreed that 
such a situation could occur. 
4. F-TAO Watchstander Questions and Results 
a. Questions Posed 
(1) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the Force TAO situation assessment skill attribute (Basic, 
Experienced, Expert) was changed.  The results showed that the Force TAO’s radar-task 
performance improved and the number of errors committed errors decreased as the skill 
level increased (Basic Æ Expert). 
(2) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC team attribute 
settings, and only the Force TAO’s experience level attribute (Newly Qualified, 
Experienced, Expert) was changed.  The results showed that the Force TAO’s radar-task 
performance improved and the number of errors committed errors decreased as the 
experience level increased (Newly Qualified Æ Expert). 
(3) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the Force TAO’s fatigue level attribute (Fully Rested, Tired, 
Exhausted) was changed.  The results showed that the Force TAO’s radar task 
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performance times worsened and the number of errors committed errors increased as the 
fatigue level increased (Fully Rested Æ Exhausted). 
(4) A simulation scenario was run using the default CIC watch team 
attribute settings, and only the Force TAO’s decision-maker type attribute (Cautious, 
Balanced, Aggressive) was changed.  The results showed that the Force TAO’s 
watchstander radar task performance times decreased and the number of errors 
committed increased as the decision-maker type increased (Cautious Æ Aggressive). 
(5) The results showed that the CIC team performance (Average 
Classification Times & Number of Errors Committed) improved/decreased as the Force 
TAO’s skill and experience levels increased and worsened as the fatigue levels increased. 
(6) The scenario results showed that the CIC team’s average classification 
times decreased and the number of errors increased as the Force TAO’s decision-maker 
type was changed (Cautious Æ Aggressive). 
b. Results (See Appendix C Section B for Graphs) 
 
F-TAO Questions Average Mean Std. Dev. 
1.  Skill Modification 6 6 1.12 
Contrary Responses 4 4 N/A 
2.  Experience Modification 5.78 6 0.83 
Contrary Responses 5 5 N/A 
3.  Fatigue Modification 5.56 5 0.73 
Contrary Responses 4 4 N/A 
4.  Decision-maker Type Modification 4.33 4 1.41 
Contrary Responses 4.5 4.5 0.58 
5.  CIC Team Performance wrt F-TAO 
Performance 
5.22 5 1.30 
Contrary Responses 4 4 N/A 
6.  CIC Team Performance wrt F-TAO 
Decision-maker Type 
4.44 4 1.59 
Contrary Responses 4.25 4.5 0.96 
 
Table 47.   Results of F-TAO Questions. 
 
c. Analysis and Recommendations 
For the skill, experience, and fatigue questions, the average responses 
were between the agree and strongly agree categories (6, 5.78, and 5.56 respectively) 
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with only one contrary response for each question.  However, for each of these contrary 
responses, the person agreed that such a situation could occur.  Starting with the decision-
maker type question, there was a moderate level of disagreement where four of the seven 
experts disagreed with the outcome (4.33 averaged) and had a middle-of-the-road reply to 
the contrary responses value (4.5 averaged).  For the CIC Team Performance (with 
respect to F-TAO performance) question, the responses were generally in the agree 
category (5.22 average) with only one contrary response for the question.  The CIC Team 
Performance (with respect to F-TAO Decision-maker type) garnered a similar level of 
disagreement to the decision-maker question and resulted in a 4.44 (average response) 
with four experts providing contrary responses (4.22 average), indicating a mixed review 
of the reasonableness of the occurrence of the situation under a given set of 
circumstances. 
5. CIC Team Questions and Results 
a. Questions Posed 
(1) Two simulation scenarios were run with two different CIC watch team 
settings.  In the first scenario, the Force TAO was assigned EXPERT ratings in the Skill 
and Experience attributes, but was assigned an EXHAUSTED rating in the Fatigue 
attribute.  The rest of the CIC team was assigned BASIC/NEWLY QUALIFIED in the 
Skill and Experience attributes and FULLY RESTED in the Fatigue attributes.  For the 
second scenario, these settings were reversed so that the Force TAO was assigned 
BASIC/NEWLY QUALIFIED ratings in the Skill and Experience attributes, and was 
assigned a FULLY RESTED rating in the Fatigue attribute.  The rest of the CIC team 
was assigned EXPERT in the Skill and Experience attributes, but EXHAUSTED in the 
Fatigue attributes. 
The results of the scenarios showed that the Force TAO / CIC Team 
settings in the second scenario committed fewer contact classification errors and had 
lower initial contact radar detection times than the team in the first scenario. 
(2) During scenario testing, it was noted an expert skilled/experienced CIC 
watch team that had a high level of fatigue performed better (task performance times, 
number of errors committed) than a basic skilled/experienced watch team that was fully 
rested (no fatigue). 
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b. Results (See Appendix C Section B for Graphs) 
 
CIC Team Watchstander Questions Average Mean Std. Dev. 
1.  F-TAO Expert/Exhausted – CIC Team 
Basic/Well-Rested 
5 5 1.50 
Contrary Responses N/A N/A N/A 
2.  F-TAO Basic/Well-Rested – CIC Team 
Expert/Exhausted 
4.67 5 1.32 
Contrary Responses 4 4 N/A 
 
Table 48.   Results of CIC Team Watchstander Questions. 
 
c. Analysis and Recommendations 
The results of question one indicate that most of the respondents agreed 
that the scenario outcome was reasonable (5.0 average), but there were a couple of 
disagreements (two ratings of three).  Although there were low ratings indicating a 
disagreement by two respondents, they did not answer the contrary response question. 
The results of question two indicate that most of the respondents agreed 
that the scenario outcome was reasonable (4.67 average), but there were also a couple of 
disagreements (two ratings of three).  There was one contrary response in which the 
expert agreed that under a certain set of circumstances, the situation could possibly occur. 
6. Additional CIC Team Questions and Results 
a. Questions Posed 
(1) In some scenarios, the number of errors committed and watchstander 
performance times were better for lower (rating) skill/experience/fatigue/equipment 
readiness levels than higher ones.  Given a certain set of conditions, is this outcome 
possible? 
(2) In some scenarios, the CIC watch team did not identify/classify a 
nearby, closing contact until it was within a potential weapons-release range (if it was 
hostile).  Given a certain set of conditions, is this outcome possible? 
(3) In some scenarios, the CIC watch team misidentified a contact, which 
then remained incorrect for a significant amount of (simulated) time before being 
corrected.  In some case the contact was never correctly identified.  Given a certain set of 
conditions, is this outcome possible? 
144 
(4) In some scenarios, the CIC watch team misidentified a contact as 
hostile (imminent attack) and launched missiles at the aircraft.  Given a certain set of 
conditions, is this outcome possible? 
(5) It was noted that the higher the Scenario Threat Level (White, Yellow, 
Red), the more likely the CIC watch team was to classify a contact as either Suspect or 
Hostile.  Is this outcome typical of such a situation? 
(6) It was noted that the performance of the RSC, EWCO, and IDS 
watchstanders influenced the classification of a contact (via the Force TAO) more than 
any other watchstander on the CIC team.  Is this outcome typical of such a situation? 
b. Results (See Appendix C Section B for Graphs) 
 
Additional CIC Team Watchstander 
Questions 
Average Mean Std. Dev. 
1.  Lower Skilled/Experience W/s Performance vs. 
Higher Skilled/Experienced W/s Performance 
4.67 5 1.12 
Worthy of Concern wrt. Training Questions 3.5 3.5 0.71 
2.  Closing Contacts Not Classified by CIC Team 
until within Weapons Release Range. 
5.44 5 1.01 
Worthy of Concern wrt. Training Questions 5.33 5 1.53 
3.  Contacts Misidentified and not corrected for 
significant amount of time or never. 
5.66 5 1.13 
Worthy of Concern wrt. Training Questions 5.67 6 0.58 
4.  Contacts Misidentified as Hostile and missiles 
launched against them. 
5.33 5 1.00 
Worthy of Concern wrt. Training Questions 6.33 7 1.15 
5.  Higher Scenario Threat Level led to greater 
probability of Suspect/Hostile Classifications. 
4.78 5 0.83 
Worthy of Concern wrt. Training Questions 4.75 5 1.26 
6.  Greater Influence of RSC, EWCO, & IDS W/s 
on Force TAO’s Classifications of Contacts. 
5.25 5 0.89 
Worthy of Concern wrt. Training Questions 4.67 5 1.53 
 
Table 49.   Results of CIC Team Watchstander Questions. 
 
c. Analysis and Recommendations 
(1) Question 1.  The results of this question indicate that most 
respondents agreed that the scenario outcome was reasonable (4.67 average).  Two 
experts disagreed (3.5 training concern response) that it was a topic worthy of concern. 
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(2) Question 2.  The results of this question indicate that most 
respondents agreed that the scenario outcome was reasonable (5.44 average).  Three 
experts disagreed with the outcome, but moderately agreed (5.33 training concern 
response) that it was a topic worthy of concern. 
(3) Question 3.  The results of this question indicate that most 
respondents agreed that the scenario outcome was reasonable (5.66 average).  Three 
experts disagreed with the outcome, but moderately agreed (5.67 training concern 
response) that it was a topic worthy of concern. 
(4) Question 4.  The results of this question indicate that most 
of the respondents agreed that the scenario outcome was reasonable (5.33 average).  
Three experts disagreed with the outcome, but strongly agreed (6.33 training concern 
response) that it was a topic worthy of concern. 
(5) Question 5.  The results of this question indicate that there was 
a mixture of agreement and disagreement on the scenario findings.  Four experts 
disagreed with the results although they agreed that it was a topic worthy of concern 
(4.75 training concern response).  Three of the experts agreed with the results producing a 
4.78 average. 
(6) Question 6.  The results of this question indicate that most of 
the experts agree with the simulation test (5.25 average), but three people disagreed with 
the results.  However, in the training concern question, these people seemed to 
moderately agree that it was a topic worthy of concern (4.67 contrary average). 
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VI. FUTURE WORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRUISER 
ADC SIMULATION 
A. FUTURE WORK INTRODUCTION 
From its inception, the ADC Simulation was conceived as a long-term project that 
would start with the development and deployment of the initial program as a proof-of-
concept and would continue to be expanded in scope and detail.  Ideally, a research 
collaboration among the Naval Postgraduate School Modeling, Virtual Environments, 
and Simulation (MOVES) Institute and Computer Science Department, Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR) San Diego, Office of Naval Research (ONR), 
AEGIS Training & Readiness Center at Dahlgren, Virginia, and the Naval Sea Systems 
Commander at Dahlgren, was envisioned to be the most beneficial arrangement.  The 
MOVES Institute in conjunction with the Computer Science Department would establish 
a Battle Group Air-Defense Research Project Laboratory, similar to the MOVES 
Institute’s Army Game Project, to oversee and coordinate the simulation’s 
implementation.  Masters’ and doctoral students at NPS under the direct guidance and 
supervision of academic professors would conduct the primary research and development 
of ADC Simulation.  The students’ military experience coupled with their academic 
research and requirements would provide a unique opportunity to capitalize on these 
assets to implement advanced modules.  Furthermore, this project work could be 
accomplished at a substantially reduced cost compared to the same amount of work 
performed by a civilian contractor company resulting in favorable benefits vs. cost ratio.  
If this path of research and development were pursued, SPAWAR, ONR, ATRC 
Dahlgren, and NAVSEA would provide project and system training objectives, additional 
guidance, technical data, simulation evaluation responsibilities, and funding to support 
the development and implementation process.   
Expansive development of the ADC Simulation could occur in three categories 
that would result in a possible line of products to support air-defense training and 
planning.  The first category of future work would involve the continued expansion of the 
ADC Simulation in scope and detail.  The scope factor would relate to the increase of the 
simulation’s focus so that a wider area of relevant operations could be simulated.  The 
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detail factor would consist of improvements to the fidelity of the simulation to replicate 
various aspects of battle group air-defense more accurately.  The second category of 
future work would pursue the extension of the ADC Simulation as the centerpiece of an 
interactive air-defense training simulation system for use by watchstanders to assist in 
gaining and maintaining watchstation proficiency.  The last category of future work 
would involve the adapting of the ADC Simulation for use in replicating similar types of 
operations conducted the United States Army and United States Air Force. 
B. FUTURE WORK TO EXPAND THE SCOPE AND DETAIL OF THE ADC 
SIMULATION 
1. Implement Networked Simulation of Battle Group Air-Defense 
Operations 
The next logical step in the extension of the ADC project is to develop a 
networked simulation of naval ships performing battle group air defense to more 
accurately reproduce realistic performance and events from such operations.  In the 
original ADC Simulation, additional ships beyond the ADC cruiser and aircraft carrier 
were also simulated in the program, but were abstracted to only provide the necessary 
performance requirements (i.e. transmission of LINK 11/16 contacts, surface-to-air 
missile engagements, communications reports to the cruiser).  To gain a greater level of 
fidelity in the ADC Simulation, these other ships must be implemented in a similar 
manner as the ADC cruiser, which would require they be developed using multi-agent 
systems architecture.  However, implementing these additional agent-based CIC 
teams/ships into the existing program platform would be problematic for the following 
two reasons.  First, the current platform’s resources are already near maximum usage 
(due to the speed and memory limitations of the computer) and any additional large-scale 
additions would likely strain the system to the point that its performance would be 
negatively affected.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, the performance of these 
additional ships and teams would not be accurately represented because their actions 
which normally occur in parallel in the real world, would be executed serially despite the 
use of Java language-based parallel processing components (multi-threading) because of 
inherent PC hardware designs.   
These issues can be resolved by implementing each of the CIC teams/ships on 
their own individual processor and then networking them together to more accurately 
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simulate battle group air-defense operations.  Using the Extensible Markup Language 
(XML) and other computer networking components, the ships could be connected 
together to realistically simulate the voice and LINK 11/16 messages which represent a 
significant majority of all of the communications occurring within a battle group.  A 
diagram of the proposed configuration is listed in Figure 39. 
 
 
Figure 39.   Battle Group Simulation of Air-Defense Operations. 
 
There are several advantages to expanding the ADC Simulation in such a manner 
to replicate battle group operations.  First, the use of independent platforms to host the 
CIC teams/ships would eliminate the serial-performance problem associated with 
attempting to implement them on the same platform and would promote a significantly 
greater level of parallelism that is inherent in actual operations.  Second, if appropriately 
designed to capture a level of performance similar to actual operations, this configuration 
could provide exceptional insight into the understanding of battle group air-defense 
performance under a wide variety of situations.  If all of the platforms would be 
implemented using the same architecture as the ADC Simulation, a considerable level of 
accuracy and fidelity could be achieved as a multitude of watchstander, ship system, and 
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environmental attributes could be specified for each CIC team and ship, especially in the 
areas of LINK 11/16 performance and air-defense decision-making and aircraft 
classification.  Lastly, a battle group ADC Simulation could provide battle group and 
fleet command staffs, battle group training organizations, and doctrine/war-gaming 
organizations with very accurate and realistic simulation architecture in supporting their 
mission objectives. 
2. Implement a More Detailed Watchstander Fatigue/Vigilance Model 
Another potential and useful development project for the ADC Simulation would 
be to implement a more detailed and realistic fatigue performance model for the 
watchstanders.  In the current system, the user presets the fatigue level before and/or 
during the simulation run, but this setup does not accurately represent the decline of 
watchstander performance over extended periods of time or any of the other factors that 
influence them.  Major Joerg Wellbrink, Federal German Army, and Dr. Rudolph Darken 
at the MOVES INSTITUTE of the Naval Postgraduate School, are exploring the research 
and development of fatigue and vigilance models for inclusion in watchstander 
performance.  They assert,  
It is possible to realistically simulate individual human performance to 
generate surprises, unintended consequences and potentially dangerous 
outcomes.  A new cognitive model, based on complex adaptive systems 
(CAS) theory, enabled us to explore imperfect human behavior, thereby 
meeting a necessary precondition to a new kind of threat-analysis 
simulation models.57 
The integration of this model into the ADC Simulation’s watchstander agents could 
greatly enhance the realism of the agents’ behaviors to a level much closer to expected 
human performance thereby increasing the overall fidelity and usefulness of the program. 
3. Implement Aircraft Contacts as Watchstander Agents 
The aircraft contact objects used in the simulation were designed with a 
substantial level of detail with regard to their performance and actions that produce a 
robust and dynamic set of behaviors.  This rich variety of potential actions ensures the 
watchstander agents are not presented with static aircraft profiles which would otherwise 
reduce the quality and uniqueness of the ADC Simulation.  The next step in the 
                                                 
57 Wellbrink, Joerg and Darken, Rudolph, Sustained Attention Modeled as a Complex Adaptive 
System, MOVES Institute, p. 1. 
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development of the aircraft contacts would be to implement them as agents.  
Transforming the contacts into agents would instill into these software components a set 
of objectives and intents that would drive them towards behaviors more closely related to 
those of human aircraft pilots.  This interesting capability would allow for the 
introduction of deception as part of the behavior set of the aircraft agents and could 
produce very interesting results when deployed against the CIC team. 
4. Implement a More Detailed Log Parser Using XML 
Although the current program contains a simulation log parser to find and display 
specific data, this implementation was basic in its design and can be improved to increase 
its usefulness and relevance.  In the most recent version, the ADC Simulation log parser 
allows the user to search for watchstander, scenario, and equipment log data by inputting 
an aircraft contact’s track number.  Using XML technology to designate data within the 
log entries more effectively, the simulation’s data recording and displaying components 
could be redesigned to allow for parsing of these logs with a greater level of granularity.  
This implementation could allow for an increased flexibility in the display of the 
recorded data including the parsing of specific logs (i.e. RSC Decision History Log only), 
parsing between designated periods of time, comparison of different watchstander log 
records on the same aircraft contact, and any combination of the above to retrieve data. 
5. Implement a More Detailed Capability for AEGIS and Air-Defense 
Doctrine 
In the current version of the ADC Simulation, the only user-modifiable doctrine 
available is the capability to alter the Auto-special doctrine under the AEGIS Doctrine 
menu.  This option was included as a proof-of-concept to demonstrate the usefulness of 
capabilities for modifying various types of doctrines to more realistically replicate all of 
the tools available to the CIC team.  Other relevant doctrine that could be implemented is 
Identification Doctrine, IFF Doctrine, and Auto-Standard Missile Doctrine.  These 
doctrines, frequently used by CIC teams to alleviate some of the time constraints inherent 
in air-defense operations, would greatly enhance the performance of the simulation. 
6. Implement Alternate Scenario Locations 
The ADC Simulation location is set in the Arabian Gulf region, a place that has 
been (and remains) a particularly dangerous and demanding environment to operate in for 
aircraft carrier battle groups.  However, there are many other locations of military interest 
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to the United States Navy such as the Korean Peninsula, the Taiwan Straits, and the 
Adriatic Sea that are also relevant to current and future naval operations.  Implementing 
the capability to alter the scenario locations would provide an increased flexibility and 
applicability to the simulation program. 
7. Implement More Detailed Treatment of SPY-1B Radar System, SLQ-
32 System, and Communications System 
During the development process, the performances and characteristics of the 
SPY-1B Radar System, SLQ-32 System, and External Communication System were 
abstracted so as to provide realistic qualitative behavior without requiring a substantial 
amount of coding to replicate them (which was not within the scope of the research).  A 
byproduct of this project would be the capability to accurately simulate the effects of 
weather and geography (land formations) on the performance of the systems.  
Implementing these systems with a finer level of detail that addresses the underlying and 
fundamental characteristics and operations of the combat systems equipment would 
increase the overall level of realism and accuracy of the simulation.  For certain systems, 
this extension would require the need to delve into classified material to properly 
implement the improvements. 
8. Conduct a More In-Depth Study of Metrics for Watchstander 
Performance Attributes (OR/OA) 
Since an accurate and vetted data resource on many of the simulation’s modifiable 
attributes was not available during its design and development, the watchstander (skill, 
experience, fatigue, decision-maker types), equipment readiness levels, and external 
scenario attributes were adopted from extensive interviews with air-defense training 
experts.  These values specifically refer to the probability of success values and 
watchstander maximum task times associated with the above attributes.  Although the 
capability to modify these values was incorporated into the simulation if the user 
disagrees with the default values, the ADC Simulation would benefit from a rigorous, in-
depth study of the watchstander performance metrics for each attribute.  Such a study 
would be of significant value to the Navy in general as well as very advantageous to 
increasing the realistic performance of the watchstander agents.  Additionally, as part of 
this study, a more in-depth statistical analysis of the ADC Simulation could be conducted 
to provide a greater level of understanding of the program’s performance characteristics, 
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which could then be measured against the performance of an actual CIC team conducting 
air-defense operations.  This study could be of great value if the investigator was able to 
replicate the scenarios performed by the actual CIC team within the simulation scenarios 
so that a direct comparison could be made and an assessment of the ADC Simulation’s 
level of reality determined.  A study of this magnitude and scope would be well suited for 
a student in the Operations Analysis/Research curriculum. 
9. Implement the Capability to Replay Previous Scenarios and/or 
Portions of Those Scenarios 
The current version of the ADC Simulation does not have the capability to rerun 
previously conducted scenarios.  To increase the training usefulness of the simulation, a 
capability could be added to the program to allow the user to replay either an entire 
scenario run or designated portions of it for review and training purposes. 
10. Implement the Capability to Build Scenarios with Specified Contact 
Aircraft of Various Types and Behaviors 
A useful feature that could be incorporated into the ADC Simulation would be the 
capability to create specific scenarios (instead of allowing the program to generate 
random events as it does now) containing contacts with desired aircraft behaviors and 
attributes.  This would provide the user with a greater level of flexibility in the potential 
uses of the simulation, especially, if he or she only prefers to test only a certain set of 
scenarios. 
C. FUTURE WORK TO ADAPT THE ADC SIMULATION FOR ADVANCED 
TRAINING OF WATCHSTANDERS 
1. First Phase Single Watchstander Training System 
The second major project for the continued development of the ADC Simulation 
would be to incorporate a capability for the user to play a specific watchstander in the 
simulation for training purposes.  Such a program would display a screen equivalent to 
the specified watchstander’s actual CIC console display and would prompt the user to 
participate in the simulated CIC team’s duties.  The ADC Simulation program would run 
in the background and in addition to handling the display for the watchstander, it would 
simulate the other watchstander agents’ actions and reports (voice and text) as well as 
coordinate the overall scenario events. 
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Figure 40.   Live Watchstanders Participating in Air-Defense Training Simulation. 
 
2. Second Phase Multi-Watchstander, Interlinked Training System 
Once the ADC Training Simulation mentioned above was completed, the next 
logical step in its development and deployment would be to implement the capability for 
multiple human watchstanders to train with the simulation program at the same time as 
part of a coordinated CIC watch team (see Figure 39).  Each watchstander would interact 
with a computing platform system that would display the CIC console associated with 
that particular watchstation while a central Multi-Watchstander ADC Training 
Simulation server program would autonomously (as configured by the training 
supervisor) control the scenario.  All of the watchstanders would be connected via 
headsets for communication and the simulation program would use voice cues to 
replicate voice reports from other ships.  Also, the simulation server would assume the 
role of watchstanders if a full team were not available. Similar to the Battle Force 
Tactical Trainer (BFTT) system discussed in Chapter Two, this training program would 
have a unique difference in that the simulation would be run by a system using a multi-
agent systems architecture that would generate dynamic, rich, and demanding events to 
challenge the watchstanders.  Additionally, the Multi-Watchstander ADC Training 
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Simulation would provide the training supervisors with an easier and much faster way to 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Air Defense Commander (ADC) Simulation is a top-view, dynamic, and 
graphics-driven software implementation of an AEGIS Cruiser Combat Information 
Center (CIC) team performing the Battle Group Air Defense Commander duties in the 
Arabian Gulf region.  The program simulates the mental processes, decision-making 
aspects, cognitive attributes, and communications of an eleven-member CIC air defense 
team performing their duties under stressful conditions facilitated by the requirement to 
maintain an overall situational awareness of the battle group’s airspace.  The ADC 
Simulation was developed to assist air-defense trainers in gaining understanding and 
insight into the degree to which CIC watchstander skill, experience, fatigue, type of 
decision-maker, and various other environmental attributes influence the performance of 
the individual as well as the collective watch team.  Developed in the Java language, the 
CIC watchstanders were implemented using multi-agent systems (MAS) technology, 
which provided a robust architecture to closely simulate the human participants.  The 
program offers a significant level of flexibility and options for the user including the 
capabilities to configure almost every attribute variable in the simulation (watchstander 
attribute levels, environment settings, etc.), record all of the events within a scenario for 
later review and analysis, examine performance metrics of the simulated watchstanders, 
and interact and modify ongoing scenarios. 
The development of the ADC Simulation has demonstrated the potential 
usefulness of such programs to the United States Navy and other services in several 
ways.  First, air-defense operations were successfully modeled and implemented into a 
software system that reasonably represented this vital warfare area while offering a 
unique, helpful, and new approach to evaluating such processes.   
Second, the successful production of the ADC Simulation serves as a proof-of-
concept to the capabilities and usefulness of these programs in service to the military to 
assist in training and planning.  Because it was developed using multi-agent system 
architecture, the ADC Simulation has the potential to be easily modified for use in 
157 
modeling other types of similar warfare operations performed by other naval 
communities and military services.   
Lastly, it showed that the knowledge and capability to design and develop such 
systems (as well as more sophisticated ones) resides at the Naval Postgraduate School 
Computer Science and MOVES Institute among the faculty and students.  The academic 
expertise combined with the military knowledge and initiative of the military 
officer/students provides the United States Navy and the Department of Defense with an 
extraordinary wealth of knowledge and talent to use in developing and implementing 
software training and support systems for the military.   
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APPENDIX A.  UCD PROCESS PHASE THREE DATA 
A. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN SKETCHES 
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APPENDIX B.  UCD PROCESS PHASE FIVE DATA 
A. ANALYSIS OF TASK DATA 
Listed below is a summary breakdown of the key data collected from the five 
subjects’ evaluations of each task they were requested to perform.  For each task, either 
the primary and secondary measurement values or two primary measurement values are 
provided.  In the case of the former set of measurement values, the primary value has the 
best case, worst case, and target level for the measurements included with the average 
value for that measurement.  For the latter set of measurement values, they both include 
the best cases, worst cases, and target levels for those measurements.  Following each 
summary table, are comment blocks for noteworthy errors and memorability/learnability 
issues that were encountered during the evaluations.  The best case, worst case, and target 
levels for number of errors and times to complete tasks were determined during the initial 
development of the task list. 
There are two sets of graphs associated with each task data table and are displayed in 
Section B.  The first set contains the averaged and individual responder task-times 
graphs, and the second set includes the averaged and individual responder number of 
errors committed per task graphs. 
Task #1:  Open Scenario Menu 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average Number of Errors 1.2 Errors 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Average Time to Complete Task 16.6 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  




Task #2:  Open Watchstander Attributes Menu 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete task:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 2 Seconds 
Target Level 5 Seconds 
Worst Case 10 Seconds 
Average Time to Complete Task 4.2 Seconds 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Average Number of Errors 0.2 Errors 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was noted that the average number of errors for this 
task dropped appreciably after the completion of Task #1.  This decrease in errors is 
believed to be from the subjects’ increase in familiarity of the main menu bar items.  
There was a corresponding decrease in the average time it took the subjects to perform 
the task, also.   
 
 
Task #3: Open CIC Equipment Setup Menu 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 2 Seconds 
Target Level 5 Seconds 
Worst Case 10 Seconds 
Average  2.8 Seconds 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Average 0 Errors 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was noted that the average number of errors for this 
task dropped appreciably after the completion of Task #1.  This decrease in errors is 
believed to be from the subjects’ increase in familiarity of the main menu bar items.  
There was a corresponding decrease in the average time it took the subjects to perform 






Task #4: Open Scenario Doctrine Setup Menu 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average  0.4 Errors 
 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Average 3.2 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was noted that the average number of errors for this 
task dropped appreciably after the completion of Task #1.  This decrease in errors is 
believed to be from the subjects’ increase in familiarity of the main menu bar items.  
There was a corresponding decrease in the average time it took the subjects to perform 
the task, also.   
 
 
Task #5: Open Scenario External Attributes Menu 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Best Case 10 Seconds 
Target Level 5 Seconds 
Worst Case 2 Seconds 
Average  2.6 Seconds 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Average 0.2 Errors 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability / Learnability Issues:  It was noted that the average number of errors for 
this task dropped appreciably after the completion of Task #1.  This decrease in errors is 
believed to be from the subjects’ increase in familiarity of the main menu bar items.  
There was a corresponding decrease in the average time it took the subjects to perform 
the task, also.   
 
 




Task #6:  Open Simulation Logs Menu 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average  0 Errors 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Average 2.4 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was noted that the average number of errors for this 
task dropped appreciably after the completion of Task #1.  This decrease in errors is 
believed to be from the subjects’ increase in familiarity of the main menu bar items.  
There was a corresponding decrease in the average time it took the subjects to perform 
the task, also.   
 
 
Task #7: Change the Maximum time it takes a Watchstander to Complete a Task 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  3 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value #1:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 3 Errors 
Average  0.6 Errors 
 
Primary Measurement Value #2:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 20 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average 8.4 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  The only noteworthy error was that several subjects committed was to 
first search the “Watchstander Attributes” Menu before realizing the “Watchstander 
Tasks & Skills” Menu was where the task could be correctly completed.  This was due to 
the initial confusion of the purposes and contents for each of the menus. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  The overwhelming cause of the errors according to 
the subjects was due to the similarity in names for both of the menus.  After the 
evaluation, several of the subjects made recommendations to eliminate the confusion 
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caused by the menus’ names.  These recommendations can be found in  Chapter III, 
Section F-7 - Recommendations . 
 
 
Task #8: Select a Contact to Display Data in the Contact Data Display Window 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average  4 Seconds 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Average 0 Errors 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  N/A 
 
 
Task #9: Select the F-TAO Watchstander to Display Data in the Agent Attributes 
Window  
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 4 Errors 
Average  1.2 Errors 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Average 12.6 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  There was a slight rise in the average number of errors between this 
task and Task #8, which was similar in nature.  There was a more significant increase in 
the average time to complete the task measurement.  The increase in time was considered 
to be due to the subjects searching the “Watchstander Attributes” menu initially instead 
of immediately selecting the F-TAO icon in the CIC Agent Display. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was expected that there would be an improvement 
in both measurement values for this task because it was similar in nature to the 
performance of Task #8, but for the reason sited above, this did not occur.  
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Task #10: Open a Contact’s Pop-up Options Window 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete: 1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 2 Errors 
Worst Case 5 Errors 
Average  4 Errors 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Average 49.6 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  Two of the subjects produced a significant number of errors during the 
performance of this task, which affected the length of take time required for them to 
complete the task.  The overwhelming cause of the errors for those subjects resulted from 
their lack of recognition that a “right mouse click” on the contact would make the pop-up 
options window appear (just like a file icon in windows).  Because of this situation, the 
subjects searched through several menus to no avail until they returned to the icon and 
discovered the correct action to perform. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  The initial goal for this task was to show that the 
subjects would translate their familiarity with M.S. Windows’ operations to the 
performance of tasks in the ADC Simulation.  This familiarity would allow for a smooth 
transition to usage of the program with little difficulties for the subjects.  Although some 
of the subjects realized the similarity between Windows and the Simulation and 
consequently, performed adequately, the other two subjects had significant trouble. 
 
 
Task #11: Open F-TAO Pop-up Options Window 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 10 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average  6.4 Seconds 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Average 1.2 Errors 
 
Error Comments:  For this task, only one of the subjects had difficulty with its 




Memorability/Learnability Issues:  Due to the similarity of this task to Task #10, it was 
expected that task completion times and the number of errors committed would decrease 
significantly.  With the exception of the one subject, this expected performance 
materialized, and there was a substantial decrease in errors and task completion times.  
With respect to the subject who encountered some difficulties, this subject’s performance 
increased adequately in comparison to his performance on Task #10. 
 
 
Task #12: Increase the Time Compression of the Simulation 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value #1:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average  1.8 Errors 
 
Primary Measurement Value #2:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average 27.4 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  For this task, only one of the subjects had difficulty with its 
completion.  The other four subjects all performed the task with zero errors and 
significantly lower task completion time (three achieved two seconds, one completed in 
eleven seconds).  The subject who encountered difficulty did not realize that the 
“Increase Time Compression” button was located on the GUI in the “Shortcut Control 
Button Display” and instead searched through the menus. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  N/A 
 
Task #13: Pause the Simulation 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value #1:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 






Primary Measurement Value #2:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average 2.8 Seconds 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  After the performance of Task #12, it was expected 
that the subjects’ performance on this task should improve significantly due to the 
familiarity with the “Shortcut Control Button Display.”  This improvement did occur. 
 
 
Task #14: Pause the Simulation (2nd Way) 
 
Usability Attribute:  Initial Performance 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  2 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value #1:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average  1 Error 
 
Primary Measurement Value #2:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average 11.6 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  There was an expected increase in the number of errors and the 
average task completion time because the subjects had to determine where to find the 
second place where the simulation could be paused. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  After the evaluation, most of the subjects stated that 
they searched the “File” menu first because it seemed to be the logical place to find it.  
(This was a correct deduction). 
 
 
Task #15: Set the Situation Assessment Skill Level to Expert for the Force TAO  
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability  
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  4 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average  49.2 Seconds 
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Secondary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Average 3 Errors 
 
Error Comments:  The largest number of errors during the completion of the task 
occurred for two reasons.  The first reason was that some subjects initially opened the 
“Watchstander Skills & Attributes” menu to complete the task.  The second reason for 
the high task completion times and average number of errors was because some of the 
subjects tried to select the F-TAO icon in the CIC Agent Display and use the pop-up 
options window to complete the task.   
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  During the subjects’ evaluations, it was noted that a 
significant number of them attempted to complete the task by opening up the pop-up 
options window on the F-TAO icon.  This indicated that the subjects expected to be able 
to manipulate all of the watchstander attributes found in the “Watchstander Attributes” 
menu via the “CIC Agent Display” icons, also.  Several subjects communicated these 
recommendations, which are discussed in Chapter III, Section F-7 - Recommendations. 
 
 
Task #16: Set the Fatigue Level to Exhausted for the RSC 
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  4 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average  0.4 Errors 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Average 10.6 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was expected that the average number of errors and 
the average task completion times should decrease significantly due to the similarity of 
this task to Task #15.  These expectations were realized. 
 
 
Task #17: Set the SPY-1B Radar Equipment Readiness Level to Non-Operational 
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 





Primary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average  0 Errors 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Average 7.4 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was expected that the average number of errors and 
the average task completion times should decrease significantly due to the similarity of 
this task to Task #15.  These expectations were realized. 
 
 
Task #18: Set the ADC Doctrine Query Range to 30 NM & Warning Ranges to 
20NM 
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  2 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average  4.4 Seconds 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Average 0 Errors 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was expected that the average number of errors and 
the average task completion times should decrease significantly due to the similarity of 
this task to Task #15.  These expectations were realized. 
 
 
Task #19: Set the Scenario Threat Level to Red 
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  3 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average  10.6 Seconds 
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Secondary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Average 0 Errors 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was expected that the average number of errors and 
the average task completion times should decrease significantly due to the similarity of 
this task to Task #15.  These expectations were realized. 
 
 
Task #20: Open the Scenario Event Log 
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  2 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average  0 Errors 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Average 5 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  N/A 
 
 
Task #21: Open the SLQ-32 System Status Log 
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  3 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average  16.4 Seconds 
 
Secondary Measurement Value:  Number of Errors 
Average 1.8 Errors 
 
Error Comments:  There was an unexpected rise in the average number of errors and task 
completion times, which was attributed to some confusion among three of subjects during 
the performance of the task.  Upon determining the task involved the SLQ-32 (piece of 
CIC equipment), these subjects first searched the “CIC Equipment Setup” menu for the 
appropriate menu item instead of the “Simulation Logs” menu. 
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Memorability/Learnability Issues:  Although two of the subjects realized that the 
“Simulation Logs” menu was the appropriate menu (since it contained the term ‘Logs” in 
the name), the other subjects could not capitalize on this familiarity due their association 
of the type of log (SLQ-32) with the “CIC Equipment Setup” menu. 
 
 
Task #22: Set the Performance Probabilities Watchstander Fatigue Levels to 0.5, 
0.7, 0.9 (L to R) 
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  3 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value #1:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 






Primary Measurement Value #2:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average 13.6 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was expected that the average number of errors and 
the average task completion times should decrease significantly due to the similarity of 
this task to Task #7 and the familiarity with the menu items located in the “Watchstander 
Tasks & Skills” menu.  These expectations were realized. 
 
 
Task #23: Change the Maximum Time for the F-TAO Watchstander to Complete a 
Task 
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  2 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value #1:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average  0.6 Errors 
 
Primary Measurement Value #2:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average 14.4 Seconds 
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Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was expected that the average number of errors and 
the average task completion times should decrease significantly due to the similarity of 
these tasks to Tasks #7 & #22 and the familiarity with the menu items located in the 
“Watchstander Tasks & Skills” menu.  These expectations were realized. 
 
 
Task #24: Change the Speed of the Hostile Air Contact to 500 KTS 
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  1 click 
 
Primary Measurement Value #1:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 
Average  2.4 Errors 
 
Primary Measurement Value #2:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average 29 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  It was expected that the average number of errors and average task 
completion time would decrease due to the similarity of this task to Task #10 and the 
familiarity of the contact pop-up options menu items, but this was not the case.  Several 
of the subjects initially searched the menus or attempted to select the contact (left mouse 
click) to modify the attributes displayed in the “Contact Data Display.” 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  After Task #10, some of the subjects still did not 




Task #25: Change the F-AAWC Experience Attribute to Expert  
 
Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  4 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value #1:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 0 Errors 
Target Level 1 Error 
Worst Case 2 Errors 




Primary Measurement Value #2:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
14.4 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average 
 
Error Comments:  The largest cause of errors was due to several of the subjects initially 
searching the “Watchstander Tasks & Skills” menu instead of the “Watchstander 
Attributes” menu. 
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was expected that the average number of errors and 
the average task completion times should decrease significantly due to the similarity of 
this task to Tasks #15 & #16 and the familiarity with the menu items located in the 
“Watchstander Attributes” menu.  These expectations were generally realized. 
 





Usability Attribute:  Learnability 
Number of mouse clicks to complete:  4 clicks 
 
Primary Measurement Value #1:  Number of Errors 
Best Case 
Target Level 1 Error 
2 Errors 
Average  0.2 Errors 
Worst Case 
 
Primary Measurement Value #2:  Time to Complete Task 
Best Case 5 Seconds 
Target Level 15 Seconds 
Worst Case 30 Seconds 
Average 6.4 Seconds 
 
Error Comments:  No noteworthy errors. 
  
Memorability/Learnability Issues:  It was expected that the average number of errors and 
the average task completion times should decrease significantly due to the similarity of 
this task to Task #17 and the familiarity with the menu items located in the “CIC 












B. SIMULATION EVALUATIONS 
1. Evaluation Charts (Number of Errors and Task Completion Times) 
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Errors During Performance of Tasks
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Figure 47.   Errors During Performance of Tasks. 
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Figure 49.   Errors During Performance of Tasks. 
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Table 50.   Errors During Performance of Tasks. 
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Errors During Performance of Tasks
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Figure 52.   Errors During Performance of Tasks. 
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Figure 54.   Total Time to Complete Tasks. 
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Figure 56.   Total Time to Complete Tasks. 
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Figure 58.   Total Time to Complete Tasks.  
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C. SIMULATION EVALUATION SURVEYS 
1. Evaluation Survey Charts (Average and Raw Data) 
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Figure 62.   Survey Scores. 
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Figure 63.   Overall Display Layout Survey Averages. 
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Figure 65.   Menu Location and Wording Survey Averages. 
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Figure 66.   Survey Scores. 
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Figure 67.   Task Completion Survey Averages. 
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Figure 68.   Survey Scores. 
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APPENDIX C.  SIMULATION EVALUATION RESULTS AND AIR-
DEFENSE EXPERT SURVEY RESULTS 
A. ADC SIMULATION EVALUATION RESULTS  
1. Evaluation Results for the RSC Watchstander Agent 
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Figure 69.   RSC Averaged Times-Radar Operations Skill Level. 
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Figure 70.   RSC Averaged Errors-Radar Operations Skill Levels. 
 










Number of Attempted CIC Classifications
W/s Skill Level
 
Figure 71.   RSC Averaged Number Attempted CIC Classifications, Radar Operations 
Skill Level. 
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Figure 72.   RSC Averaged Times-Experience Level. 
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Figure 73.   RSC Averaged Number Attempted CIC Classifications-Experience Level. 
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Figure 74.   RSC Averaged Times-Fatigue Level. 
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Figure 75.   RSC Averaged Errors-Fatigue Levels. 
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Figure 76.   RSC Averaged Number Attempted CIC Classifications-Fatigue Level. 
 
































Figure 77.   RSC Averaged Times-SPY-1B Radar Readiness Level. 
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Figure 78.   RSC Averaged Errors-SPY-1B Radar Readiness Levels. 
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Figure 79.   RSC Averaged Number Attempted CIC Classifications-SPY-1B Radar 
Readiness Level. 
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2. Evaluation Results for the EWCO Watchstander Agent 
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Figure 80.   EWCO Averaged Times-ES Analysis Skill. 
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Figure 81.   EWCO Averaged Errors-ES Analysis Skill. 
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Figure 82.   EWCO Averaged Number Attempted CIC Classifications-ES Analysis 
Skill. 
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Figure 83.   EWCO Averaged Times-Experience Level. 
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Figure 84.   EWCO Averaged Errors-Experience Level. 
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Figure 85.   EWCO Averaged Number Attempted CIC Classifications-Experience 
Level. 
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Figure 86.   EWCO Averaged Times-Fatigue Levels. 
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Figure 87.   EWCO Averaged Errors-Fatigue Levels. 
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Figure 88.   EWCO Averaged Number Attempted CIC Classifications-Fatigue Level. 
 
































Figure 89.   EWCO Averaged Times-SLQ-32 System Readiness Levels. 
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Figure 90.   EWCO Averaged Errors-SQL-32 System Readiness Levels. 
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Figure 91.   EWCO Averaged Number Attempted Classifications-SLQ-32 System 
Readiness Level. 
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3. Evaluation Results for the Force TAO Watchstander Agent 
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Figure 92.   Force TAO Averaged Times-Situational Awareness Skill Level. 
 




























Figure 93.   Force TAO Averaged Classifications Errors (Percentage)-Situation 
Assessment Skill Level. 
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Figure 94.   Force TAO Averaged Times-Experience Levels. 
 




























Figure 95.   Force TAO Averaged Classification Errors (Percentage) – Experience 
Level. 
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Figure 96.   Force TAO Averaged Times – Fatigue Levels. 
 






























Figure 97.   Force TAO Averaged Classification Errors (Percentage) – Fatigue Levels. 
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Figure 98.   Force TAO Averaged Times-Decision-Make Type. 
 






























Figure 99.   Force TAO Averaged Classification Errors (Percentage) – Decision-
Maker Type. 
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4. Evaluation Results for the CIC Team Comparison Trials 
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Figure 100.   CIC Team Profile Trials Averaged Times. 
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Figure 101.   CIC Team Profile Trials Averaged # of Classification Errors (Percentage). 
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Figure 102.   CIC Team Profile Trials Averaged # of Attempted Classifications. 
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5. Evaluation Results for the SCENARIO WEATHER Trials 













































Figure 103.   Scenario Weather Trials Averaged Times. 












Figure 104.   Scenario Weather Trials Averaged # of Classification Errors (Percentage). 
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Figure 105.   Scenario Weather Trials Averaged # of Attempted CIC Classifications. 
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B. AIR-DEFENSE EXPERT SURVEYS OF ADC SIMULATION 
PERFORMANCE 
1. Individual and Averaged Survey Results for the RSC Watchstander 
Questions 
A.  Respondent Survey Results For RSC Simulation Questions
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Skill/Exper.
Contrary Experiences Question











Figure 106.   Respondent Survey Results for RSC Simulation Questions. 
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Figure 107.   Averaged Survey Results for RSC Simulation Questions. 
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2. Individual and Averaged Survey Results for the EWCO 
Watchstander Questions 
B.  Respondent Survey Results For EWCO Simulation Questions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.  EWCO Skill Modification Question
Contrary Experiences Question
2.  EWCO Experience Modification Question
Contrary Experiences Question
3.  EWCO Fatigue Modification Question
Contrary Experiences Question
4.  EWCO SLQ-32 System Modification
Question
Contrary Experiences Question
5.  CIC Team Performance wrt.EWCO
Skill/Experience











Figure 108.   Respondent Survey Results for EWCO Simulation Questions. 
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Figure 109.   Averaged Survey Results for EWCO Simulation Questions. 
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3. Individual and Averaged Survey Results for the Force TAO 
Watchstander Questions 
C.  Respondent Survey Results For Force TAO Simulation Questions
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.  FTAO Skill Modification Question
Contrary Experiences Question
2.  FTAO Experience Modification
Question
Contrary Experiences Question
3.  FTAO Fatigue Modificaiton Question
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4.  FTAO Decision-maker Type Question
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Performance
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Decision-maker Type
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Figure 110.   Respondent Survey Results for Force TAO Simulation Questions. 
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4. Individual and Averaged Survey Results for CIC Team Questions 
 
D.  Respondent Survey Results For CIC Team Simulation Questions







2.  F-TAO Basic/Well-















Figure 112.   Respondent Survey Results for CIC Team Simulation Questions. 
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Figure 113.   Averaged Survey Results for CIC Team Simulation Questions. 
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